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If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent
If the unheard, unspoken
Word is unspoken, unheard;
Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard,
The Word without a word, the Word within
The world and for the world;
And the light shone in the darkness and
Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled
About the centre of the silent Word.
-T. S. Eliot, Ash Wednesday
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Introduction
This Loquacious Soil: Language and Religious Experience in Early America
They one and all embarked for the wilderness of America, where they might enjoy,
unmolested, the inestimable luxury of talking. No sooner did they land on this loquacious
soil, than, as if they had caught the disease from the climate, they all lifted up their voices
at once, and for the space of one whole year did keep up such a joyful clamour, that we
are told they frightened every bird and beast out of the neighbourhood.
-Washington Irving, The History of New York
The first American colonists so demanded the luxury of talking, Irving imagined,
that they crossed the ocean to find it: English religious dissenters desired freedom of
conscience, which soon became liberty of speech because ―they possessed that ingenuous
habit of mind which always thinks aloud, and is for ever galloping into other people‘s
ears.‖1 I take seriously Irving‘s joke that America has its roots, at least in part, in the
desire to talk. But, as he quips, this inclination to loquacity also implies ―the right of
talking without ideas and without information,‖ which makes the tongue a weapon to
tyrannize, silence, and indoctrinate the powerless or disagreeable members of society.2
The powerful tongue always stands on the brink of manipulation.
In Irving‘s narrative, the English dissenters‘ talkative nature necessarily resulted
in the clergy adopting ―the usual methods‖ of reclaiming the people‘s ears. Yet their
―invincible spirit of independence‖ could not be subdued, and they embarked for a soil
that seemed more naturally suited to their loquacity.3 The colonial clergy were no less
interested in reclaiming ears, and they felt there were many obstinate ears. Preacher
Solomon Stoddard‘s (1643-1729) thunderous hell-fire sermons are one example echoing
Irving‘s depiction of the American colonists as unbounded speakers. His sermons,
1

preached almost a century after the first loquacious colonists arrived, were explicitly
aimed at recapturing ears, and through them, souls, with loud, uncontainable words. But
like Irving‘s depiction of the tyrannous tongue, Stoddard‘s sermons always stood the risk
of manipulating or drawing attention to their own loquacity rather than authentically
transforming the soul. Stoddard, thus, poses the central problem of my dissertation: the
text initiates but threatens the authenticity of religious experience.
The sermon and the Bible were meant to give the hearer or reader access to God,
but the text could easily manipulate or disrupt an immediate experience of the divine. The
theologies of Stoddard, his grandson Jonathan Edwards, their Puritan predecessors, and
the Puritan‘s heretical contemporaries were all defined by this tension between religious
experience and the sermonic and biblical texts. Thus, Stoddard strove to make the sermon
a genre of experiential transference; the sermon conveyed an experience of God, rather
than an argument aimed at persuasion, but it also rhetorically structured the laity‘s
religious experience. The hearer was meant to sense his or her experience as authentic
and individual, despite the sermon‘s work of making all religious experiences fit within
pre-defined boundaries of a universal spiritual truth.
Stoddard‘s 1705 sermon, The Danger of Speedy Degeneracy, issues a warning we
expect from hell-fire preaching: ―God will surely judge you, if you corrupt your selves.‖
In order to make his congregation realize the fear of this as yet abstract threat, Stoddard
rhetorically personalizes God‘s judgment. He explains how God will judge the corrupt:
you may never recover, the world will reproach you, and you will perish. Under this last
head Stoddard reinforces his argument with repetition: ―multitudes of you will perish.
2

Multitudes when they dye will go to Hell; when Parents dye, and Husbands dye, and
Wives dye, and Children dye, they will generally go to Hell; after all miseries here they
will have Eternal misery […] and then the Children of the Kingdom are cast into outer
darkness.‖4 Though Stoddard shifts from the second person to the third, he catalogues
types that particularize the abstraction of God‘s judgment: God will judge parents,
husbands, children. He ends his sermon with a repetition of ―children‖ as a generalization
that exposes the anxiety in every listener‘s mind: even those who assume themselves to
be children of the kingdom may be cast into darkness. As Stoddard walks away from the
pulpit, his words echo in the darkness of the listener‘s soul: ―I am cast into outer
darkness.‖
This scene, typical of New English meetinghouses throughout the seventeenthand early eighteenth-century, highlights the experience of sermon-listening. The minister
needed to make the listener feel the fear of being cast into the darkness of hell. Although
Stoddard promoted the role of education and intellectual application in religion, his
emphasis on experience made him skeptical of those who relied too heavily on texts in
their faith. During the revivals in Northampton, Massachusetts in the 1710s, he warned
young preachers that ―Whatever Books men have read, there is […] need of experimental
knowledge in a Minister; many particular things will occur that he will not meet withal in
Books; it is a great calamity to wounded Consciences to be under the direction of an
unexperienced Minister.‖5 Ministers relying on texts alone would become blind guides,
he argued. That Stoddard prefaces his sermon on ―how to Guide souls through the work
of conversion‖ with a warning against the elevation of the text suggests his awareness of
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the always potential gap between text and experience. Texts act as messy mediators in an
ostensibly unmediated religious experience, texts elevate reason over experience, and
texts can never fully convey the full experience of grace. Stoddard argued that every
minister had a responsibility to attend to these gaps and miscarriages, always appealing to
experience as the true guide to Christ.
Stoddard‘s concern that the text would disrupt experience characterized much of
Reformed religion in early America. The sermon risked functioning like the books that
created blind guides—as textual obstacles to experienced religion. Because experience
was the guide to Christ, as Stoddard argued, the sermon had to become a conduit for the
lay person‘s experience, not simply another text mediating between God and listener. But
for Stoddard the sermon had urgent work: ―Many Men are in a fast Sleep, and whispering
will not awaken them; the threatening of God had need ring in their Ears; they are so
atheistical and devoted to the World, that it is well if Thunder & Lightning will scare
them; they are so hardened, that talking moderately to them, as Eli did to his Sons, makes
no impression on them, than on the Seats of the Meeting house.‖6 Sitting in the meeting
house, the best listeners urgently scribbled notes, hung on Stoddard‘s every ringing word,
and experienced the dark fear of being cast into hell. But how did Stoddard‘s thunderous
words not become one more mediating obstacle between God and the hearer‘s experience
of God? The answer lies in Stoddard‘s theory of sermonic rhetoric; speech was the site in
which the tension could be reconciled, or at least addressed; language registered the gap
between text and experience.

4

This fissure was essentially epistemological. For Stoddard, the minister‘s firsthand experience of grace meant that ―Christ will be so present with the Gospel-Ministry,
that His visible Kingdom shall be upheld.‖7 Stoddard‘s conception of the visible kingdom
relies on the distinction between the visible and invisible church, which also guided his
Puritan forerunners. While only God knows who is truly among the elect, they all argued,
the church must have some way, however uncertain, of determining who is a member of
the church. Earlier Puritan theologians argued that there was always a discrepancy
between the visible and invisible church, and Stoddard angered his contemporaries by
arguing that, because regeneracy was not certainly visible, it was lawful for the
unregenerate to participate in acts of worship like communion. It did not follow, he
argued, that each individual was truly regenerate. Stoddard and the seventeenth-century
Puritans believed that there was always a fissure between the seen, material world and the
invisible, spiritual world. They did not mean that the visible was at variance with the
invisible, but rather that the visible world was constituted by signs of the immaterial that
were always potentially illegible. Sermons were such signs. A successful ―GospelMinistry‖ would make visible what was otherwise inaccessible: religious experience
became sensory—heard, seen, felt.
The language of the sermon managed the gap between visible and invisible,
making legible the material signs of the divine. A rhetorical register was necessary for
connecting and testing the relationship between experience, its outward or material
manifestations, and the religious texts that initiated the experience. But the sermon was
not the only form of speech to address this epistemological problem. There were various
5

models of the register at work within early American religion. Within New English
Puritanism, the plain style sermon became the means for camouflaging the distance
between experience and text. Within heterodox religious groups in New England,
language was not the means for closing a gap but instead registered the narrowing gap
between God and human listeners. Spontaneous, prophetic language was the
manifestation of immediate revelation for the Quakers and Antinomians. For the
translators working among Native Americans, the act of translating the Bible or of
creating a written language exposed the discontinuity between text and experience. And
Jonathan Edwards, during the Great Awakening, redefined the nature of language as a
material manifestation of divine realities in order to suture text and experience. The act of
writing, for example, became a spiritual and experiential act for Edwards.
These varied responses to the same gap between text and experience constitute an
epistemological crisis in early American religion. As Lisa Gordis has argued,
seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay colony ―faced a crisis in literary theory.‖8 In an
effort to guide the laity‘s response to the sermon but also to give them ownership over
their own religious experiences, Puritan preachers made themselves theoretically
transparent in the pulpit. Teresa Toulouse identified this phenomenon in 1987, but Gordis
extends it to argue that as such, ministers were ―treating preaching as a fuller form of
reading,‖ and a crisis in interpretive strategies emerged from the hermeneutic work in the
pulpit.9 I share Gordis‘s insistence that early American texts spoke not only to the issues
at hand—an explication of a biblical passage, a jeremiadic warning against church
declension, or a pamphlet war over toleration—but theorized the interpretive strategies
6

that transcended individual debates or sermons. But I also see the interpretive crisis she
identifies extending beyond the pulpit, beyond the biblical text, beyond Puritanism, and
into theories of language.
While originating in an immaterial experience of the invisible world, early
American religious experience had a material life in visible signs, in biblical types, and in
material texts, which imagined language as rooted in the material world. With this central
similarity, early Americans generated various epistemologies of language that addressed
the relationship between the visible and invisible: Jonathan Edwards saw language as
human construct, derived from Lockean empirical knowledge of the natural world;
seventeenth-century Quaker language theories advocated, not a transcendence of
language, but a redemption of natural language; and Native American language was
thought to grow out of the unique American landscape. My dissertation describes the
ways that religious language was believed to have material agency and uncovers a range
of epistemologies of religious experience that erased easy boundaries between the visible
and invisible worlds. Some scholars have demonstrated that early American uses of
speech and interpretive strategies were profoundly theological and sophisticatedly
theoretical, yet here I explore the relationship between textuality and spiritual experience
as generating innovative uses of rhetoric and theories of language.10
The tension between text and experience I identify in early American religion
builds on and diverges from a long history of early American scholarship that has focused
on two things essential to New England Puritanism. The first, the doctrine of sola
scriptura, ―scripture alone,‖ was a reaction to Catholicism‘s mediator priests and its
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laity‘s lack of access to the biblical text. In my reading of early American texts, however,
experience is emphasized alongside sola scriptura, and experience is often imagined as
the evidence of biblical truths. I turn most often to theories of spoken language because
the ontological instability of oral language made it a more promising and problematic site
for attempting to express divine things. Ann Kibbey has argued that ―the crucial
importance of speaking in conversion shows that Puritans believed written texts were in
some way fundamentally dependent for their intelligibility on their incorporation into
speech, that sound—however transitory and precarious—was essential.‖11 Kibbey‘s
argument overturns assumptions about the primacy of the written text, and it implies a
challenge to sola scriptura. I do not mean to suggest that the Puritans did not, in fact,
believe in the doctrine of sola scriptura, but the practice of living doctrine surmounted
belief.12 And spoken language was always part of the practice of grace.
The second critical focus that underlies my argument is the relationship between
doctrine and experience. Perry Miller first characterized seventeenth-century Puritanism
as struggling between experience and ideology, and Sacvan Bercovitch revised Miller to
argue that ideology functioned as the explanation for experience.13 By ―ideology,‖ Miller
and Bercovitch mean something akin to doctrine, but their definitions extend to include
basic beliefs about identity, epistemology, politics, etc., all of which, they argue, are
captured in doctrine. I, however, see a distinction between doctrine and some ideological
assumptions within early American Puritanism. While Bercovitch points to a gap
between text and experience, he elides the distinction between text and ideology by
arguing that texts were ideology.14 I argue, instead, that the content of a text was not the
8

only thing that seemed disconnected from experience; the way a text was thought to
function in faith was itself cut off from experience and doctrine. Text inculcated faith,
spurred on conversion—but that was in stark contrast to the doctrine that held that the
Spirit, not the text, enacted the work of conversion. A convert was brought to grace
partially through texts, but he or she felt, and was meant to feel, that experience as the
work of God, not the minister or text. Doctrine and ideology were in conflict about the
role of the text.
By expanding critical attention beyond New England Puritanism, scholars of the
last two decades have challenged the historiographic trend that dichotomizes experience
and ideology, but for these scholars the opacity of experience as a category necessitates
its rhetorical validation.15 This more recent work suggests that there is still a critical
tendency to separate experience and ideology in a way early Americans never imagined. I
argue that an emphasis on experience in religion was explicit in early American doctrine
and ideology. The rhetorical forms and linguistic theories emerging in early America
were less about validating experience and were instead addressing a fundamentally
epistemological problem. Rhetoric was not a means of justifying experience; it
simultaneously acknowledged and worked to narrow the distance between experience and
language, which was always just slightly incapable of describing experience.
In revising the role of sola scriptura in religious experience I turn to the oral, but
in thinking through the relationship between ideology and experience I consider both the
oral and the written. Of course, all of the sources at my disposal are written, though some
are written translations of oral texts. Most recent early Americanists working with oral
9

genres address the problem of access to oral historical events. Sandra Gustafson, in
Eloquence is Power, writes that ―Even at the moment of the performance, the gap
between what the orator intended and what different members of the audience heard, saw,
and understood produced an unavoidable indeterminacy.‖16 Gustafson argues that this is
one of the ―problems with sources‖ in any study of what she calls ―radically contextoriented art,‖ but I see this as a problem of which early Americans were profoundly
aware.17 Therefore, I address theories of both spoken and written language, working to
understand how different kinds of early Americans—Puritan ministers, heretical
laypeople, religious minorities, translators, diarists, and religious philosophers—
responded to the disparity between text (what is spoken or read) and experience (how that
thing is read or heard and the resulting religious feelings and beliefs).
In some sense, I follow Gustafson‘s lead when she argues that ―Recognizing the
flexible boundaries and considerable overlap between oral and textual forms, as well as
the persistence of oral genres, we must attend to the symbolic and performative meanings
attached to speech and writing.‖18 Like Gordis, Gustafson has urged us to revise our
assumptions about what early American texts did in the world and what broader theories
of interpretation, material textuality, and performance they suggested.19 I ask how the
symbolic meanings attached to speech and text structure broader linguistic philosophies
that attempt to account or compensate for the perceived gap between language (written
and spoken) and religious experience.
In all of the theories of language I trace here, one commonality stands out. Each
theory sought to close the distance between words and things, which implies that
10

contemporary thinkers considered religious experience to be more materially grounded
than we might assume. Rather than imagining spiritual experience as the strictly
transcendent, early Americans defined it as sensory. In this, they were infusing the
discourse of natural philosophy into their theology. The work of bringing word and thing
into a one-to-one correspondence was not limited to the theologies I examine here; it was
fundamental to seventeenth-century natural philosophy. It was so pervasive a concern
that when Jonathan Swift‘s Gulliver toured the ―grand Academy of Lagado‖ he
encountered the Laputian scientists‘ scheme for ―abolishing all Words whatsoever.‖
Swift mocks the natural philosopher‘s efforts to suture words to things:
For, it is plain, that every Word we speak is in some Degree the
Diminution of our Lungs by Corrosion; and consequently contributes to
the shortening of our Lives. An Expedient was therefore offered, that
since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for
all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the
particular Business they are to discourse on. […] Another great Advantage
proposed by this Invention, was, that it would serve as an universal
Language to be understood in all civilized Nations, whose Goods and
Utensils are generally of the same Kind, or nearly resembling, so that their
Uses might easily be comprehended.20
Swift‘s description of Laputian sages wandering the streets, bent in half by their sacks of
things is entertaining to be sure, but his parody echoes the actual arguments for a
universal language, or real character, put forth by some natural philosophers in the mid
11

and late seventeenth-century.21 The theories of language I treat here imagine the
problems of language in fundamentally theological terms, but early Americans, like
natural philosophers, proposed linguistic theories that assumed universal similarities in
how language works and the necessity of grounding words in things. The theories of
language I discover in early American religious texts work to give language the ability to
materially capture spiritual truths and experience and give it the agency to affect change
in souls.
Though British philosophy has long been the preferred object of study for those
interested in the rhetorical and linguistic theory of natural philosophy, the distinct
theology of New England generated sophisticated and influential rhetorical responses to
the epistemological problems British philosophers and language reform projects
addressed. New English clergy and lay people alike strove to accommodate their
theology to an empirical epistemology in which sensory experience was the source of
knowledge. Thus, they rooted their epistemology of the soul in experience; one‘s senses
perceiving and feeling God work on the soul replaced doctrinal knowledge as evidence of
sanctification. I argue that this experience was fundamentally experimental. By this, I
mean that first generation Puritan ministers advocated a reproducible and testable
experience. Though this is certainly distinct from scientific experiment, they did not
imagine it as such. For someone like Thomas Shepard, grace was something that worked
in essentially the same manner on every soul.
While natural philosophers like John Locke and Thomas Sprat thought
empiricism would combat the kind of religious enthusiasm they saw in religious
12

dissenters, early Americans adapted the empiricism of natural philosophy to their own
religious ends. Michael Hunter touches on this in Science and Society in Restoration
England when he argues that people reacted to sectarian conflict by ―seeking a fresh basis
for faith in consensus rather than illuminism, in rationalism rather than dogma […]
science could play a part through the humble pursuit of knowledge in God‘s works.‖22
But in my assessment, the New England Puritans did not see science just as a means of
overcoming sectarian conflict; their brand of empiricism was also a tool for overcoming
fallible human knowledge and accessing universal, divine truth. The Puritans were not
alone in this practice; heretics, sectarians, and eighteenth-century Congregationalist heirs
of Puritanism also saw empiricism as offering a new way of accessing God.
Thus, when Stoddard‘s advocates ―experimental knowledge‖ over book
knowledge he implies something more sensory than spiritual transcendence; he means to
import the discourse of empiricism into religion. A note on terminology is useful here.
Religious texts throughout the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries, often use
―experimental‖ interchangeably with ―experience‖ or ―experiential,‖ but all imply
something sensory, not just emotional.23 For example, William Penn calls all people to a
“Sensible and Experimental knowledge of God,‖ which he defines in Quakerism, A New
Nick-Name for Old Christianity (1672): ―Experience is Demonstration; and the World
without, and the Redemption I know within […] make up that Demonstration; which is
that Experience.‖24 Penn defines experience as demonstration derived from the natural
world and from his own internal, spiritual senses. His ―experimental,‖ then, is sensory
and empirical in the sense that it is formulated through observation of the natural world,
13

but experimental knowledge of faith always includes an internal, spiritual sensation. For
John Cotton ―experimental‖ naturally carries with it a definition of scientific certainty. In
A Practicall Commentary (1656) he writes that God‘s spirit, educating through
experience, offers the faithful a ―scientificall Instruction about certain experimentall
things.‖25 This is an obvious turn from the kind of experimental knowledge advocated by
natural philosophy: the unseen Spirit, not just natural observation, guides the senses. Yet
Cotton intends to borrow the discourse of empiricism.
Cotton and Penn are representative of the range of responses to the shifting
paradigms of knowledge and the epistemological gap between text and experience.
Beginning with the first generation of Puritan preachers who addressed these gaps and
shifts by infusing their sermons and sermonic philosophy with the discourse of
empiricism, and ending with Jonathan Edwards‘s philosophy of language‘s relationship
to the material world, I ask how the particularly loquacious early Americans dealt with
the epistemological questions circling around the Atlantic world.
Opening with the most important genre of religious experience in mid
seventeenth-century New England, the first chapter, ―Mediating Words,‖ argues that the
plain style sermon worked metaphorically, mediating between two elements (audience
and God) while camouflaging that mediation. I read the sermons and sermonic theories of
three of seventeenth-century New England‘s most influential ministers, John Cotton,
Thomas Hooker, and Thomas Shepard, to demonstrate how each compensated for his
own anxiety that language failed to participate in the core epistemological assumptions of
Puritanism. To close the distance between a minister‘s hermeneutical practice and a lay
14

experience of immediacy, the plain style sermon relied on metaphor, which spoke
particularly to individual lay listeners by arousing their senses. Reading the metaphor of
the plain style against Robert Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections, I argue that early
American ministers attempted to apply the language of empiricism to religion rhetorically
in order to facilitate and structure the laity‘s experience of grace.
―Monstrous Words,‖ the second chapter, offers a counterpoint to the first
chapter‘s exploration of the orthodox view of the sermon by arguing that the so-called
heretical speech of Anne Hutchinson and the Quakers was experienced as prophetic
speech emerging from an immediate encounter with the divine. Here I read Anne
Hutchinson‘s trial and several influential British and colonial Quaker texts on the ―pure
language‖ and the silent meeting to argue that immediate revelation, the central
theological claim of each, generated religious experience that removed (or at least
compensated for) the third terms of the sermon and the minister. Anne Hutchinson‘s
prophetic speech in her civil trial was a critique of her ministers‘ anxious rhetorical
performance and an adherence to an epistemology in which a mediating system of visible
signs was unnecessary for immediate religious experience. The Quaker silent meeting
also asserted the immediacy of individual religious experience. The silent meeting was
not a place of silence, despite its name, and I argue that it organically generated an
ordered hermeneutic for reading silence that resulted in the transformation of daily
speech. Rather than rhetorically imposing order on experience, like the plain style,
Hutchinson and the Quakers imagined language arising from religious experience.
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The third chapter, ―Metamorphizing Words,‖ demonstrates how linguistic
encounters with Native Americans transformed or challenged colonial assumptions about
language. John Eliot and Roger Williams recognized the limits of language to fully
capture experience or describe the divine, and they imagined Hebrew—their version of a
heavenly or universal language—as an ideal to which their own English could never
ascend. Native languages, though, seemed to mirror, or even be linguistically related to,
Hebrew; Eliot and Williams hoped native languages would be a bridge over the divide
between language and experience. But for Eliot, translation revealed the failure of
language to capture experience, and it multiplied the possibilities of misreading.
Williams, like Eliot, recognized the opacity of translation, but he saw this opacity as
productive of new mixtures that generated new knowledge. Most critics assume that Eliot
and Williams imagined translation as transparent, but I argue these translators worried
about what translation would efface—the original Hebrew Bible, for one, experience, for
another—ultimately revealing a gap between text and experience that was the landmark
anxiety of early American Puritanism.
The fourth and last chapter, ―The Material Word,‖ argues that Jonathan
Edwards generated a linguistic theory in which words were images of the divine. His
linguistic revision was a response to the disjunction between theology and experience he
witnessed in the Great Awakening and to the seeming inability of language to describe or
affect experience. Edwards‘s interpretation of John Locke led him to view language as a
human construct meant to communicate ideas within the speaker‘s mind. Merging this
with his own philosophy, Edwards created a distinct philosophy of language wherein
16

words were both a part of the natural world and a link between the material and the
divine. Through his sermons, case histories, and typology, Edwards generated an
empirical philosophy of language in which words operated as images of the divine, thus
bridging the divide between the material and the immaterial.
I argue that Edwards marks a turning point in early American theories of the
relationship between language and experience. Edwards‘s philosophy of language
ameliorated anxiety about the mediating influence of the text and the distance between
language and experience, but George Whitefield initiated the practice of preaching
without attending to these gaps and fissures. By way of conclusion, I examine
Whitefield‘s performative sermonic philosophy of the Great Awakening, developed in
the same moment Edwards was working out his linguistic philosophy of religious
experience. Edwards established the philosophy that made Whitefield‘s sermonic practice
possible, but Edwards‘s sermons lacked the performative spectacle of Whitefield‘s
preaching. Whitefield‘s conspicuously affective performances in the pulpit register the
emergence of a distinctly modern conception of the relationship between language and
experience. His emphasis on performance over the words themselves expressed a belief
that language unproblematically modeled, reflected, and generated experience in what
would become a lasting feature of American evangelicalism.
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Chapter 1
Mediating Words: The Plain Style Sermon
I.

Occasional Reflections

In a 1779 letter to the Abbe Morellet, Benjamin Franklin included his meditation on
wine:
To confirm still more your piety and gratitude to Divine Providence,
reflect upon the situation which it has given to the elbow. You see in
animals, who are intended to drink the waters that flow upon the earth,
that if they have long legs, they also have a long neck, so that they can get
at their drink without kneeling down. But man, who was destined to drink
wine, must be able to raise the glass to his mouth. […] Let us, then, with
glass in hand, adore this benevolent wisdom;—let us adore and drink!1
Franklin caricatures the epistemology of the seventeenth-century occasional reflection or
meditation and demonstrates the illogical lengths to which meditations on the natural
world can be taken if they presuppose the lesson of the observation. The genre of
occasional meditations assumes that piety requires reflection upon the natural world, and
then it observes the world as it reasons toward a moral truth.2 In Franklin‘s meditation, he
follows this logic: his observations on the elbow lead to the moral truth ―adore and
drink.‖ But Franklin‘s meditation, unlike the seventeenth-century religious and moral
practice, explicitly presumes that wine holds forth truth before observing the animals
drinking. ―In wine,‖ Franklin writes as an introduction to his meditation, ―there is truth.‖
While Franklin satirizes argument from design, the occasional meditation observes the
natural world leading to new knowledge rather than confirming previous assumptions, yet
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Franklin‘s parody does turn on the occasional meditation‘s central epistemological belief
that the material world provides access to knowledge of the unseen.
Robert Boyle, whose Occasional Reflections (1665) catalogues meditations on
various ―objects‖ and ―accidents,‖ or occurrences, is clear about the epistemological
value of reflecting on the material world. For Boyle, the soil sermonized. Meditation on
natural phenomena will ―make the World vocal,‖ he wrote, and will make ―the very
Flowers of [a man‘s] Garden, read him Lectures of Ethicks or Divinity.‖3 While Boyle
admits that the image of the immaterial in the material is hazy, his meditations
demonstrate an epistemology in which empirical access to the natural world generates
knowledge of what cannot be seen. In Boyle‘s meditation ―upon the sight of ones
Shadow cast upon the face of a River‖ he considers that the ―World may without much
extravagance be tearmed the Shadow‖ of its divine author, but he adds that this shadow is
―very superficial and obscure.‖4 Occasional Reflections posits the material world as full
of signs of moral truths, but those signs are always shadowy; objects and occasions are
not literal manifestations of immaterial realities. Thus, this way of reading the world
presents an epistemological dilemma. Moral or spiritual truths are not immediately
accessible or perfectly legible. One could, for example, easily read the elbow as evidence
for divine endorsement of inebriation. By reading the material world for empirical
evidence of an a priori assumption, Franklin demonstrates how easily such an
epistemology can go awry. Boyle exempts himself from the kind of faulty epistemology
Franklin satirizes, but New English ministers, preaching in the same moment as Boyle
was writing Occasional Reflections, were anxious that their sermons were too shadowy
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as reflections of spiritual truths and thus liable to the kind of misreading Franklin
parodies. Boyle and New English Puritan ministers attended to the natural world as a site
of moral truths, but I argue that while Boyle explicitly marked the epistemological
connection between the material and spiritual worlds as one of shadowy likeness, the
epistemology reflected in the sermon held the material world to be a more direct
manifestation of spiritual truths.
For Boyle, the soil sermonized, and sermons, too, were material reflections of
spiritual lessons, but their stakes were much higher. Often, in Occasional Reflections,
Boyle meditates on some object or occasion that emblematizes the problem of the
sermon. These meditations consider how to merge style and content so that language does
not distract from piety. That form could upstage content was a constant concern for
ministers, and Boyle captures this debate, common in seventeenth-century sermonic
theory. In reflection VI, ―upon the sight of a Looking-glass, with a rich Frame,‖ three
men dialogue upon the mirror as an image of eloquence in sermons. One of the speakers,
Eugenius, reflects that eloquence in sermons draws listeners just as the gilt frame draws
lookers, but his companions find fault in his sermonic philosophy. They argue that
eloquence has ―no Power, like a good Looking-glass, to acquaint the beholder with the
true Image or Representation of his own Complexion,‖ and they condemn the preacher
who works to make ―his Expressions, than to make his Hearers, good.‖5 Boyle‘s
meditation presents both sides of the debate: should the minister use all available sources
from art and nature to draw listeners, or would that art distract from or even undermine
the sermon‘s true goal? Should the sermon present itself as a man-made, material object
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that is only similar to the spiritual meaning it carries, or should the sermon, instead,
present itself as an immediate manifestation of divine things? The sermon form worked
like the objects and occasions on which Boyle reflected, but it also needed to mediate the
potential misreading that Franklin highlights.
Boyle‘s empiricism assumed an epistemological connection between the
observable and larger moral principles, and Puritan sermons incorporated the language of
empiricism while also obscuring the processes of mediation occurring between the visible
and the invisible. The sermon, like the meditation, needed to transmit the interpretive
work behind the lesson to readers or hearers who would experience it as if they had
discovered it themselves. But the sermon, unlike the meditation, camouflaged the initial
interpretive work. The epistemological framework of early science, as Boyle‘s
Occasional Reflections shows, relied on empirical data to generate new knowledge. The
Puritan ministers in New England recognized this shifting paradigm, and it unmoored
their usual frames of reference for spiritual knowledge. If Boyle, as scientist, used
empirical data to uncover natural laws, Puritan ministers began to rely on empirical data
to confirm their assumptions about God‘s laws. In order to assure themselves that their
knowledge of God was empirical—testable, reproducible, and sensible—ministers crafted
their sermons using the rhetoric of the plain style. I argue that the New England plain
style sermon was a means of overcoming ministerial anxiety, of holding on to the
revealed Word of God while acknowledging shifting epistemological paradigms.
The plain style, ministers believed, presented an answer. Its rhetoric would
ideally reproduce experimental results, assuring that different readers and hearers, at
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different times, would have the same experience of God‘s Word and would arrive at the
same conclusions about it. Early American Puritan ministers used the language and tools
of early empiricism in order to assure themselves, even more than their audiences, that
God‘s Word was still God‘s Word. But audiences were always a concern. As Boyle was
writing the Occasional Reflections, across the sea New England minister Thomas
Shepard was worrying that the Word of God never ―stirs the soules‖ of some men who
find it to be only a ―strange thing […] a voice of words, a sound of words, so they hear
men spake, but understand no more then if they speak in a strange language, or if they do,
it concernes not them; or if it stirs, ‗tis but as the blowing of the winde upon a rock,
which blusters for a time; but when the winde is down they are still. Truly they hear the
word spoken, but they do not hear God speaking.‖6 If Boyle‘s soil speaks, Shepard
worries that language is as meaningless as rocks.
Shepard‘s concern was spiritual, but it points to the dilemma on which Boyle‘s
meditation on the gilded looking glass turns. Eloquence, or art, in a sermon or occasional
reflection ran the risk of underscoring the materiality of language, and with it, the
possibility of mishearing and misreading. To keep their listeners from hearing only the
wind on the rock, or from mistaking the soil for the sermon, the New England Puritan
clergy relied on the plain style. Along with a ministerial desire for empirical confirmation
of spiritual laws or religious truths, ministers worried that they, as interpreters of God‘s
Word for the people, would disrupt the empirical process. Their voices, and the sermon‘s
style, needed to be transparent conduits for God‘s Word.
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I argue in what follows that the plain style sermon relied on the primacy of
experience (in juxtaposition to the Text) as the empirical site of saving grace. Such an
emphasis on experience necessitated the minister‘s (and the Bible‘s) transparency in the
pulpit. The long history of the plain style had always emphasized the experiential, but the
rise of the new science shifted the plain style‘s definition of experiential. New England
Puritan ministers used the plain style to create a testable and reproducible religious
experience, and they did so through metaphor. Metaphor in the plain style sermon
functioned as the link between the universal and the particular: metaphor gave the lay
listener the sense of being spoken to directly and personally (fostering a sense of
immediate experience) while facilitating universal experiences that were reproducible
and testable in what the ministers imagined to be an empirical sense.7
Thus, the plain style sermon camouflaged the minister‘s mediating presence, and
it did so rhetorically. The obvious conflict, that the medium of language compensated for
mediation, was not lost on Puritan ministers. Here I look at the sermonic philosophy of
three of seventeenth-century New England‘s most prolific and influential ministers—
Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, and John Cotton—demonstrating how they merged
empiricism and metaphor to forge linguistic philosophies that mirrored the central image
of their faith: the incarnation of Christ. In the end, Cotton argued that Christ was trope,
but he did not mean Christ was immaterial or a mere image. The incarnation was a
movement from the universal to the particular, a turn to the visible. It made material what
had been unseen, and Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton imagined the work of the sermon in
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just the same way. The metaphor of the plain style made the immaterial material and the
particular visible.

II.

A Study in Mediation: The Plain Style and its History
The sermonic plain style has often been misunderstood as a rejection of

ornamentation in speech, part of a broader puritanical rejection of all kinds of
ornamentation, although a better definition recognizes the plain stylists‘ deliberate—if
careful—use of ornamentation.8 With this concession, the plain style is better understood
as a rhetorical effort to subordinate human learning to the Word, to elevate the literal
sense of the Scriptures, and to make the sermon accessible to a variety of listeners. Such a
redefinition of the plain style has been occurring in scholarship on New English sermons
over the past decades, but its connections to shifting epistemological frameworks has yet
to be explored.9
Although this revision has recognized the frequent use of metaphors in plain style
sermons, I argue that the epistemological framework of the sermon itself relied on
metaphor. This is where the sermon diverges sharply from the rhetorical framing of
Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections. Boyle imagined the relationship between an object and
its moral lesson, such as a fire and lust, as similitive rather than metaphorical. Boyle‘s
meditation ―Upon the making of a Fire with Charcoal‖ demonstrates the simile at work:
For as Wood that is once thorowly set on Fire, may afterwards have that
Fire quite choak'd, and extinguish'd, and yet by those changes be turn'd
into Charcoal, whereby it is not only made Black, but dispos'd to be far
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more easily Kindled, and Consum'd than before; so those, who have once
had their Hearts thorowly possest by the pernicious Flames of Lust, […]
ev‘n when they have stifled these criminal Flames, and feel no more of
their Heat, may not only have their Reputation irrevocably blemish‘d [ …]
but commonly carry about with them an unhappy Disposition to be reinflam‘d.10
Boyle explicitly employs the language of simile: x is ―as‖ to y. And his admission of the
shadowy nature of occasional reflection further suggests he did not assume, as Jonathan
Edwards would a century later in his similar meditations, that the objects upon which he
meditated had some inherent spiritual meaning. The rhetoric of Boyle‘s meditations
makes the simile explicit; he does not attempt to hide the mediation occurring. But the
contemporaneous plain style sermon sought to do just that. Ministers, though, were
anxious about this hidden mediation, and they sought linguistic ways to remedy it.
The occasional reflection demonstrates an epistemology rooted in empirical,
sensory experience. New England ministers believed that this epistemology, manifested
in the plain style, would guard against the dangers of mishearing, mediation, and
enthusiasm.11 An overly artful sermon style could produce any one of these miscarriages,
the ministers believed, but the plain style allowed the laypeople to observe and
experience God just as the occasional meditator observed and experienced natural
phenomena. Enthusiasm was a great concern for all ministers; it disrupted the
hermeneutics in place for reading one‘s soul by severing signs from that which they
represented. The enthusiast would, for example, read his or her tears as evidence, not just
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of sorrow over sin, but as evidence of true repentance, true transformation of the soul. As
a merely affective response to stimuli, enthusiasm overreached the empirical methods of
deciphering grace in one‘s soul or evil in the world by advancing the experiential sign
over its spiritual referent, and it was too individualistic ever to be reproducible. The plain
style made religious experience reproducible: each listener should receive the same
knowledge and have similarly legible responses. Enthusiasm was an error of signreading, and the plain style meant to ensure that the laity read signs as God intended them
to be read. Like Boyle‘s famous air pump experiment, the plain style facilitated empirical
observation. Just as one could observe a vacuum at work in the air pump, so one would
observe God in the Bible and, via the plain style, in the sermon.
Steve Shapin and Simon Schaeffer have written about Boyle‘s interest in the
recreation of the experimental moment in Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), and they
argue that Boyle wrote and circulated descriptions of his experiments in order to gather
what they call ―virtual witnesses.‖ By either replicating the experiments for themselves or
by visualizing the experiment Boyle describes, readers could re-experience the
experiment and then validate the results. Without these witnesses, Shapin and Schaeffer
argue, the knowledge-claims gained from the experiment could not become ―matters of
fact.‖ Shapin and Schaeffer discuss the literary technologies that Boyle used to
communicate these experiments and their resulting knowledge-claims to his audience: the
experimental text ―is a narration of some prior visual experience [that] points to sensory
experiences that lie behind the text.‖12 I argue that the sermonic moment works similarly.
It, too, points to some sensory experience that led to the text‘s construction. The minister,
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like the scientist, communicated through language an earlier, personal experience, and he
attempted to convey to his audience the sense of immediate observation that Boyle
implemented in his experimental texts.
The interpretation of a particular biblical passage, it was believed, was not
imposed or made by the minister; it was inherent in the Bible itself and simply observed
there. Because the minister had a set of observational tools (knowledge of biblical
languages, hermeneutical training etc.), he was more likely than the lay reader to arrive at
the interpretation that actually inhered in the text. The role of the sermon, then, was to
give the reader the experience of observing the ―matter of fact‖ in the Bible despite not
having the minister‘s tools. The sermon opted for a bare style that presented the
interpretation in language that was accessible to anyone and that erased the presence of
the human agent. The lay listener did not ―take the minister‘s word for it,‖ but assented to
his interpretation, because the plain style presented knowledge as evidence, not
argument.13 The act of listening to a sermon or of reading the Bible was experimental; the
layperson seemed to engage in the work of interpretation alongside the minister, reading
the signs before her. Thus, the plain style ostensibly provided empirical evidence and
ensured reproducible results.
Reformed preaching manuals of the 1590s and early years of the seventeenthcentury first defined the sermonic rhetoric of the plain style. The New England Puritans
relied heavily on these manuals for their own sermonic form and rhetoric, though each
adapted the initial preaching philosophies to the new environment of colonial New
England. In his 1596 treatise A Declaration of the True Manner of Knowing Christ
30

Crucified William Perkins, the non-separating Puritan minister most influential for the
New England Puritans, writes: ―Now the knowledge of this [Christ‘s resurrection] must
not be onely speculative, that is, barely conceived in the braine, but it must be
experimental: because we ought to have experience of it in our hearts and lives.‖14
Throughout this treatise, Perkins contrasts ―experimental‖ knowledge with intellectual
awareness, or the ability to ―handle the whole mysterie of God incarnate soundly and
learnedly‖ without an ―inward and lively feeling.‖15 Perkins‘s experimental knowledge
relies on the metaphors of sensory experience to claim that religious knowledge is seen,
tasted, felt, but in the late sixteenth-century he did not make the claim his New England
heirs would: that religious experience is real because empirical. Perkins‘s emphasis on
the emotional transformation of conversion and the minister‘s camouflage of mediation,
however, were also central to the New England plain style.
Perkins first published his preaching manual, The Arte of Prophecying, in 1592,
and it is one of the earliest, and the most formational, articulations of a Reformed plain
style.16 Perkins, and other ministers, devised the plain style as a way of compensating for
the tension between two central Reformation teachings.17 With the rise of Protestantism,
the sermon took on a more central role in the inculcation of faith in the individual soul: as
Martin Luther argued, faith comes through hearing (God‘s Word) alone. If Luther
emphasized the centrality of the sermon, Desiderius Erasmus added that Christ alone is
Priest. His treatise on preaching and the priesthood, Ecclesiastes, was first published in
1535 and was an important source for the Puritan preaching manuals that appeared in the
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last decade of the century and into the next.18 Ecclesiastes emphasizes Christ as the sole
mediator and the priest‘s or minister‘s role as one of mere interpreter.19
However, these Reformation fundamentals—that the sermon was central to faith
and that Christ alone was mediator—were in conflict. Although Christ was the sole
mediator between God and humanity, the minister did hold a mediating role as interpreter
of Scripture for the people. Therefore he had to be cautious to make his sermon a catalyst
of faith without making himself the agent. A rhetorical plain style was the result of this
very contradiction because it deemphasized the physical presence of the minister and his
voice and gave, or was thought to give, the layperson an unmediated experience of God.
At the same time, though, the plain style was a way of regulating the potential heresy of
this unmediated experience. The plain style as a regulatory mechanism became a way of
assuaging anxieties about individual interpretive agency and ministerial meditation.
Perkins‘s The Arte of Prophecying created the sermon format used by Puritan
ministers throughout the seventeenth-century: the four-part sermon that included text,
doctrine, reasons, and uses. Aside from this format, Perkins provided the minister with
tools for disguising the art of preaching. The title of the manual points to the
contradiction between ―prophecying‖ (preaching), which should be a divinely guided
surrender of human wisdom, and ―arte,‖ which highlights the human agency behind the
sermon. Throughout the manual, Perkins offers advice for both the preparation and the
delivery of the sermon that would bring art and prophecy into proper balance.20 He
argues that the minister‘s speech must be ―spiritual‖ and simple, ―fit both for the peoples
understanding and to express the maiestie of the spirit.‖21 This dual-role of sermonic
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speech, to reach the simplest minds yet to match the glory of the subject, requires that the
minister essentially make himself invisible in the pulpit. Perkins is explicit on this point:
―Humane wisdome must bee concealed, whether it be in the matter of the sermon, or in
the setting forth of the words: because the preaching of the word is the Testimonie of God
[…] and not of human skill.‖22 The primary goal here is simple enough: to ensure that the
hearers do not ascribe their faith to any man, or human knowledge, but to the grace of
God alone. But how is the minister to enact such transparency in the pulpit, especially as
he is allowed to use the ―arte‖ of human wisdom in his private preparations?
Perkins answers this potential counter-argument by claiming that the minister
partially erases his presence in the pulpit through small verbal and physical gestures. He
recommends abandoning the use of Greek or Latin phrases, uncommon words, or the
―telling of tales‖ in order to make the minister appear artless. More importantly, Perkins
advises ministers to be grave in their gestures: ―It is fit therefore, that the trunke or stalke
of the bodie being erect and quiet, all the other parts, as the arme, the hand, the face and
eyes have such motions, as may express and (as it were) utter the godly affections of the
heart.‖23 For Perkins, the body performs ministerial transparency by making itself as
invisible as possible.
Although these small strategies were calculated for their effect, the Perkinsonian
sermon form had the greatest role in rendering the minister transparent in the pulpit and
creating a sensed immediacy between God and congregant. Teresa Toulouse, in The Art
of Prophesying: New England Sermons and the Shaping of Belief (1987) has most fully
and influentially treated the problem of ministerial mediation in Puritan New England.
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She argues that the sermon form, as Perkins describes it, encapsulates the minister‘s
interpretative process: ―Once the true ‗literall‘ meaning has been established, the process
of how the preacher arrived at it can then be shaped within the public text-doctrinereasons-uses model.‖24 Toulouse does not directly discuss the minister‘s struggle for
transparency in the pulpit, but her argument here suggests that the Perkinsonian sermon
form acts as a kind of scrim; the form conceals the minister‘s previous interpretation
because it recreates the interpretive process in the pulpit. Or, as Toulouse puts it,
Perkins‘s model ―involves preacher and listener in a nascent narrative that unfolds in the
logical movement from the sacred text to its applications in the present moment.‖25 The
shape of the sermon, in Toulouse‘s description, persuades the listener because it seems to
develop immediately and spontaneously; the Perkinsonian model controls the
interpretation for the audience. Toulouse emphasizes what she sees, and what others have
seen, as the rationality of Perkins‘s model. She argues that Perkins desired to view
―God‘s ways as ultimately rational,‖ but I would add that her description of Perkins also
emphasizes the transparent nature of the preaching minister. The form of the sermon
erases the minister‘s previous interpretive work by creating that work anew in the pulpit
and by allowing the Bible to ―open‖ immediately before the listeners.26
Although the plain style sermon sought to create immediacy between Word and
listener in the moment of delivery, Perkins dedicated a significant portion of his treatise
to the minister‘s preparation before the sermon. This suggests that, one, some of the work
of transparency occurred before the sermon was performed, and two, that the minister‘s
private experience of the Word was essential for the delivery of an effectively transparent
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sermon. The majority of Perkins‘s The Arte of Prophecying offers instructions along
these lines. The minister‘s work of interpretation in his private study requires opening the
text so that the ―one entire and natural sense may appeare.‖ Perkins is clear that the
―supreme and absolute means of interpretation is the Scripture it selfe.‖27 Lisa Gordis has
most thoroughly theorized this in Opening Scripture: Bible Reading and Interpretive
Authority in Puritan New England (2003). Here she describes the Puritan belief in a selfinterpreting Bible: ―Puritan theorists saw the Bible not as a closed book, but as an open
text, a locus for ongoing interaction between God and his chosen saints. Clergy and laity
often described that interaction as ‗opening.‘‖ She adds, ―[p]rivileging God as author and
interpreter, Puritan interpretive strategies minimized the role of the human interpreter,
relying on methods that in theory allowed the text to interpret itself.‖28 Gordis observes
an ―interpretive fluidity‖ in Puritan practice that, because of a complex relationship
between text, minister, hearer/reader, and God, permits a more disruptive, exciting,
contentious, and lively biblical interpretation than we once allowed the Puritans.29
However, Gordis is careful to note, the biblical text was only theoretically
interpreting itself. While the Puritans believed the Bible was a fully transparent, selfopening text, the minister‘s work of interpretation was far from passive. Rather than
having the text magically opened to him (or, as the minister believed, alongside having
the text spiritually opened to him), the minister applied a variety of hermeneutical tools to
the Bible. The Arte of Prophecying was largely an instruction manual establishing the
interpretive strategies the minister could use without imposing his own will on the Bible.
Referencing the original language, collating related passages, and deciphering tropes and
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figures in the Bible, to name a few, were all hermeneutical activities that allowed the
minister to more actively open the text. These ―helps,‖ as they were called, were tools
that allowed the minister to observe divine knowledge in the text. But they, unlike the
tools of empirical observation, confirmed the minister‘s a priori assumptions. Perkins
warned that the audience must not discern the workings of human art in the minister‘s
interpretation: ―the Minister may, yea, and must privately use at his libertie the artes,
philosophie, and varietie of reading, whilest he is framing his sermon: but he ought in
publike to conceale all these from the people, and not to make the least ostentation.‖30
The minister had to conceal these tools so that the people would, as Gordis observes,
sense the text opening before them. Thus, the laity was able to observe truth in the text.
Perkins used art to disguise art in order to make the sermon‘s argument
immediately accessible to all audiences. In this sense, the sermonic plain style was
simply a rhetoric of accessibility; all types of listeners could understand the theological
logic of the sermon when presented through the clear and structured logic of the plain
style. But there were certain forces at work in the colonial communities that made the
plain style‘s regulation of religious experience more important than Perkins could have
anticipated. Threats of hypocrisy and heresy loomed large in New England because the
communities were geographically isolated and because their success, both religious and
otherwise, depended on a cohesive community free from internal subversion. The New
England Congregationalist churches strove for consensus, and those individuals who
threatened this theological consensus were forced from the region.31 The plain style made
consensus more likely because it controlled biblical interpretation. But the plain style was
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not only a means of regulation; it was most interested in fostering unmediated
relationships between the laypeople and their God. These two contrasting purposes of the
sermonic plain style highlight an anxiety over the minister‘s role as mediator, and this is
the distinguishing characteristic of the New English sermonic plain style. Varying
degrees and types of ministerial anxiety concerning mediation structured each minister‘s
use of the plain style. And each minister I read here—Shepard, Cotton, and Hooker—
addressed these anxieties through language itself; style, hardly ―plain,‖ became the means
for appeasing anxieties about mediation.
Although Perkins advocated the use of ―art‖ in preaching, ministers worried that
their words were always potential sites of distraction. God spoke nothing but truth, but
that was always in danger of being misheard. The Bible could not be wrong, but it could
be misread. And the material world could provide insight into spiritual truths, but
miscarriages between spiritual truth, natural world, and human interpreter would occur.
The New England ministers were all too aware of these potential miscarriages, and thus
they relied on the sermonic plain style as the safeguard against mishearings and
misreadings. In the plain style, language mediates all potential problems of mediation.
Boyle‘s Occasional Reflections, addressing the use of art in sermon writing,
clarifies why ministers rely on art and natural knowledge. In the meditation ―upon being
presented with a rare Nosegay by a Gardener,‖ Eugenius and his companions once again
turn to the sermon, and reflecting on the labor involved in producing the beautiful
arrangement, Eusebius makes the object an image of the sermon, and of writing in
general: ―to be able to write one good book on some Subjects, a man must have been at
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the trouble to read an hundered.‖32 Eloquence in sermons, he argues, is the result of much
learning and labor, and both nature and art play a role: ―For though an Author‘s Natural
parts may make his Book abound with Wit, yet without the help of Art he will scarce
make it free from faults. And to be well stock‘d with Comparisons, which when skillfully
manag‘d make the most taking passages of fine Pieces, one must sometimes survey and
range through the works of Nature and Art.‖33 For Boyle, careful observation of the
natural world made the writer clearer and more effective. And the plain style sermons
relied on comparisons from the natural world and on the knowledge derived from many
―good books.‖ Yet, as Perkins cautioned, ministers should always hide the work of art in
their sermons. Both Perkins and Boyle warned that style could hinder meaning if not
managed with skill.
The style of an occasional reflection could, Boyle admitted, become an obstacle to
true understanding of the object‘s figurative significance. Though his reflections employ
figurative language—and Franklin‘s caricature is stylistically sophisticated—Boyle
argued that the observer need not have ―much wit or eloquence‖ to engage in reflections.
He or she needed only ―cherish piety,‖ because the reflection‘s purpose was to ―make the
man good, whether or no they make his style be thought so.‖34 But style mattered for
Boyle. A poor style could keep the written reflection from communicating its intent, and
an overly ornamented style would distract from the lesson itself. This stylistic tension is
part of the epistemology of both the occasional reflection and the sermon. The sermon‘s
spiritual truths and the reflection‘s moral lessons are mediated by a speaker and by
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language itself: the material world is full of shadowy signs of moral truth, but it is always
mediated.
Boyle‘s reflections prioritize the figurative significance of the observed object;
there is surprisingly little consideration of the naturalness of the things observed in
Occasional Reflections. Michael Hunter argues, in Robert Boyle Reconsidered (1994),
that the natural philosophy Boyle espouses in Occasional Reflections ―pushed literal
details into figurative significance.‖35 The figures in the material world are best captured
in figurative language. Though Thomas Shepard argued that ―it is a rule, never to flie to
metaphors, where there can be a plain sense given,‖ the plain style relied on a similar
conception of the relationship between figurative language and truth. Plain style sermons
often began with the work of unpacking biblical metaphors, and they used figurative
language borrowed from the natural world to illuminate spiritual truths.
In making the medium of language a remedy for the problems of mediation,
ministers anxiously realized they had to rely on the tools and helps Perkins described. But
fifty years after Perkins, New England ministers seized opportunistically on the language
and methods of the new science. Beyond emphasizing the sensory experience that
Perkins argued should guide the sermon listener, the New England plain style sermon
extended the meaning of Perkins‘s ―experimental knowledge‖ and incorporated the
discourse of empiricism. By deferring to this authoritative discourse, ministers imagined
the work of the sermon as experimental. Where this manifests itself most importantly, I
argue, is in metaphor. Plain style sermons employed metaphors taken from the natural
world, which became one means of making an argument more efficacious and
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experiential. Natural metaphors seemed to ground language to the material world, ideally
closing the gap between word and thing. And New England ministers characterized the
work of the sermon itself as metaphorical: it made visible and particular the invisible and
universal.

III.

The Empiricism of Metaphors: The New England Sermonic Plain Style
In 1653, the British Fifth Monarchist John Rogers published Ohel or Beth-

Shemesh. A Tabernacle for the Sun, partially a collection of forty conversion narratives
that he gathered from his congregants in Dublin and that all roughly follow the same
rhetorical structure.36 In discussing the requisites for church membership, he argued that
―Everyone to be ADMITTED, gives out some EXPERIMENTAL Evidences of the work
of GRACE upon his SOUL.‖37 The experimental evidences to which Rogers points were
also those of the New England plain style. In Roger‘s conversion narratives, and in the
plain style sermon, experience included external experiences, internal sensations, and a
third category that occupied a space between the external and internal: spiritual or
internal sensations of physical experience, or metaphor.
The first, outward experiences, included both the supernatural—such as visions—
and the natural—like illnesses, hearing sermons and more general outward actions (as
both pre-conversion evidence of a sinful state and as evidence of conversion). Internal
sensations included dreams and various emotional states like longing, awareness,
temptation, or, as one narrator reported, the ―sweet enjoyments of Jesus.‖38 The third
category of more metaphorical sensory experience involved seeing, hearing, or perhaps
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even touching the divine. Although I label these as metaphorical experience, the
congregants often described them quite literally. Rogers‘s conception of experimental
knowledge does seem metaphorical in relation to the material sensory experience of
Boyle‘s experiments, but Rogers speaks of this knowledge in sensory terms: ―If so be ye
have tasted how gracious the Lord is,‖ he writes citing William Ames‘ commentary on 1
Peter, ―not onely taken grace (for many do) but tasted grace […] and found
experimentally feelingly […] O then, will you say, O it is good!‖39 Tasting grace is the
empirical work of reading the signs of grace in one‘s soul. And it is both a metaphorical
and sensory tasting.
Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton all relied on this conception of metaphor in
experience: metaphors in sermons allowed the audience to taste grace. Metaphor was
both a means of incorporating empirical evidence into the sermons, and it was the
epistemological mechanism of the plain style sermon. Whereas Boyle‘s reflections
functioned by simile, the plain style sermon itself worked metaphorically, eliding the
actual analogy and representing the sermon as the audience‘s own experience rather than
the minister‘s educated argument. The sermon as metaphor works like the incarnation,
which collapses tenor and vehicle into the one God.
Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, and John Cotton wrote most directly about the
plain style in the 1640s through the 1660s, and while the sermon styles of all three fit
Perkins‘s general definition of the plain style, they each had different, and at times
oppositional, stances on the role of the sermon and on the minister‘s relationship between
audience and Scripture. Each minister built on Perkins‘s sermonic theory, generating
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individual theories of the sermon that attempted to soften anxiety about the process of
conveying biblical interpretations to listeners through the means of the sermon.
Encouraging true hearing was every plain stylist‘s aim, and the rhetoric of the plain style
accommodated this. Cotton, Hooker, and Shepard each wrote sermons or pamphlets
designed to instruct the layperson‘s hearing, but in order to provide the key to true
hearing, experience, the sermon also needed to engage a full sensory knowledge. True
hearing was the plain style‘s goal, but true hearing meant more than just hearing. In The
Soules Preparation (1632), Hooker wrote that antagonists of the plain style opposed it
―because thereby the eye of the soule comes to be opened.‖40 The plain style, he argued,
was more than mere sermon form. More than sounds. More than words. True hearing
reached the heart and opened the eye of the soul. Despite the plain style‘s ostensible
rejection of metaphor, Hooker‘s metaphor of the soul‘s eye represents the basic theory of
the New England Puritan plain style. Metaphor, not plainness, became the sermon‘s
means for opening the eyes of the soul.
Hooker, Shepard, and Cotton were not unaware of the ironies of their rhetorical
solution to the problem of mediation. How can language, a medium by definition,
become the remedy for mediation? The anxiety each minister experienced in realizing
this contradiction led to different forms of compensation, explanation, and performance,
all of which combined to form the sermonic and linguistic theories of each minister.
Hooker demanded from godly ministers a deliberate use of every word so that meaning
did not miscarry in the midst of communication, and figurative language was often his
preferred tool for knitting meaning and form. Shepard articulated a sermonic theory in
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which the act of listening for God‘s voice in the sermon became a full sensory
experience, thus placing more emphasis on the layperson‘s testing of that experience than
on language itself. And Cotton, the most prolific of the three, formed a middle ground,
worrying about his own mediating presence but anxious that language would always be
too imprecise, too much a part of mediation, to remedy mediation. Cotton addressed these
anxieties, though, by equating language itself with Christ‘s incarnation.
Thomas Hooker worried that language was the obscuring agent in the pulpit. He
advocated a plainness of speech in which word corresponded as closely as possible to the
thing it represented. His Application of Redemption (1656) offers the clearest articulation
of his ideal pulpit style. He writes:
The plainness of the Ministery appears, When the Language and Words
are such as those of the meanest Capacity have some acquaintance with,
and may be able to conceive; when the Preacher accommodates his
Speech to the shallow understanding of the Simplest Hearer, so far as in
him lies, alwayes avoiding the frothy tinkling of quaint and far fetched
Phrases, which take off, and blunt as it were the edge of the blessed Truth
and Word of God.41
Hooker‘s assertion that the sermon‘s language should be directed towards the lowest
common denominator suggests that language is always potentially unruly, spinning out
into inaccessible and unintended meanings. But the real force of Hooker‘s argument is his
worry that a ―frothy tinkling‖ will impede Scripture‘s power. Hooker argues that a
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minister who fills his sermons with sweetness tries too hard to ―please the pallat‖ of the
listener, overlooking the true health of the patient.
If the minister is a doctor for the soul, Hooker‘s Application suggests that the
minister is an instrumental and persuasive, not transparent, figure in the pulpit. Hooker
claims this outright, writing that ―the Minister must hew and square your hearts before
they can be prepared for the Lord Jesus.‖42 Therefore, Hooker stresses using the precisely
right word so that the sermon will have particular and ultimate efficacy. In Puritan
theology, although an individual could not actively choose salvation, he or she could
prepare his or her heart to be worked upon by God, and the hearing of sermons was both
an essential part of this preparation and a means through which God could act on the
prepared heart. For Hooker, though, the minister‘s words seem to be a prerequisite for
preparation. If this is true, there is little room left in the pulpit for the Word of God to
speak directly to the people.
But Hooker shifts the responsibility to the listener. In exhorting his audience to
cultivate itself in preparation for the preached word, he writes: ―when you hear the Word
plainly and powerfully preached to you, labor that the Word may be so unto you as it is in
it self.‖43 Hooker addresses his anxiety that he, like the Catholic priests, might be acting
as mediator between God and man by removing himself from the equation. The
individual works to hear the Word not as it is preached, but as it is. Regularly in his
sermons, as he begins to interpret a biblical passage, Hooker uses the language of
―opening the text.‖ This (theoretical) transparency is what Hooker references when he
asks his audience to hear the Word ―as it is in itself.‖ His sermonic philosophy intended
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to render the minister transparent in the pulpit, yet he gave the preacher an essential and
active role in the process of conversion.
Hooker‘s anxiety about his role as mediator was connected to his worry over the
tendency of words to become unmoored from the things they represented and to his
worry over a minister‘s tendency to manipulate words to serve his own base purpose. The
―far fetched‖ phrase, that which does not adequately convey the minister‘s meaning,
corrupts the listener‘s understanding not just because it sounds too pretty but because the
word or phrase is too distant from the minister‘s meaning. Too close an attention to the
―sugar‖ ruins the ―potion‖ of the sermon‘s intended effect.44 Yet this argument itself
relies on metaphor. How does the clear metaphorical imagery of this passage not fall
under the condemnation of frothy sugariness? Hooker would argue that the metaphor
here, the Word of God as sword, ―make[s] way for the efficacy of the Gospel‖ by
clarifying rather than hindering meaning. In this passage, Hooker‘s primary concern is
that biblical truths are not corrupted with sugary language, the very pleasure of which can
undermine the medicinal work of the Spirit.
The Spirit‘s medicinal work, though, is knit to—and partially dependent on—the
minister‘s words. Frothy tinklings impede the Spirit‘s work, but careful and plain words,
Hooker argues, sharpen the edge of the Word. Hooker‘s plain style is an expression of the
relationship between words and things, not a rejection of figurative language. In
Application, after Hooker describes his plain style, he offers a definition of an anti-plain
style, an unfaithful and deceptive use of words:
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Plainness of Preaching, appears also in the matter that is spoken: when sin
and sinners are set out in their native and natural colours, and carry their
proper names, whereby they may be owned suitable to the loathsomeness
that is in them […]; A Spade is a Spade, and a Drunkard is a Drunkard,
&c. and if he will have his Sins, he must and shall have Hell with them.
Its Satans Policy (who painter or tyre-maker like, cozens all the world
with colors) to smut and disfigure the beautiful wayes of Godliness, and
the glorious Graces of the Spirit, with the soot and dirt of reproaches, and
base nick-names: Sincerity, he terms Singularity; Exactness, Puritanism
and Hypocrisie; and so ignorant men (who judge the person by the picture)
are brought out of love and liking with those blessed wayes.45
Hooker defines plain preaching as using a thing‘s ―proper name;‖ his plain style is a
rhetorical commitment to ensuring that words honestly represent ―natural colours‖ rather
than paint a false picture. Painting a false picture is Satan‘s policy. In the passage above,
Hooker lists words that Satan uses to paint God‘s good things as undesirable, and he goes
on to list words Satan uses to represent sinful things (drunkenness, cowardliness) as
desirable (fellowship, discretion). Satan‘s project is to obscure language‘s relationship to
experience and to make the clergy his middlemen, so that the layperson has no access to
divine truth.
Hooker is most troubled by ministers who become ―the Divels Brokers‖ and
refuse to call a spade a spade, instead making sin the punch line for sugary jokes: ―Those
secret wipes, and witty jerks, and nips at sin, at which the most prophane are pleased, but
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not reformed; are utterly unsavory and unseeming in the Place, the Person, the Office,
and the Messenger of the Lord of Hosts. What! A Minister a Jester! O fearful! to make
the Pulpit a Stage, to play with sin.‖46 The Jester, for Hooker, speaks only in riddles,
spinning the truth through language. The minister‘s most important role is to speak truth,
but to do so he must call a spade a spade. The devil‘s broker might use figurative
language to obscure truth, making language itself a joke, but the plain style, if nothing
else, took language very seriously. If Satan‘s goal is to unmoor language from
experience, the minister‘s is to connect the two—to offer his message in language that
reflects and generates experience. Hooker does this, often, by recourse to figurative
language, which posits the material world as a sign or shadow of the immaterial. His
preaching was renowned for its liveliness, and his use of figurative language contributed
to that reputation.47 When used carefully, metaphor fosters immediacy and conveys
empirical knowledge.
In The Soules Preparation, Hooker writes that ―a speciall application of particular
sinnes, is a cheife means to bring people to […] a true sorrow for them.‖48 The sermon
that strikes out generally will not hit any target, Hooker says. To make this argument
Hooker employs a series of figurative comparisons:
A Master commands a servant to doe such a thing, and because he names
him not; one thinks it is not hee, and another it is not hee […] So when a
Minister saith, In many things we sinne all, he hits no man, and so none
are affected with it. But now particular application brings every mans part
and portion, and not onely sets the dish afore him, but cuts his meate, and
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carves for him. […] The words of a faithfull Minister are like arrows,
which if they be shot a cock height, they fall downe againe and doe
nothing; but when a man levels at a mark, then, if ever, hee will hit it.49
Masters and servants, meat and arrows. Hooker uses each of these figures to achieve the
particularity he demands from the sermon—a particularity that gives each layperson the
sense that the minister speaks directly to him or her—and metaphor is the vehicle of this
particularity. The compounding of figure upon figure reinforces this particularity, each
figure revealing a different element of Hooker‘s argument. The master shouts an order,
but no one responds: the minister‘s responsibility is to particular application. The steward
buys the meat, serves it, cuts it: particular application gives the listener not just an
argument about sin, but a taste of his own sinfulness. The marksman aims, shoots, hits.
And Hooker‘s arrow pierces a listener‘s heart.
Particular application alone, Hooker argues again and again, makes way for true
hearing. Only when the minister says ―This is thy drunkness, and thy adultery and
prophaneness‖ can application touch the heart.50 Hooker does not mean that a minister
calls out individual names from the pulpit, but the general ―thy‖ achieves particularity
through metaphor; the particularity of language, and not just argument, pierces the heart.
Hooker demonstrates this, again, through metaphor:
For the fashion that God useth in framing the heart is different; two men
are pricked, the one with a pinne, the other with a speare: two men are cut,
the one with a pen knife, the other with a sword: So the Lord deals kindly
and gently with one soule, & roughly with another, and handles it
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marvelous sharply, and breakes it all to pieces. There is the melting of a
thing and the breaking of it with hammers.51
Through this particular application, Hooker argues, the word ―sincks deepest into the
heart,‖ and ―the eye of the soule comes to be opened.‖52
For Hooker, metaphor was also a means of compensating for the mediation of the
minister and sermon. If language itself could be made to place before a man his meat so
near he could taste it, then the minister was simply a server and the sermon a serving
platter. The hearer saw and tasted the meat for him or herself, hardly aware of the
mediating influence of speaker and form. The many metaphors for the work of the
sermon that Hooker marshals in The Soules Preparation highlight the agency of language
over the agency of the minister. The Word, a sword, will wound a man when struck with
a ―full blow,‖ Hooker writes. But then: ―I confesse it is beyond our power to awaken the
heart, but ordinarily this way doth good.‖53 Ministers do not have power over their
listeners‘ hearts, but ―this way‖—the way of language—does have some agency.
Ultimately, Hooker answers his anxieties about mediation by conflating his
interpretive voice with the voice of God. The metaphor, or particular application
composed of language itself, effaces the minister‘s mediating presence. He describes this
in his sermon, Wisdomes Attendants: or, the Voice of Christ to be obeyed (1651). The
sermon opens the text of Proverbs 8:32, ―Now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children:
for blessed are they that keep my ways.‖54 Hooker explains, in several steps, what it
means to ―harken,‖ the first of which is hearing with the ear, and this naturally leads
Hooker into a discussion of preaching. He writes: ―It is not onely the voice of man that
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persuades you, and enjoyns you to give audience to the Lord Jesus, but God himself, and
that from heaven, and that immediately from his own mouth.‖55 The sentence moves
from minister and God joining voice together (―not onely‖) to God‘s voice speaking
directly (―with his own mouth‖) to gradually erase the minister‘s presence and voice. In
the end, this is where Hooker lands: although he claims for the minister a persuasive
agency, he is only able to make the claim because God, and not the minister, is the actual
speaker in the pulpit. And because the words themselves have power, like nails set fast
upon the heart, Hooker need only prepare his own heart to be pierced by God.
If, for Hooker, metaphor achieved particularity, Thomas Shepard added to this the
power of metaphor to awaken the mind to a full sensory experience of God. His 1652
sermon, Of Ineffectual Hearing, begins where we left Hooker: with an explication of
what it means to hear God speak. Shepard opens his sermon with a reading of John 5:37,
―Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape.‖56 These two sensory
experiences—hearing and seeing—form the foundations of religious knowledge.57 True
hearing, for Shepard, means true experiencing.
Shepard did not explicitly argue for the particular force of metaphor, though his
sermons relied on the same need for and use of particularity that Hooker‘s did. Shepard‘s
sermons worked like Hooker‘s, effacing his own presence in the pulpit through language
itself, despite his clear anxieties about language. And he, like Hooker, believed that God
spoke with particularity. Reading John 5, Shepard argues that God speaks literally:
―Some think they are metaphorical speeches, to express their ignorance of God,‖ Shepard
writes of the seeing and hearing John describes. Yet he continues: ―Now though this be
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the scope, and the general truth, yet I conceive, the Lord speaking particularly, and
knowing what he spake, intends something particularly: and it is a rule, never to flie to
metaphors, where there can be a plain sense given.‖58 The hearing John references,
Shepard argues, is quite literal. Shepard sees the Word of God as two-fold: one part is
―Gods external or outward word, containing letters and syllables‖ and the other is ―Gods
internal word and voice, which secretly speaks to the heart.‖59 The plain sense, then, is
that God‘s voice is literal, real, material: words spoken, letters read. Never fly to
metaphors.
But, of course, Shepard does. In distinguishing between effectual and ineffectual
hearing, Shepard references the Gospel of Luke‘s parable of the sower.60 Because this is a
scriptural, and not invented, metaphor, it avoids charges of flying away from the plain
sense. But Shepard goes on to invent his own metaphor for the same situation: ―When the
Sun is down the Moon may arise, but yet a man is cold and dark; but then the Sun ariseth,
oh it warmes […] so it is here, when the Lord speaks inwardly and effectually to the
heart.‖61 This metaphor, compared to the abstraction of the preceding lines, ―they may
hear it inwardly, but never effectually,‖ attempts what Christ‘s parables accomplish.
After relating the parable of the sower, Christ‘s disciples ask what he means by it, and he
replies: ―hearing they may not understand.‖62 The work of understanding a metaphor in a
sermon engages the heart, Shepard would argue, in a way that reason in the sermon
cannot. The addition of Shepard‘s sun metaphor reinforces this. In case the biblical
metaphor, spoken from the mouth of the Word himself, does not generate effectual
hearing, Shepard piles metaphor on top of metaphor.
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The metaphor, the sermon suggests, is part of God‘s internal voice. It speaks to
the heart. And it encourages the second experience that John 5 references: seeing God‘s
shape. This, like hearing God‘s voice, works empirically to generate faith. The visual
experience of God, Shepard says, refers to the mind ―com[ing] to have a true Idea of
God, as he reveals himself in the Word and Means by the Spirit.‖63 Shepard compares
gracious experience with sensory experience, and metaphor makes this comparison more
than mere figure; Shepard argues, as Rogers did, that the experience of grace is sensory.
Shepard‘s sun metaphor is full of the language of sensory experience—cold, dark,
warm—and this, like Christ‘s parables, is meant to provide an understanding that mere
hearing cannot.
Shepard‘s concern that his listeners might not ―hear God speaking,‖ is resolved by
particular application that comes through a particularity of language itself—often in
metaphors that provide a fuller sensory experience. Yet Shepard‘s anxiety rears itself
again: though Of Ineffectual Hearing is directed towards the listener, it is not lost on
Shepard that he, as a giver of sermons, is largely responsible for how the audience will
receive his sermon. Shepard resolves this problem, a nagging sense that even his
particular language is still just ―a voice of words,‖ by arguing for what he calls the
―eternal efficacy‖ of the Word. Though Shepard may not see the immediate effects of his
sermon‘s particular application, he has faith that the Word will transcend his words. He
places responsibility on the hearer for using all available means to ensure that the Word
―may come with efficacy.‖64 Much of Of Ineffectual Hearing is given to expounding the
tools for trying one‘s experience of hearing the sermon. ―There is great need of trial,‖
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Shepard writes, ―for a man may reade, hear and understand externally, whatever another
may; and yet the whole Scripture a sealed book.‖65 External hearing does not necessarily
actualize experience, and Shepard uses language to transmit sensory experience of the
sermon‘s content.
Shepard‘s attempts to remove his anxieties about his role as mediator, though, end
with a grave sense of his own responsibility: ―something is to be done by Ministers; that
is, to preach truth, and Gospel-truth, fetch‘d from heaven with many prayers, and soaked
with many tears.‖66 The minister must first have his own immediate, sensory experience
of spiritual truth in order to provide his audience with the means to hear God‘s voice and
see his shape in the sermon. Shepard acknowledges the minister‘s responsibility, but he
places all hope of immediacy between God and congregation in the Word—Christ, the
Bible, and language itself. The medium of language remedies the problems of mediation.
Metaphor makes abstract spiritual truths accessible and material. Shepard, like Hooker,
relieved his worry over his own role as mediator.
John Cotton understood himself as a medium. If Hooker and Shepard used the
plain style to efface their own mediating presence, Cotton used it to ensure that his was
guided by the Spirit. He writes of this in A Practicall Commentary (1656), a collection of
sermons on 1 John, arguing that God ―clears the Medium.‖ Divine testimony instills true
knowledge in the heart, and as a result, God clears ―the Word and Sacraments, Prayer &
Christian Communion, so that whereas before we lookt at them, but as beggarly
rudiments, of little power or worth, after God hath once enlightened us, we see the power
and virtue of God therein, so plainly, as if we had been touched by the Sun beams.‖67 The
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sermon, a medium like those Cotton lists here, is not erased, but in it the audience is able
to see God clearly and plainly.
Cotton believed that assurance of faith was possible, while Hooker and Shepard
always worried over the implications of such confidence. The core of Cotton‘s sermonic
theory was his belief that he preached to two distinct audiences, the regenerate and the
unregenerate, and those two audiences would hear and experience a sermon differently.
While the sermon could provide for the elect an experimental knowledge of faith leading
to assurance, the non-elect audience would not hear the sermon as it was. Hooker,
Shepard, and many of their fellow clergymen believed that the sermon had an essential
role in the preparation of hearts for justification and sanctification, but Cotton was not
such a preparationist.68 Teresa Toulouse argues that Cotton believed the elect could
―conceivably read and hear the Word of God preached without ‗vaile‘ or ‗shadows,‘‖
because their hearing had already been transformed.69 Cotton‘s trust in his elect
audience‘s hearing relieved some of the anxiety over mediation that Hooker and Shepard
worked so hard to overcome.
But Cotton also addressed the problem of mediation through language, and the
audience‘s experience of listening was structured as much by the words themselves as by
the listener‘s election. As Ann Kibbey argues in The Interpretation of Material Shapes in
Puritanism (1986), ―The more of a rhetorician Cotton becomes, the more invisible he
becomes as an orator, for the more it all seems to come from the words themselves and
from a deity who uses ministers the way he uses words, as a material vessel in the fallen
world through which the order of things, words, and people is redeemed and given
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expression.‖70 Language and Cotton as minister act as conduits for the Spirit, and while
they become, in Kibbey‘s assessment, invisible mediums, both are material. For Cotton,
she argues, ―[b]ecause the figures of acoustic design are inextricable from the material
fact of speech, all language use is figurative in some way,‖ and Puritan preachers
believed that ―[e]ven literal meaning was dependent on the interplay of signifiers and the
use of tropes.‖71 Cotton sees all language as working figuratively in some sense.
Cotton writes in A Practicall Commentary that ―Christ spake in parables, but after
his ascension, the Spirit revealed things clearly.‖72 Yet Cotton himself admitted the
occasional obscurity of even post-ascension revelations in the Bible. Parables are
sometimes still necessary, and Cotton‘s sermons do make use of them. ―Three things go
to clear discerning,‖ Cotton writes, ―the object must bee clear, the medium clear, and the
eye clear, and then wee may discern; now the Holy Ghost plainly reveals the Counsells of
God, and then opens our judgements to discern it, and then clears all the mediums, so that
a Christian may plainly discern; so that the Spirit is a clear Instructor, no men need bee
taught more clearly.‖73 Because he still needed to fulfill his ministerial duties, Cotton
made the language of his sermons the conduit for Spirit‘s instruction.
In Magnalia Christi Americana, Cotton Mather records a listener‘s response to
Cotton‘s preaching: when he ―preaches out of any Prophet or Apostle, I hear not him; I
hear that very Prophet or Apostle; yea, I hear the Lord Jesus Christ himself speaking in
my heart.‖74 No doubt Cotton Mather was attempting to paint a flattering picture of his
grandfather, but John Cotton represented his own preaching in the same way. A sermon
should be judged, he wrote, ―not in excellency of words, but in evidence of the Spirit.‖75
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But Cotton‘s words were excellent—famously so. Mather describes John Cotton‘s
preaching: ―When a Golden Key of Oratory should not so well open a Mystery of
Christianity, he made not stick to take an Iron One, that should be less Rhetorical. […]
Nevertheless his more Judicious and Observing Hearers, could by his most Untrim‘d
Sermons perceive that he was a man of more than Ordinary Abilities.‖76 Even his
plainest, least rhetorical sermons were judged as great. By a ―golden key,‖ Mather means
eloquence and ornamentation, and it is partially due to descriptions like this that the plain
style has been misjudged as a rejection of figurative language. Cotton‘s Iron Key of
Oratory, though Mather calls it ―less Rhetorical,‖ made use of metaphor just as Hooker
and Shepard did. It seems ―less Rhetorical‖ because, as Mather describes it, Cotton ―had
the Art of concealing his art‖ when preaching.77
Cotton‘s act of concealing art leads to preaching that is a ―scientificall Instruction
about certain experimentall things‖—clearing the medium for the Spirit‘s
enlightenment.78 Cotton discourses on sermonic language at length in A Modest and
Cleer Answer to Mr. Ball‟s Discourse of Set Forms of Prayer (1642). Though Cotton‘s
central argument is against set forms of prayer, or the reading of sermons, A Modest and
Cleer Answer is also an articulation of his sermonic theory. Reading another man‘s
sermon from the pulpit is sinful, Cotton argues, because it suggests the speaker values the
words of men more than the things of God. Reading a sermon is not preaching, because
God will not ―blesse the heart with gracious affections, when the eyes go a whoring after
the imaginations and inventions of men.‖79 The ―inventions of men‖ refers to linguistic
and rhetorical inventions. Preaching and scriptural interpretation are, Cotton argues,
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commanded by God, ―but the phrase and method of Interpretation is of men.‖80 The
words of a prayer or sermon are manmade, but Cotton is explicit that though invented,
these words are inspired. They are not ―such words as mans wisdom teacheth, but which
the Holy Ghost teacheth.‖81
Cotton privileges the minister‘s inspiration over the mere words of the sermon: in
A Modest and Cleer Answer Cotton distinguishes preaching and the public reading of
sermons. He objects to Mr. Ball‘s argument that a minister may rightfully read a sermon
before the congregation:
Though reading and pronouncing of a thing, be both of them adjuncts, and
common adjuncts too, to that which is propounded and read, yet according
to the ends and subjects, to which they may be applied, the one may be
lawfull, the other not indifferent but sinfull, the reading of a Sermon for
preaching, is a sinfull manner in preaching: The difference will ever hold
between the word read, and preached.82
Cotton is addressing the controversy over reading sermons; whether the minister reads
another man‘s sermon or reads his own carefully written sermon, he precludes the
inspiration of the Spirit in the sermonic moment.83 Although Cotton‘s argument was not
uncommon, his seriousness here (―not indifferent but sinfull‖) reveals his own
commitment to the indispensability of the minister‘s private inspiration. The minister‘s
experimental knowledge was, for Cotton, essential to the construction of a sermon that
communicated anything to the congregation. Cotton‘s belief that the sermon did not
actively, immediately convert its listeners and his belief that the layperson had individual
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authority in biblical interpretation were part of this larger valuing of experimental
knowledge and part of his acknowledgement that language—at times, even biblical
language—was slippery.
Teresa Toulouse argues that, for Cotton, language could never quite ―reach‖ the
―mystery of a Deus Absconditus—the true Logos.‖84 Hooker and Shepard anxiously
acknowledged that this was true of the sermon—God is indescribable—but Cotton
extended this to describe the biblical text as well. For Cotton, Toulouse argues, the Bible
is not reducible to its ―mechanically extractable uses,‖ but is instead something to be
searched for keys to the mystery that is God. Cotton relied on a host of hermeneutical
tools in order to access these mysteries, but he was also willing to acknowledge that the
Bible was at times dark and obscure. And unlike many of his fellow Puritans, Cotton
located this darkness, not in the reader‘s sinfulness, but in the text itself. Cotton‘s
sermonic ideal, whatever the degree of his use of various rhetorical or hermeneutical
―helps,‖ was that the minister relied not on his own intellectual strength but on the
Spirit.85 The helps, or tools, provided a safeguard against misinterpretation, and true
immediacy with God occurred through divine inspiration and the Spirit‘s strength.
Ideally, the Spirit would transform faith into experimental knowledge. The Spirit cleared
the medium, making the sermon itself a space where experimental knowledge could
occur.
Hooker and Shepard both used metaphors as a means of achieving a particularity
that generated experimental knowledge, and Cotton explicitly advocated experimental
knowledge as the foundation of true piety. But he, better than either Hooker or Shepard,
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articulated the fraught relationship between faith, knowledge, and language. A Practicall
Commentary opens with a reading of 1 John 1:1, ―That which was from the beginning,
which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon,
and our hands have handled, of the Word of life.‖86 Cotton reads 1 John as a divine
argument for experimental faith, which is more certain because it is not merely
demonstrated, but experienced. Cotton‘s definition of experimental knowledge is
different than Perkins‘s; for Cotton, experimental knowledge carries with it a sense of the
empirical.87
Cotton‘s main claim in A Practicall Commentary is that faith comes through
experimental knowledge. Referencing 1 John 1:1, Cotton argues that seeing, hearing, and
touching are all ways of accessing and knowing the Word of Life. For John, faith comes
through metaphorical sensory experience of the divine. Cotton, though, distinguishes
faith and knowledge through different kinds of sensory experience:
Faith comes by hearing, when we assent to any thing upon Divine
testimony, as if God hath given us some word, we believe it, but if we see
a thing by sense, or by experience, or by some certain Arguments of Gods
dealing with us, that we do not now only believe it from Gods Word, but
we plainly see it by experience in our hearts from some love of God.88
The faith that comes through hearing God‘s word is transformed into certain knowledge
by experience, Cotton suggests. Though faith and knowledge work similarly because they
are ―both acts of the judgement, for both are Scientia axiomatic certi, the knowledge of a
certain truth,‖ there is a difference.89
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Cotton argues that ―Faith is a perswasion or trust a man takes up upon the credit
of Divine testimony‖ but ―we know and believe, and we know that we know, which is an
Actu judeii, and more than opinion, or faith; Knowledge is such an acknowledgement as
ariseth Ex principis scientificis, such as proceeds from certain Principles.‖90 For Cotton,
faith comes first: divine testimony initiates faith, a trust, and then experience breeds
certain knowledge and assurance of faith. If faith and knowledge work economically,
then knowledge, or scientific demonstration is the ―gold standard,‖ and faith is ―credit.‖
A man takes up faith, Cotton writes, ―upon the credit‖ of God‘s Word, but knowledge
means a man sees and knows that he knows, and knowledge comes from empirical
experience.
But at times Cotton defines faith in a more expected way: ―Faith which is wrought
in us by the work of the Holy Ghost […] is greater, and more certain, than any science
gotten by demonstration.‖91 Here faith seems to be the gold standard. While this
illuminates the central tension in Cotton‘s work—faith versus knowledge—this passage
also defines faith as certainty arrived at through empirical experience. And it defines
―science gotten by demonstration,‖ like faith through hearing, as information taken upon
the credit of someone (or thing) else; here faith is demonstrated, not experienced. True
knowledge and true faith, Cotton argues, require experience, and that experience is
formed on ―sure grounds‖ of empirical reason, not just a rational assent to a reasonable
argument.
The sermon is a space where seeing, hearing, and touching the Word of Life
occur, where one can transform faith taken upon credit into experienced and certain
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knowledge, or assurance of grace. This is one of the central doctrines of A Practicall
Commentary, and referencing 1 John, Cotton asks why Christ is called the Word of God:
―here is a metaphor, and every metaphor is a short similitude, and it must not bee
expected that any similitude should agree in all points.‖92 The metaphor, as a medium,
strives to represent something, but it will always be limited. Yet this is one medium
Cotton does not attempt to clear: Christ as Word is metaphorical, Cotton, argues, but not
simply so.
His further explication of Christ as Word sheds light on how he understands the
metaphor of the logos and how he imagines the sermon to be efficacious though limited.
Christ is the Word of God in four respects, Cotton says: ―hee is the wisdome, image, and
interpreter, and promise of the Father.‖ In describing the first, wisdom, Cotton writes that
the Word is ―not any accident to [the Father], but of the same nature.‖ Second, the word
is the image of God, or of the same character. The Word is interpreter because it declares
God‘s will and meaning, and last, the Word is the promise because ―hee it was of whom
the Lord spake from the beginning.‖93 In each case, Cotton sutures vehicle to tenor;
Christ is a metaphorical manifestation of God, but he is of the same nature as God.
Metaphor, then, does not necessarily imply an invented figuration. Metaphor is the
particular manifestation of the universal. Though Cotton writes that God is love ―without
a Trope,‖ because love itself and not just having the quality of love, his reading of 1 John
suggests that God does, in some sense, need tropes.94 Christ as Word is a metaphor, and
Christ himself stands in relationship to God as a figurative image stands to the moral
truth it represents. Christ is trope.
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In the end, Cotton, Shepard, and Hooker allowed themselves some hope in
language. Because they must: faith comes through hearing, they all remind us. But
beyond this, the irony that the medium of language serves as a remedy for mediation is a
divine irony. It is the paradox of the Christian faith: God becomes flesh, encasing himself
in the material in order to redeem the material. Language, as medium, clears the medium.
The gilt frame from Boyle‘s mirror-as-sermon would only serve to highlight the medium.
The plain style, though, fully embraces the purpose of the mirror. It does not require
ornamentation, because the process of reflection is itself full of images, figures, and
meaning.
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Chapter 2
Monstrous Words: Anne Hutchinson, the Quakers, and Heretical Speech
I.

Miscarried Theologies
In 1638 Anne Hutchinson‘s sixteenth pregnancy miscarried, producing half a

dozen or so monstrous creatures all ―at once; some of them bigger, some lesser, some of
one shape, some of another, few of any perfect shape, none at all of them […] of humane
shape.‖1 Several months earlier Hutchinson was tried and imprisoned as an Antinomian,
and just a month before her trial she had helped another Antinomian woman, Mary Dyer,
through her own miscarriage. Then governor, John Winthrop, describes the product of
Dyer‘s birth as such:
it had a face, but no head, and the ears stood upon the shoulders and were
like an ape‘s; it had no forehead, but over the eyes four horns, hard and
sharp; […] behind, between the shoulders, it had two mouths, and in each
of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had arms and legs as other
children; but, instead of toes, it had on each foot three claws, like a young
fowl, with sharp talons.2
For the ministers and magistrates, these monstrous births were material evidence of
theological error and spiritual failure—hence Winthrop‘s rendering of a conventional, if
tiny, devil and Thomas Weld‘s refusal to see any ―humane shape‖ among Hutchinson‘s
progeny. Weld makes explicit the correlation between monstrous births and monstrous
ideas: ―Then God himself was pleased to step in with his casting voice […] by testifying
his displeasure against their opinions and practices, as clearly as if he had pointed with
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his finger, in causing the two fomenting women, in the time of the height of the opinions,
to produce out of their wombs, as before they had out of their brains, such monstrous
births.‖3 To the ministers and magistrates, Hutchinson‘s and Dyer‘s miscarriages were
easily legible signs of error, demonstrating an epistemology characteristic of mid
seventeenth-century New English Puritanism. That is, material and physical realities were
visible signs of invisible truths: the Pequot War was a sign of providential displeasure,
conversion narratives verbalized unseen spiritual realities, and the world and the self
were searched for tangible evidence of grace.
The first chapter argues that the sermonic plain style was an attempt to hold on to
this epistemology, to make language a link between the visible and the invisible. But at
the core of the heretical claims that led to Hutchinson‘s trial and banishment was an
assertion that the invisible world was immediately accessible without the need for a
system of visible signs.4 The ministers, Hutchinson believed, were vulnerable to biblical
misinterpretation and ineffective preaching, suggesting that their rhetoric, sermonic style,
and hermeneutics shielded the fact that language somehow failed to participate in an
epistemology that posited the visible as a direct sign of the invisible. Hutchinson pursued
a religious experience that removed (or at least compensated for) the third terms of the
sermon and the minister. She claimed to receive immediate revelations from God and
therefore, to eliminate the epistemological uncertainties of divine knowledge by asserting
an immediacy that precluded any possibility of miscarriage—between the Bible and its
reader, between the sermon and its hearer, and between God and the individual.
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Hutchinson believed that relying on Christ‘s voice in immediate revelation
(transcending the biblical text) would render interpretive miscarriages unlikely. The
distinction between the Bible and Christ as Word was a defining characteristic of
seventeenth-century Quakerism as well, to which Mary Dyer converted after being
banished from Massachusetts following her monstrous birth. In her 1659 For Those that
Meet to Worship at the Steeplehouse, Quaker Rebecca Travers succinctly captures the
position of her fellow Quakers and of Hutchinson: Travers reprimands those who had
―turned the invisible God into the similitude or likeness of visible things‖ and ―let Ink
and Paper in his place, calling it by his Name.‖5 Hutchinson may not have drawn an
explicit opposition between the Bible and Christ, but her embrace of immediate
revelation did assume that Christ‘s voice was not limited to ―ink and paper.‖ At stake for
Hutchinson, Dyer, and Travers was a central contrast between letter and spirit. Travers
takes her cue from 2 Corinthians 3:6—―for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life‖—in
order to oppose what she saw as the natural text of Scripture to the spiritual force of
Christ. The prophetic speech of Hutchinson, Dyer, and Travers exposed the orthodoxy as
relying on the Bible as a third term, a mediating object obscuring direct divine
experience.
Hutchinson and the Quakers sought to bridge the gap between text and experience
they saw in the Puritan orthodoxy by making language reflective and generative of
spiritual experience. But New England authorities targeted Quaker and Antinomian
speech, in particular, as certain evidence of spiritual error. Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech
in her court trial, the contagious quality of Antinomian speech, the strangeness of the
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Quaker ―thou,‖ and the Quaker silent meeting all received criticism as sites of enthusiasm
and unrestrained speech. The orthodoxy described this speech as heretical in stark
opposition to their own ordered rhetoric. The plain style stood as a corrective for the kind
of enthusiastic experience the orthodoxy assumed was occurring in the Quaker meeting,
where there was no minister and no official sermon, as well as in the prophetic speech
issuing from Hutchinson‘s immediate revelations.
Puritan ministers emphasized the text over experience, Hutchinson and the
Quakers believed, but Hutchinson and the Quakers sought to give the letter spiritual life
by bringing it closer to experience. This chapter looks at the ―heretical‖ responses to the
same questions posed in the first chapter, which examined the Puritan orthodoxy‘s
positions on the relationship between language and religious experience. I ask how
Hutchinson and the Quakers, some of the most fiercely targeted heretics in midseventeenth-century New England, posed an alternative theology that mapped itself out in
and against a rhetorical rubric for accessing, understanding, and communicating religious
experience—particularly the experience of hearing Christ speak directly to the soul.
Hutchinson‘s immediate revelations and prophetic speech offered an alternative model of
religious experience that insisted on unmediated access to God, but the Quakers
thoroughly embraced immediate revelation and systematized the relationship between
revelation and public speech. They performed the same type of prophetic speech
Hutchinson did—speech arising from an unmediated experience of God‘s voice—but
they organized their doctrine and public meetings around this practice.
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Both Hutchinson and the Quakers went against the grain of Puritan orthodoxy by
claiming access to divine revelation; for Hutchinson this was immediate revelation, and
for the Quakers it was the inner light. Though immediate revelations and the inner light
had importantly different theological implications, they shared a sense of proximity to
God that transcended or superseded orthodox Biblical revelation, thus ostensibly
rendering meaning transparent. In this Hutchinson and the Quakers acknowledged that
the Bible, as written text, was liable to all kinds of miscarriage; language was always
potentially confused and confusing, and they sought ways to make divine truth more
accessible, communicable, and understandable by modeling alternative relationships
between religious experience and language. Rather than attempting to impose order on
experience rhetorically, as the plain style did, Hutchinson and the Quakers imagined
language arising from religious experience. Bridging the gap between text and experience
that they saw in the orthodoxy, Hutchinson and the Quakers sought a theology without
any third terms—without miscarriage.

II.

Speech without Miscarriage: Hutchinson’s Prophetic Speech
Anne Hutchinson was taken to civil trial at the Boston General Court in

November, 1637, officially banished from Massachusetts colony and held prisoner in a
Roxbury home for some months (while Thomas Shepard worked to convince her of her
errors), and then given a church trial in March of 1638, before finally leaving
Massachusetts. Hutchinson‘s accusers found much threatening in her immediate
revelation and attending unorthodox hermeneutic, but they also found easy evidence of
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heresy in the form of her speech.6 Winthrop described Hutchinson‘s language as he did
her womb: as the source of unrecognizable, prolific, and uncontrolled monstrosity. He
and Weld saw Dyer‘s and Hutchinson‘s monstrous births as clear providential signs of
punishment, and Winthrop characterized Hutchinson‘s language as the clear agent of the
controversy and of her own fate.
Winthrop‘s account of Hutchinson‘s trial and the Antinomian Controversy, A
Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians (1644), opens with a
catalogue of the erroneous and false opinions that Hutchinson and the other Antinomians
held. 7 Thomas Weld is the author of this list, and among the twenty-nine errors he lists,
language and its uses appear in several. The first error, ―That the Law, and the Preaching
of it is no use at all, to drive a man to Christ,‖ exposes a ministerial fear that Hutchinson
invalidated their spiritual and earthly purpose by questioning the salvific role of
preaching and of the Bible itself.8 What is more, Hutchinson undermined the value of
words, not just the Word, by using her language to seduce and manipulate. Winthrop
maintained that Antinomian speech, not just Antinomian ideas, seduced away members
of the church: ―with much faire speech they caused them to yeeld, with the flattering of
their lips they forced them.‖9 Her speech was cunning, Winthrop insinuates, but it was
also a legible sign of error:
for here she hath manifested, that her opinions and practise have been the
cause of al our disturbances, & that she walked by such a rule as cannot
stand with the peace of any State; for such bottomless revelations, as
either came without any word, or without the sense of the word, (which
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was framed to humane capacity) […] for they being above reason and
Scripture, they are not subject to control.10
The ―here‖ Winthrop mentions is Hutchinson‘s admission, on the second day of her twoday trial before the General Court of Boston, that God would deliver her from the
―calamity‖ of the trial by a miracle, and that she knew this by way of immediate
revelation. The controversy is condensed into Winthrop‘s above sentence: Hutchinson‘s
Antinomian opinions are the source of civil unrest, but in this passage Winthrop does not
focus on matters of justification and sanctification or the covenants of works and grace
(some of the major theological issues at stake). Instead, he concentrates on the Word and
its proper uses, thereby positing a relationship between Hutchinson‘s unruly tongue and
her disorderly relationship to Scripture. In Winthrop‘s assessment, Hutchinson‘s abuse of
language made her dangerous, but it was also the error that led to her banishment: her
―owne mouth should deliver her into the power of the Court,‖ Winthrop wrote. Winthrop
believed he had caught her in a trap of her own making when she admitted to immediate
revelation, and he read her prophetic speech as direct evidence of her reliance on
immediate revelation, because it came without any ―sense of the word,‖ meaning it was
fully unmoored from the doctrine of sola scriptura. Hutchinson did rely on the Bible as a
source of spiritual truth, but she exposed Winthrop and her ministers as substituting the
Bible—either the word or the sense of it—for immediate religious experience. She
claimed they put ink and paper in God‘s place.
Hutchinson‘s unruly tongue has received much critical attention, though scholars
often focus on issues of gender when discussing her speech. Jane Kamensky argues that
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Hutchinson‘s dissenting voice ―offered New England leaders a chance to define their own
voices as the speech of authority by classifying the words of disorderly women as the
archetype of social danger.‖11 Although Hutchinson‘s ―feminine‖ speech certainly was
threatening, focusing solely on gender obscures the criticism she leveled at her ministers‘
use of language. In her ―unruly‖ speech she claimed interpretive agency and exposed her
ministers‘ biblical interpretations as faulty. As Lisa Gordis has argued, Hutchinson
―highlighted the interpretive crisis and the ways in which it was shaped by Puritan
theories of reading, preaching, and interpretation. Most dramatically, Hutchinson‘s
claims about immediate revelation exposed the potential dangers of Puritan theories of
exegesis.‖12 Hutchinson challenges the very basis of Puritan epistemological systems, but
she does so, first and foremost, by criticizing her leaders‘ conception of language and
positing an alternative way of understanding the relationship between word and thing.
Patricia Caldwell, in her 1976 ―The Antinomian Language Controversy,‖ was the
first to call sustained attention to the linguistic theories at play in the Antinomian
Controversy. She argues that, on one level, Hutchinson was ―speaking a different
language‖ than her adversaries.13 She does not mean, simply, that Hutchinson was
making heterodox theological claims, though Caldwell assumes this; instead she means
that Hutchinson saw language as ―imprecise and uninformed before grace and [was]
swept away in a tidal wave of spirit after grace.‖14 Hutchinson, according to Caldwell,
believed that words could not ―fill their basic denotative function‖ and that words were
not a ―part of what one is.‖15 Although I agree with Caldwell that the Antinomian
Controversy, and Hutchinson‘s trial in particular, represents a controversy over language,
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not just theology, she misreads Hutchinson‘s distrust of language.16 Rather than thinking
of language as incapable of truly representing one‘s heart and mind, Hutchinson argued
that her ministers misused and abused language, severing the word‘s relationship to thing.
Hutchinson herself, though, used her prophetic speech as a means of overcoming the
linguistic failure she saw in her leaders. In this sense, her language was caught up ―in a
tidal wave of spirit‖—not deposed by the Spirit, but a part of it—but Hutchinson did not
argue that language was swept away by or in spirit.
Tamara Harvey has most directly responded to Caldwell‘s argument, pointing out
that ―all Puritans were suspicious of human language and interpretations.‖17 For Harvey,
the difference between Hutchinson and ―all‖ Puritans was in how each ―conceptualized
language‘s performative actions.‖18 In opposition to the rejection of language that
Caldwell identified in Hutchinson, Harvey argues that ―[f]or Hutchinson, bodies and the
Word are not stable signs that signify God‘s will but rather are conduits for the Holy
Spirit, witnessing to God‘s will functionally.‖19 Harvey emphasizes the ―functionally‖
here, arguing that Hutchinson‘s performative body was a ―third term‖ in her testimony.
She ―recognizes the limits placed on her body,‖ Harvey writes, ―but challenges the
accepted relationship between body and soul and in doing so, redefines ‗power‘ such that
her body is no longer a manipulated object within a symbolic hierarchy, but rather a
transitory vessel serving as a conduit for the Holy Spirit.‖20 Against Caldwell, then,
Harvey argues that Hutchinson imagined an alternative relationship between material
(word, body) and immaterial (signified, soul) that reclaimed language from the abusive
hands of her ministers. And in Harvey‘s assessment, as in my own, Hutchinson espouses
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a view in which the material is overcome by the spiritual; language is remade as spiritual
power and the body as spiritual vessel.
I argue that, though in many respects they contradict one another, both Harvey
and Caldwell are right. Although, as Harvey argues, Hutchinson attempted to reclaim
language and her body as vessels of the Spirit, she ultimately failed, as Caldwell helps us
realize. Hutchinson failed because her attempts to reclaim language ended in a
repudiation of the very epistemological link between seen and unseen that Puritanism
posited and in which Hutchinson sought a more consistent role for language.
Hutchinson‘s trial, then, uncovers a shift in her conception of language. Although she
tried to reclaim her ministers‘ epistemology from what she saw as errors in their use of
language, she failed. In her speech to the court she left behind the literal, physical text of
the Bible and she denied her body‘s physicality. She was made over, and made the text
over, in the image of the Spirit, but with that renovation she lost control over her material
existence and was banished from the colony.
Throughout the first half of her trial, Anne Hutchinson seems a confident, careful,
and smart speaker: she overturns the faulty arguments of her accusers, uses the law to her
advantage, and employs scriptural references to support her arguments and defeat those
of her accusers. She is decidedly in control of her language, and understands its potential
to persuade; she does not assume a voice that is purely prophetic. Eventually, though, this
control over her own voice fails to spare her from punishment when she admits to
immediate revelations, and as we have seen, delivers herself into the hands of the court
by ―her owne mouth.‖ Because of this Hutchinson‘s admission is often read as surrender:
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Hutchinson simply gives up, gets too weak, or sees no way around her fate.21 While we
now understand, especially in the wake of Janice Knight‘s Orthodoxies of Massachusetts,
that the Antinomian theological ―errors‖ were not inherently unorthodox, but merely
vying for the upper hand in a theological, social, and political battle of ideas, we still
imagine Hutchinson as an unruly speaker.22 Certainly, she loosened her voice from the
social strictures of her moment and upset convention, but her performance in her court
trial is disciplined, at least initially. It is precisely in the speech in which she admits
immediate revelation—often read as unruly—that she becomes most verbally disciplined,
because she relies on a disciplined hermeneutic of reading Christ‘s voice and understands
her own voice as disciplined by God. Hutchinson must submit herself to God‘s voice; she
must die to the flesh to become a vessel for the Spirit‘s voice. But ultimately language
spins out of control. It is not the case that Hutchinson‘s voice is unruly; instead, language
itself is severed from things. Language has no material ground in Hutchinson‘s attempts
to make her body and voice pure spiritual vessels.
If, as I will argue later, the Quakers rejected an orthodox hermeneutic for
immediate revelations accessed through the inner light, Hutchinson does not transgress
quite so far; she never denies the literalism of the Bible, and she unequivocally states that
she derives all her theological opinions directly from Scripture. When asked to provide
scriptural support for holding meetings in her home to instruct other women, Hutchinson
quickly offers one: ―I conceive there lyes a clear rule in Titus, that the elder women
should instruct the younger.‖23 After some debate about whether it is lawful for
Hutchinson to instruct any men that come to her, Hutchinson asks the court to ―set me
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down a rule by which I may put them [men] away,‖ and Winthrop responds that it is not
the court‘s job, but hers: ―You must shew your rule to receive them.‖24 Hutchinson
reminds them that she had previously brought scriptural rules as support, but then
Winthrop changes the burden of proof by arguing that her meetings are ―greatly
prejudicial to the state‖ and completely abandons the scriptural line of argument.25 The
ministers and magistrates do not, in the court trial, respond to Hutchinson‘s miscarried
interpretation with substantial debate about the meaning of her scriptural references or
offer her religious guidance; instead they abandon their arguments. In the face of
Hutchinson‘s careful and quick speech, the ministers and magistrates are silent.
Although she uses the proper hermeneutical tools, Hutchinson‘s interpretation
miscarries into a monstrous claim about divine revelation. Hutchinson follows the
exegetical guidelines handed down to her from her ministers but still derives an
unorthodox reading, thus threatening to undermine the hermeneutical system of New
England Puritanism by implying that if the sermon and biblical hermeneutics were to
correspond to the ministers‘ epistemological assumptions, there could never be real
theological consensus. Hutchinson sees her ministers‘ reliance on hermeneutical tools, or
human helps, as a tacit acknowledgment of the impossibility of a truly unmediated
relationship to God, thus also admitting that language itself fails to truly represent. In
place of this she turns inward to the voice of God, searching for a more legible and
communicable experience.
Hutchinson‘s admission of immediate revelations occurs in the context of her
longest speech in the trial. In response to one of the fiercest charges against her—that she
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undermined the authority of her ministers by claiming that many of them were under a
covenant of works—Hutchinson takes the floor: ―If you please to give me leave I shall
give you the ground of what I know to be true.‖26 ―What I know to be true‖ is immediate
revelation. Hutchinson begins her story in England, describing her religious journey of
the past few years. She recalls being tempted to become a separatist, doubting the Church
of England‘s authority, and questioning whether ―papists‖ are not actually ―anti-christ‖
because they do not deny Christ in the flesh.27 In some ways, Hutchinson‘s speech
presents itself as a conversion narrative, but it does not follow most of the genre‘s
rhetorical conventions. Those it does incorporate are turned to new ends: although
Hutchinson chronicles her movement from a place of doubt into clarity, she not only
discusses her own justification and sanctification, but also her ability to discern these in
others. And while she describes how God had opened her heart and mind through
Scripture, her realizations come through ―the voice of his own spirit to my soul‖ and not
Scripture alone.28 This narrative reveals Hutchinson‘s own epistemological struggles, but
she closes with an assurance of spiritual knowledge achieved through a direct experience
of God‘s voice that disciplines her sight and her speech.
As a result of her divine experience, Hutchinson believes God has given her the
ability to discern the inner spiritual state of individuals—particularly her ministers. Much
of the trial is spent confirming the rumors that Hutchinson had questioned her ministers‘
authority. Early in the trial Thomas Dudley, the deputy Governor, says that Hutchinson
had ―disparaged all our ministers in the land that they have preached a covenant of works,
and only Mr. Cotton a covenant of grace.‖29 Though Hutchinson attempts to deny this by
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saying that ―one may preach a covenant of grace more clearly than another,‖ the court
does not believe her. Eventually Hutchinson admits that she might have said the ministers
preached a covenant of works, but here she makes a distinction between preaching a
covenant of works and being under such a covenant. She, like Travers, uses 2 Corinthians
3:6 to argue the difference.30 When Hutchinson claims to know the ―clear ministry,‖ then,
she means this distinction between the letter and the spirit. Those ministers preaching a
covenant of works, Hutchinson argues, labor under the Law, not the Gospel. For
Hutchinson‘s accusers, the Gospel was the new covenant of grace, marking the passing
away of the Law, but Hutchinson, like Travers, argued that her ministers emphasized the
letter over the spirit, accusing them of making ―ink and paper‖ their god. She exposed
their faith as false, because highly mediated, and she dismissed the authority of any who
would deny her an immediate experience of God.
Hutchinson‘s speech in her trial opens with and turns on the question of
interpretive authority. But unlike her ministers, whom she views as having assumed
authority, Hutchinson asks who has authority. In an earlier moment of doubt, Hutchinson
reports, the Lord had opened the Scripture to her and brought to her mind a passage from
Hebrews, revealing to her that ―those which did not teach the new covenant had the spirit
of the antichrist.‖31 Hutchinson begins conventionally, describing the Lord opening a
passage to her—a customary way of describing the bible-reading experience—but then
transcends the sense of that passage by applying it to something outside its explicit
meaning. She continues:
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upon this he [God] did discover the ministry unto me and ever since. I
bless the Lord, he hath let me see which was the clear ministry and which
the wrong. […] Since that time I confess I have been more choice and he
hath let me to distinguish between the voice of my beloved and the voice
of Moses, the voice of John Baptist and the voice of antichrist, for all
those voices are spoken of in scripture.‖32
Hutchinson goes beyond claiming an interpretive authority that some of her ministers,
Cotton in particular, encouraged, to asserting an ability to discern who had such
authority.33 She makes the Bible the ground for all of these claims, something her
ministers and judges overlook, but such a claim to discernment relies on immediate
revelation, not the Bible. To her claim to distinguish which of her ministers is in the
―clear ministry,‖ Hutchinson adds that she has gained the ability to discern the voice of
her beloved, the voice of God. This discernment is a form of discipline, and Hutchinson
implies that her spiritual journey is fully realized when she gains discernment of voices.
It is a sign, to her, that she hears God‘s voice outside biblical revelation, and it affirms
her belief in an unmediated experience of God.
The minister and magistrates seize on this moment, attempting to expose
Hutchinson‘s ―discernment‖ as enthusiastic, or absolutely undisciplined. When asked
how she knew that the Spirit, as opposed to Satan or her own fancy, gave her this
discernment Hutchinson answers, ―How did Abraham know that it was God that bid him
offer his son,‖ to which Winthrop responds, anxiously one imagines, ―By an immediate
voice.‖ Hutchinson replies without any apparent hesitation: ―so to me by an immediate
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revelation.‖34 Claiming the kind of revelation Abraham experienced on Mount Moriah
constituted, from the perspective of the court, a contagious enthusiasm that undermined
real (biblical) revelation and warped the Word of God. Hutchinson claimed to discern
between the ―bad‖ and ―good‖ ministers and practiced an alternate hermeneutic—not the
one modeled by her ministers, but one directed by God‘s voice and not Scripture alone.
God spoke to her, she believed, not just through Scripture, but above it, and Scripture was
of little direct application when discerning which of her ministers practiced the ―clear
ministry.‖
After Hutchinson‘s speech, Winthrop rejoices that God‘s providence has made
her ―lay open her self‖ and tells the court that ―the ground work of her revelations is the
immediate revelation of the spirit and not by the ministry of the word […] Ey it is the
most desperate enthusiasm in the world, for nothing but a word comes to her mind and
then an application is made which is nothing to the purpose, and this is her revelations
when it is impossible but that the word and spirit should speak the same thing.‖35
Winthrop takes issue with Hutchinson‘s speech, not because she claims that God had
revealed something to her, but because she claims this through the Spirit, not the Word.
Winthrop, and the other authorities in the court room, believed that the Bible was the
source and touchstone for any revelation, but here Hutchinson receives revelations from
―nothing but a word.‖
From her perspective, though, these were clearly God‘s words, and her
applications were something ―to the purpose.‖ For instance, when God ―revealed‖ to her
a ―place out of Daniel,‖ promising her deliverance, Hutchinson was practicing a
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typological reading, applying moments from the Old Testament to living individuals and
to the community as a whole. The end result, and not the method, is what Winthrop found
disruptive. What her ministers saw as a miscarriage between method and monstrous
product, Hutchinson claimed as evidence that their hermeneutic and epistemological
systems were obstacles to an immediate experience of God. Hutchinson‘s biblical
interpretation married method and product in a way her ministers‘ exegesis could not.
At the close of her narrative, Hutchinson assumes her prophetic voice and
preaches to the court, providing evidence that immediate access to the Spirit is
manifested in language. After she offers her reading of Daniel, wherein she claims God
had promised to deliver her from the ―calamity‖ of the trial, Hutchinson moves outside
the literal text of the Bible. She ends her speech with these words:
Therefore I desire you to look to it, for you see this scripture fulfilled this
day and therefore I desire you that as you tender the Lord and the church
and commonwealth to consider and look what you do. You have power
over my body but the Lord Jesus hath power over my body and soul, and
assure yourselves thus much, you do as much as in you lies to put the Lord
Jesus Christ from you, and if you go on in this course you begin you will
bring a curse upon you and your posterity, and the mouth of the Lord hath
spoken it.36
Although she opens with reference to Daniel, Hutchinson offers no scriptural support for
the argument she sets forth. She does not bring ―rules‖ or make explicit her exegesis.
Rather, the language of this paragraph is typical of prophecy, and when Hutchinson
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closes with ―the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it‖ she unequivocally marks the
preceding speech as a prophetic one. She moves outside the language of Daniel that
precipitates her speech and speaks directly to her accusers. What is more, she represents
her words, unambiguously, as God‘s words.
With this conclusion, Hutchinson suggests the entire speech had been prophetic.
Her language reflects her immediate religious experience and demonstrates a rejection of
an ink and paper God. Throughout the speech she relies on experience, even turning the
biblical text into a tool for accessing God. The text does not mediate because she always
moves beyond it. Hutchinson‘s claim that God has power over her body and soul
suggests a relationship between the two that is mirrored in her prophetic speech, as
Harvey argues. Language ushering from the Lord‘s mouth, to her soul, to her mouth
suggests an immediacy between God, soul, and body. Hutchinson exposes her minister‘s
sermonic rhetoric as obscuring the intimate connection between God and the individual,
and she offers prophetic speech as an alternative. The ministers and magistrates,
Hutchinson says, put Christ ―from‖ them, but her prophetic speech assumes his absolute
immediacy.
Yet some of Hutchinson‘s heretical theological opinions suggest she did not think
of the body as an agent in the way Harvey characterizes it. Instead, Hutchinson imagined
the body as swept away in the spirit, almost immaterial. Her speech in the trial, as a
manifestation of God‘s immediacy, reaffirms this. Hutchinson imagined an alternative to
her ministers‘ sermonic rhetoric, but it was a highly spiritual alternative. Her speech was
prophetic, or spiritual. In this sense, Caldwell is right: Hutchinson did not imagine
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language as fundamentally ineffective, as Caldwell argues, but she also did not imagine
efficacious language as material. Prophetic speech renounces the material word.
Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech in the trial corresponds to her mortalism, one of the
theological heresies most discussed in her church trial.37 And her mortalism further
suggests that she understood her prophetic speech as evidence of an unmediated
relationship to God.
In the seventeenth-century, there were various forms of mortalism, and while the
most extreme, annihilationism, professed the ultimate spirituality of the soul and denied
any resurrection of body or soul, most argued for a ―soul-sleep,‖ in which the soul dies or
sleeps upon death and is resurrected in the general resurrection at the end of history. In all
versions, though, mortalism was a spiritist argument that denied individual selves agency
in history and instead prioritized God acting in and through the self. Although there is
some argument about whether Hutchinson was an annihilationist, her mortalism suggests
a particular understanding of the relationship between the visible and the invisible.
Orthodox eschatology held that while the body and soul separated upon death, awaiting
their reunion at the general resurrection, the soul lived on eternally, but Hutchinson‘s
mortalism argues for the primacy of the invisible over the visible. In Hutchinson‘s
mortalism, we see the invisible overtaking the visible; the soul is valued highly above the
body, and the self dissolves into God‘s being. Thus, when she claims that the court may
have power over her body and not her soul, she thinks to render them essentially
powerless.
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A hint of perfectionism underlies Hutchinson‘s mortalism. Although she did not
profess perfectionism, she implies it in her church trial—or at least her judges thought so.
As evidence for her perfectionism, the court argued that she read many scriptural
resurrection prophecies as speaking of earthly bodies rather than spiritual bodies after
death and that she denied the resurrection of the physical body. So, they argue,
Hutchinson believed God had transformed her earthly body into a spiritual one. In place
of an orthodox eschatology, Hutchinson implied that a spiritual resurrection occurred
upon reception of saving grace; the gracious individual received an immortal spiritual
body on earth. Like language, the body was immaterial. Both functioned as pure spiritual
vessels, thus removing the gap between the material and immaterial by making
everything spiritual.
Hutchinson‘s trial begins with her desire to correct the failings of her ministers‘
linguistic forms, to replace the plain style sermon with immediate, inspired prophetic
speech. But she ends with a rejection of the plain style‘s epistemology. ―You have power
over my body, but the Lord has power over my body and soul,‖ are almost her last words,
and with these—seen in the light of her mortalism—Hutchinson realizes that the body is
not an empirically reliable sign of the soul‘s state. Her only recourse is to abandon the
body for the soul, to embrace a spiritism that denies the need for an epistemological link
between the visible and invisible. Hutchinson‘s theology and her speech tend toward a
repudiation of the visible, and directly after her speech she says ―But now having seen
him which is invisible I fear not what man can do unto me.‖38 These words conjure
Travers‘ words about those who turn the invisible God into the likeness of a visible thing.
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Hutchinson, in her prophetic moment, turns toward the invisible God, leaving the
tangible object of the Bible in the shadows of his immediate voice. And having accessed
the invisible, Hutchinson believes that what happens to her body is ultimately
inconsequential. After her speech, Hutchinson speaks very little; when she does, her
words are strikingly bare of the self-defense that marked the first half of the trial. Once
God has spoken through her, once she has heard his promises and spoken forth his
warnings, she has nothing left to say, and why should she if man cannot harm her? Her
repudiation of the visible resigns her to silence.
That is, until her last line. Once the court has pronounced its verdict, Hutchinson
asks, ―I desire to know wherefore I am banished‖ and plunges back into the visible world,
suddenly concerned with the details of her physical life. ―I fear not what man can do,‖
she had said, but here the body asserts itself as a reminder of material life. Winthrop
refuses to comfort her: ―Say no more, the court know wherefore and is satisfied.‖39 And
with that, Hutchinson is officially silenced—one last attempt by her authorities to assert
their power—once again reminding her that the court did in fact have power over her
body.
While the Quakers practiced the same kind of prophetic speech Hutchinson did in
her trial, understanding the need for divinely disciplined speech, they also saw language
itself as an epistemological tool—something Hutchinson‘s spiritism could not realize. By
regulating words themselves, in daily speech as well as religious practice, the Quakers
found linguistic forms that collapsed the visible and the invisible. But rather than
rejecting the visible world, as Hutchinson had, the Quakers believed that the spiritual
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transformed the natural. New Creatures were born out of the inner light. This was the
essential difference between Hutchinson and the Quakers; their systemization of
immediate revelation enabled them to demonstrate their epistemology in and through
language and to make language itself a tool for experiencing God. Their speech achieved
what Hutchinson‘s could not.
Just as the authorities in Massachusetts charged Hutchinson with unruly speech,
the courts and churches relentlessly persecuted the Quakers as strange, disorderly
speakers.40 The accusers, of both the Antinomians and the Quakers, were concerned with
theology, but speech was a visible sign and thus an easy target. I have argued that
Hutchinson‘s prophetic speech marks a rejection of orthodox rhetorical and sermonic
form and instead models a prophetic speech that claims immediate access to the invisible
world, and the Quakers systematized this process by organizing a hermeneutic for
hearing Christ speak to the soul. In addition to their systemization of immediate
revelation, the Quakers transformed their daily speech, disciplining their language, and
transforming it—like themselves—into the image of Christ, the incarnate Word. Rather
than repudiating the material, like Hutchinson, the Quakers transformed language into the
material reflection of God‘s Spirit.

III.

“To Speak New Things”: Quaker Speech and Silence
When, in 1676, Roger Williams, once a defender of freedom of conscience in

New England, wrote his scathing critique of Quakerism (directed at Quaker founder
George Fox and Quaker writer Edward Burroughs), titled George Fox Digg‟d Out of His
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Burrows, Fox quickly retaliated, defending his faith against every one of Williams‘s
critiques. Although not the most theologically significant point of contention for Fox,
what seemed to agitate him most was Williams‘s harsh condemnation of Quaker speech.
Early Quaker speech was composed of several features aimed at transforming daily
language, such as the rejection of conventional polite greetings, a mandate to address all
people by first names, the refusal to swear oaths, and the use of the second person
singular ―thou‖ in place of the plural ―you.‖ They called this the pure language, and the
Quaker ―thou‖ was the characteristic on which Williams—and countless other antiQuaker writers—focused most.
The Quakers were prolific writers and published countless tracts, pamphlets, and
broadsides defending themselves against their accusers; they also debated amongst
themselves the purpose, value, and proper theology of their use of language. Their
persecutors, in turn, churned out an enormous body of anti-Quaker literature. 41 While
this literature most often came out of the British press, New England was never far out of
sight, for it was the location of the most violent anti-Quaker activity, and countless
English texts cited the colonial situation as representative of the severity of Quaker
persecution. The Quakers first went to the colonies in July of 1656, when the first of
several groups of Quakers landed in Massachusetts Bay to spread their particular gospel.
It did not take long before the General Court took legal action against the Quakers: the
two Quaker women who came to the colony in July were imprisoned for five weeks
before being banished, and in the same month the General Court passed the first of many
anti-Quaker laws, which stipulated that anyone caught importing Quaker books to the
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colonies would be fined. The severity for breaking anti-Quaker laws quickly escalated,
and by 1659 Mary Dyer was led to the gallows—the first round of Quaker executions in
Massachusetts Bay.42
This persecution quickly drew attention from England, and the General Court
began to defend its actions through the English press. In 1660 A True Relation of the
Proceedings Against Certain Quakers was published in London, and it offered legal and
ecclesiastical support for the Massachusetts executions in October of 1659, when Dyer
was first sentenced to death and two other Quakers were hanged. The whole ―design‖ of
the Quakers, the True Relation states, was to ―undermine and ruine‖ the ―peace and
order‖ of the colony.43 The True Relation directly opposes Quaker unruliness, violence,
and contagion to the measured prudence of the court, aligning the English and the Boston
Court against the Quakers: the court had followed the ―example of England‖ and its antiJesuit laws, it had acted according to English laws more generally, and it was prepared to
confront the Quaker threat because it had ―intelligence from good [English] hands.‖44
Both the English and colonial authorities targeted speech as one of Quakerism‘s most
unruly characteristics. Though the True Relation makes no explicit charge against Quaker
language and speech, the Quakers‘ ―impetuous frantic fury,‖ which the Massachusetts
General Court claimed necessitated action, was one of the most common indictments
against Quaker speech on both sides of the Atlantic.45
Most Quaker writers, though, argued that the pure language, in particular the
second person changes, were encouraged, if not mandated, by Biblical precedent. In The
Pure Language of the Spirit of Truth (1655) Richard Farnsworth was the most direct,
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claiming that the pure language was ―the proper Language to any single person
whatsoever.‖ 46 Farnsworth has no patience for the critics of the Quaker ―shibboleth,‖ for
they ―cannot endure the language and life that gave forth the Scripture, therefore art thou
manifest to be the serpent, and the painted Harlot, which was ever judged with the spirit
of truth, in which is the pure Language, which is the judge of all false Languages, and the
judge of unclean spirits.‖47 Farnsworth sets up a direct relationship between spirit and
language, arguing that pure language can only emerge from pure spirits.
Quaker critics also saw speech as a visible sign, but one of spiritual error rather
than redemption. The very name ―Quakers,‖ to which they objected (often referring to
themselves as ―those scornfully called Quakers‖), carried with it an assumption of bodily
unruliness. Texts mocking Quakers often played on this assumption and read the body as
a sign of spiritual error, in the same way Winthrop read Hutchinson‘s and Dyer‘s
monstrous births. Perhaps the best example of such a text is The Character of a Quaker in
his True and Proper Colours or, The Clownish Hypocrite Anatomized (1671), written by
R. H. As the title states, R. H. paints the Quaker as a clown, but he uses this mockery to
sell his stronger claim about Quaker monstrosity. From the very first sentence, R. H.
draws attention to Quaker speech as essential evidence for their heresy and hypocrisy.
Calling Quakers the ―fag-end of the Reformation,‖ he criticizes their ―characteristick
Thou‖ and their idolization of ―Phrases,‖ and assumes his readers will easily identify a
Quaker because he refuses to ―speak like his Neighbours.‖48 The Quaker, R. H. reveals, is
an ―enemy to all Order,‖ and nowhere more than in his speech:
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His discourses are nothing but a Rhapsody of oft repeated Non-sense; and
when he hath darkened your understanding with a cloud of insignificant
Babble, he cries, Ah! Friends mind the Light. He usually begins with
Raving like Mahomet in his Falling-fit, or the Devil of Delphose‟s Priests,
that never delivered their Lying Oracles, but with extravagant gestures
and odd distortions of body. Swear not at all, is his Motto, but Lies he
holds in many cases venial. […] He cheats worse then a Long-lane
Broker, by pretending to deal at a word.49
By aligning the Quaker with Islam and comparing him to the priests of the Delphic
oracle, R. H. draws on a host of assumptions that malign the Quaker‘s theology and
verbal and bodily manifestations of that theology.50 The Quakers were often criticized as
greedy, double-dealing merchants (Long-lane being notoriously associated with
especially dishonest brokers of second-hand clothing), but here R. H. roots that deception
in language.51 The Quaker‘s theology, body, and speech are all characterized by frenzy,
disorder, and, ultimately, a lack of substance. Their speech, R. H. repeatedly asserts, is
meaningless, and deception is their norm. R. H. writes that the Quaker ―strew‟d his face
into a Religious frame, and tun‘d his voice to a puling sanctimonious key.‖52 Though
unruly, R. H. claims, the Quaker is fundamentally ineffective. The sheer amount of
literature written to unmask the Quaker, however, proves that R. H. and his ilk did, in
fact, fear the Quaker‘s voice. 53 R. H. was but one among many who dismissed Quaker
theology by mocking the Quaker clown‘s language, but underneath his mockery one can
sense an abiding fear of Quaker monstrosity and theological contagion. For R.H.
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hypocrisy was the Quaker‘s essence, and the mismatch between external claims to truth
and internal spiritual state made the Quaker much more dangerous than a clown; it made
him a monster.
Roger Williams was one of the most bombastic colonial critics of Quaker speech.
In Fox‘s response to Williams, A New England Fire Brand Quenched (1678), he quotes
Williams‘s original denunciation: ―And thou say‘st: In their first Creeping […] out of the
Cradle, how doth this Spirit dare the Spirits of Kings &c. to Thou and Thee to the Faces
of Mighty Monarchs: with what Brazen Faces.‖ Fox replies: ―The Reader may see, what
a plague the word THEE and THOU is to R. W! yet was the Language of Christ and the
holy Men of God both to Superior and Inferior. And R. W. who calleth himself an
Orator, what! hath he not read his Accidence and Grammar, Plural and Singular?‖54
Readers of Fox, both then and since, have focused mostly on his implication that the pure
language was modeled on a biblical stylistic precedent, but his recourse to grammar here
matters. The Quaker pure language was not a rejection of language, or a search for a prelapsarian, Edenic ideal; it was, as Fox‘s grammatical focus demonstrates, grounded in the
material. It was not an effort to transcend language, but rather to mirror in language the
incarnational principle of Christ as Word. The goal of the pure language was to transform
carnal, material language into holy, material language—to redeem language.
Amidst all of the concern over Quaker verbal frenzy, the Quakers were sitting
quietly in their meetinghouses, awaiting God‘s voice. The Quaker ―silent meeting,‖ as it
was called, had no minister or sermon; instead every Quaker sat silently until moved to
witness or prophecy and then spoke whatever God had revealed to him or her through the
95

inner light, Christ within. The Quaker meeting received censure for its sheer strangeness,
but much of this criticism focused on the rather loud aspects of the meeting. Roger
Williams, for example, wrote about the cacophony he witnessed in the Quaker
meetinghouse, describing the meeting as full of ―vapours,‖ ―gusts,‖ and ―interruptions.‖55
The Quakers, however, saw this possible proliferation of speech as the ordered Word of
God ushering forth. In Let Your Words be Few (1983), one of the most comprehensive
studies of seventeenth-century Quaker speech and language, Richard Bauman describes
the play between Quaker silence and speech as essentially ordered. In his assessment,
Quaker silence was not only a means to a prophetic end but was the ideal result of
speech: ―it was also the ultimate purpose, the desired outcome, of speaking.‖56 To
demonstrate this Bauman quotes George Fox: ―the intent of all speaking is to bring into
the life […] and to possess the same, and to live in and enjoy it, and to feel God‘s
presence, and that is in the silence.‖57 Any prophecy uttered by any Quaker (and any
Quaker could witness, regardless of class or gender) was meant to bring individuals into
new silenced supplication towards God. The silence was not mere preparation for an
official sermon, for which the Quakers criticized the formalism of Protestantism. Bauman
describes the relationship between silence and speaking as circular: silence begets
speaking, which in turn produces more silence. The Quaker meeting, as Bauman notes,
attempted to slough off the forms of the world, especially empty linguistic forms.
Bauman rightly characterizes the Quaker rejection of formalism, but by focusing on
Quaker silence he wrongly argues that Quakers desired to transcend language. Quaker
writings reveal that they paid careful attention to the form of their speech: the silent
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meeting had an attending hermeneutic that was an organized system for hearing Christ
speak to the soul and then communicating that revelation to the religious community. I
argue that, ultimately and ideally, the silent meeting would transform speech in order to
manifest God in the word. Rather than transcending language, Quakers sought to redeem
language.
William Britten‘s Silent Meeting, a Wonder to the World (1660) best represents
this system, and Britten begins by defining the silent meeting in opposition to the formal
Protestant sermon. Britten describes the highly mediated, and therefore dishonest, quality
of the Protestant pulpit: ―and speaking by hear-say (as others did) and not upon
experience from Christ within me, but by imitation; as Players on a Stage, assume the
Names, and act the person or Princes, Nobles &c. but being come off, and unmasked,
they are no such men.‖58 Britten exposes, or unmasks, the Protestant sermon as mere
performance, lacking the substance of experience. In contrast, the Quaker meeting brings
internal ―experience from Christ,‖ because ―when earthly thoughts, earthly words, and
earthly works are all laid aside, and the Temple within us is ready, the Light of Christ
shining in it, and the Lord with a further Manifestation of his Love, enters it by his
Eternal Power […] making us feel the power of an endless life.‖59 Part of what the critics
objected to was the emotional tenor of this experience. Britten‘s description fits the
definition of enthusiasm all too easily, but Britten anticipates and undercuts these
censures by arguing that those who do not keep watch over the tongue, through silence,
―run hastily upon action, and their tongues speak unadvisedly, in hasty Questions and
Answers, oftentimes proceeding to Passion, and Rage, like short fits of madness.‖60 The
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silent meeting, he argues, is a corrective for enthusiasm. Silence itself disciplines the
religious experience and the language uttered as part of that experience. Britten‘s
contention that ―earthly words‖ must be laid aside in order to truly experience Christ does
not mean speech had no place in the Quaker meeting, but it does distinguish carnal from
spiritual language. The speech uttered in the silent meeting was prophetic, but it did not
assume the spiritism of Hutchinson. Quaker speech was the earthly container for spiritual
language, just as Christ was the physical incarnation of God.
Christ‘s light shining in the ―temple within‖ is the Quaker inner light—the source
of this discernment. As Britten describes it: ―except Christ in Spirit be within, to work
Faith and Obedience, the seeing, hearing or reading the Letter avails little without us.‖61
The inner light enables the Quaker to do more than read the letter (the Bible or the Law)
and acts as a source of continuous immediate revelation. Although the inner light is a
constant presence within the individual, the Quaker meeting requires that each individual
discern between private revelations and those meant to edify the community. Britten
offers a hermeneutic for listening to this inner light, and whatever passivity ―silent
meeting‖ might suggest, this hermeneutic requires alertness in mind and body, and
profound activity of the soul.
Britten describes the interior work that occurs in the silence, when the ―tongue
speaks not‖: ―The body in Silent-Meetings, resting from labour (which is all the rest in a
carnal man‘s worship) but we go further, with a heart striving to rest from sinful
imaginations, and entering upon a true rest in God, of which we feel, see and taste in its
beginnings, as an earnest of our blessed Inheritance.‖62 He distinguishes the Quaker
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meeting not by the lack of motion or noise (other meetings have that outer stillness,
which is but a form), but by internal striving and entering. ―Striving to rest‖ seems
paradoxical, if not impossible, but Britten‘s phrase encapsulates the essence of the silent
meeting. While ―rest‖ is Britten‘s stated goal, self-denial being necessary for hearing
Christ, that rest is neither passive nor achieved without the full activity of body, mind,
and soul. It is only in this ―true rest‖ that the individual becomes alive to God, to ―feel,
see and taste,‖ fully experiencing. The quietness of body and mind, then, is necessary for
true experience of God, but this ―true rest‖ is brimming with activity, activity Britten
describes in bodily, sensory language. This sensory awareness is brought on by striving.
Only the disciplined can achieve a full religious experience.
Britten breaks this silent striving into several distinct steps: 1) A Spiritual Watch,
2) A Spiritual Touchstone, and 3) The Spiritual Scales. As he describes this process,
Britten articulates a hermeneutic of silence. He argues that because the ―time of Tryal‖ is
unknown, ―the spiritual watch must be truly kept within‖ always.63 Failing to keep watch
results in the enthusiastic unbridled tongue, and to keep a true watch, one must ―learne
first to come unto a pure Silence in thine own self, which is to silence all in thee that is
evil […] so thy tongue, heart and hands shall be under the Faithful Watch, and the
Actions without in the body, with thy Actions within of the mind, as Love, Joy, Desire
&c, will by degrees be all brought into true Obedience.‖64 Although Britten is clear that
this work happens ―by that Eternal Power of God,‖ it is still a work that occurs ―by
degrees‖ and requires constant vigilance. And this silence transforms the ―actions within
of the mind‖ but also the ―Actions without.‖ Body and mind must both be ―brought into
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true Obedience‖—a divine discipline—but the ―faithful watch‖ is carried out by God and
the striving self. The silent meeting is not the only place of silence; pure silence is lived
silence, in both body and mind—a fully experienced silence.
The last two steps of Britten‘s hermeneutic describe what types of speech are
acceptable in the silent meeting and how one discerns their rightness. Britten describes
the Touchstone, the step wherein the silent individual tries the ―work, word or thought‖
aroused through the silent striving to determine whether it is ―pure or impure.‖ The
touchstone thus exposes words of ―zeal, or pretence of holiness,‖ as Satan ―cover[ing]
Vices under the name of Virtues.‖65 While the evidence for or against a pure work, word,
or thought seems murky, Britten provides some guidelines: ―note in the words
themselves, how sometimes they are too many; sometimes unsound and untrue;
sometimes too short, in telling but half a truth.‖66 Britten connects the form and content
of words, and uses the form itself as a touchstone. The form of one‘s speech acts as a
touchstone, but impure words could be either ―too many‖ or ―too short,‖ suggesting that
speech in the silent meeting was judged not by its abundance or scarcity but by its
intention and spiritual value. The ―Spiritual Scales,‖ the last step of the spiritual
hermeneutic, asks the potential speaker to ―weigh, ponder, or consider all things to be
spoken or done, before they pass from thee.‖67 This differs from the touchstone because it
involves the act of speaking, and the scales assure that one will speak what he or she
means: ―Yea and Nay, Yes and No, must bee the same as they are spoken, and so speak
the same thing intended.‖68 This is the philosophy guiding the pure language as well—
transparency and honesty—not scarcity.
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The spiritual hermeneutic is an internal one, but Britten maintains that it should
have legible external consequences. New Creatures, changed by Christ within them,
―Speake and Act New Things from that Law of God written in their inward Parts; and
such dare not Vent their Frothy words, as Flesh did formerly.‖69 The new creature does
not stop at speaking fresh words, he or she acts new things—the natural becomes
spiritual. Internal spiritual changes have external effects, and the external is made over in
the image of the spiritual. The monstrous flesh is transformed, and ―all their Parts,
Members, Faculties, and Abilities; are put to a New Use, the New Heart, and the New
Spirit is in them.‖70 The transformation is not just spiritual for Britten; the new heart and
new spirit ensure that members, faculties, and abilities—―all their parts‖—are also
changed. As part of this transformation, the new creature speaks a new language—a
language as pure as the silence.
The pure language is a manifestation of internal transformation, but it is also a
disciplined effort to live that transformation—to endure the constant, daily striving to
enter an internal silence. The alteration of daily speech marked the Quakers as a people
set apart, made over as New Creatures, but it also communicated important theological
and epistemological assumptions. The pure language was an attempt to speak the
language of the Bible, to discipline language itself. But Quakerism understood the Bible
as only one instance of divine revelation, and it was neither the primary source of
revelation nor the single touchstone for other revelations. Throughout Quaker writing,
Christ as Word replaces the Bible as the source of revelation and language. The Bible,
many Quakers argued—George Fox foremost among them—was not the Word of God;
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Christ was. This fundamental belief structured Quaker theories of language, and the pure
language was an attempt to bring language closer to Christ.
George Fox describes how spiritual transformation generates a metaphorically
silent speech, a daily language that manifests the inner light. A Battledoor for Teachers
and Professors (1660) is perhaps the most comprehensive and polemical case for the pure
language. Fox begins with the English ―battledoor,‖ moving through various languages
and arguing in each case that the ―thou‖ is singular and the ―you‖ is plural. Though this
looks much like a pedagogical grammar, and Fox did intend it to be read by teachers and
scholars, it is also a defense of Quaker speech and theology. In the introduction he writes
that ―all Languages are to me no more than dust‖ but bemoans the degeneration of the
English tongue.71 He begins by describing all language as ineffectual and insubstantial,
but he ends by arguing that the pure language offers redemption.
What at first seems a straightforward rejection of ―natural,‖ earthly language
becomes more complicated and contradictory as Fox moves through the Battledoor. He
states that language itself offers no redemption, reprimanding both Catholics and
Protestants for believing that they can ―make their Divines by their Tongues‖ and that
training will allow these ministers and priests to transcend or reverse Babel and make
their sermons comprehensible to all. He writes that ―Tongues is no more to learn then to
do a natural thing, and is attained and gotten in that knowledge and wisedom, that must
be confounded.‖72 What Fox criticizes here is not the notion that language is spiritually
efficacious; he finds fault with the order in which the divines place the relationship
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between language and soul. Language cannot make one holy, Fox argues, but language is
a manifestation of the state of one‘s soul.
Fox argues that the divines‘ language is evidence of spiritual degeneration: ―If
they have degeneration from their own words, and goings as they have from their own
Tongues, from the Tongues which are natural […] sure all cannot but judg that they are
far degenerated from the Divine things, and Spiritual things.‖73 Natural degeneration is a
sure sign of spiritual degeneration. This epistemological link between the visible and the
invisible leads Fox to demand a transformation of speech that is not ―natural‖ or taught,
but that is an organic reflection of internal, spiritual transformation. The pure language
accomplishes this:
But now there is a redemption from Degeneration, from the naturalls, and
nature is come and coming into its right course again, and so now the
Truth hath to drive all this degeneration back gain to the Pope from
whence it came, and to travel through to the Protestants through all their
degenerations till it come to the head of the Pope […] that all may come
into the true understanding of God again.74
―That all may come into the true understanding of God again‖; Fox looks for a
redemption from spiritual ignorance perpetuated by all those (Catholics and Protestants,
for example) who do not have true divine knowledge. The pure language offers
redemption from the degeneration of language, which is a reflection of spiritual
degeneration. But the pure language itself does not effect transformation; rather, the truth
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shadowed forth in and through language redeems language. And the truth in language is
Christ.
In a 1659 broadside directed at the magistrates of Nottingham (whom Fox calls
inquisitioners), Fox describes the relationship between Christ as truth and language:
Did you never read that the Scriptures saith Christ is the Word, and the
Word of God? Is not he the living Word? and the Word immortal; are
writings immortal? [...] what would ye have done to John if he had been
under your power, who tells you Christs name is the word of God? And
tells you, the Revelation is words? [...] will you set the scriptures in the
room of God, and give them his name? […] you want the Word to give
you an understanding to know a fulfiller, and that which is to be fulfilled;
a fulfiller is the Word, and that which is to be fulfilled is the words and
outward types and figures of changeable things: so who is in the Word, he
is in the unchangeable which was in the beginning, in whom the Scripture
end, Christ.75
For Fox the Bible is simply a declaration of all that Christ eventually fulfills and is itself
merely words. All languages are dust, because they are mere ―figures of changeable
things,‖ but Christ the Word as the source of all words transforms the dust into something
immortal and substantial. Fox takes his description of Christ as the Word straight from
the language of the Bible: Christ is living, immortal, reconciling, and the fulfillment. Fox
suggests that the passages of Scripture to which he alludes here are not self-referencing,
and instead he points to the Word behind the words. When the biblical text speaks of the
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Word as immortal, then, it means Christ. If, for Fox, the Bible is a declaration of all that
Christ fulfills, Christ trumps Scripture; the Word surpasses words.
Fox goes on in his broadside to argue that the distinction between the Word and
the words of Scripture is a natural one: ―are you not blind that cannot distinguish
writings, weh [sic] is Scriptures, from Christ, & God, but put them in their place? Surely
you are far off from spiritual things, while you do not understand natural things, have you
not read that John saith in the beginning was the Word, and was writings at the
beginning?‖76 The Bible, as text, is a natural thing, and those who rely on texts over an
immediate experience of God will be but blind guides. ―You remain in the mortal,‖ he
tells the magistrates, ―where the jars and strifes are about words,‖ but Fox, seeing beyond
the natural thing of Scripture to Christ rises above such strife and is ―redeemed out of
language.‖77 The battles about words, interpretations, hermeneutics, and philosophies of
language, all cede before the Word. The pure language is, therefore, not a mere prelapsarian linguistic ideal. The pure language is a spiritual language, transcending
arguments about words themselves and actually using words to reach Christ, the Word
and source of all words.
Thus, the Quaker shibboleth—the ―thou‖—comes directly from the Bible, which
is one manifestation of Christ as Word, and it marks daily language as redeemed out of
the natural and made over in the image of Christ. The hermeneutic of the silent meeting is
also a redemption out of language, because the words spoken there are literally God‘s
words. The individual is made a New Creature, and his or her language reflects that
transformation. Language becomes a visible sign, but it is also more than mere sign. Just
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as Britten argued that the silent meeting would transform the striving person, Fox claims
that language—both that of the religious meeting and everyday speech—is redeemed out
of the natural. Both the silent meeting and the pure language are attempts to make
language capture and reflect the Word with a capital W. Christ, manifested in language,
redeems language, and language thus mirrors the internal silence of the silent meeting,
where ―earthly words‖ are ―laid aside,‖ and the Light of Christ shines in the temple
within.
The Quakers, working from the same epistemological assumptions that eventually
led Hutchinson to repudiate the visible world, did just the opposite. They made over the
whole visible world in the image of the spiritual. Everything becomes more than mere
sign, and words themselves provide access to the Word, Christ. Where the Quakers saw
Christ in everyday words, Winthrop saw devils in the banality of childbirth, but both saw
the invisible world encroaching on the visible. The visible was not, even for Winthrop,
just an echo of the invisible, a small window into a greater reality. In Winthrop‘s view the
material world was overtaken by the monstrosity of sin, and the Quakers strove to
transform the natural into the spiritual—to let the inner light shine until it was all that was
visible. In the end, Hutchinson alone seems stuck in the visible world, try as she might to
escape it. Her last words in the trial are a reminder that she must go about living in this
monstrous world—a world that would imprison and banish an ill, pregnant woman. The
material realities of life overwhelm her, and at times the materiality of language escapes
her grasp. More than once in the trial Hutchinson excuses her theological errors by
arguing that her words do not properly convey her meaning: ―I doe not acknowledge it to
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be an Error but Mistake: I doe acknowledge my Expression to be ironious [erroneous] but
my Judgment was not ironious, for I held befor as you did but could not express it soe.‖78
In these moments, words are loosened from the things they represent, and Hutchinson
once again is caught in a trap of her own making. The Quaker ideal was that words would
never stray from the things they represented, because words themselves could have a
spiritual quality, but Hutchinson held no such ideal, and in the end the materiality—of
language, of place, of daily life—disrupted her access to God, and her words became
monstrous, even in her own mouth.
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Chapter 3
Metamorphizing Words: Native American Language and Translation
I.

Strange Speech

For thou art not sent to a people of a strange speech and of an hard language, but to the
house of Israel; Not to many people of a strange speech and of an hard language, whose
words thou canst not understand. Surely, had I sent thee to them, they would have
hearkened unto thee.
-Ezekiel 3:5-6
Cotton Mather‘s 1707 Another Tongue Brought in to Confess the Great Saviour of
the World opens with the second half of this passage from the book of Ezekiel, obscuring
the communication gap at the heart of cross-cultural encounter: if sent among ―people of
a strange speech and of an hard language,‖ the prophet‘s speech would be heard and
understood because it is God‘s speech. God‘s language is transparent, Ezekiel and Mather
both suggest. Yet Another Tongue, because it is a catechism in Iroquois intended for use
by ―English and Dutch traders among the Iroquois,‖ implicitly acknowledges the
necessity of translation in the Indian missionary project.1 Another Tongue was published
decades after the English colonists first began to evangelize the Native Americans, but
earlier translators—the kind who made Mather‘s circulation of an Iroquois catechism
possible—recognized the ―hardness‖ of learning Indian languages. And unlike Mather
they did not portray translation as a transparent process.
In his influential Forked Tongues: Speech, Writing, and Representation in North
American Indian Texts (1991), David Murray argues that seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury colonists portrayed language as fully transparent and portrayed translation as
invisible. The ―process of translation,‖ Murray writes, ―is obscured or effaced‖ in many
113

texts. Rather than effacing the act of translation, as Murray suggests and as Mather
demonstrates, the most well-known seventeenth-century New English translators of
Native American languages, John Eliot and Roger Williams, worried about what
translation itself might efface or obscure, namely the original text and experience. 2 Both
men recognized the limits of language to fully capture experience or describe the divine,
and they imagined Hebrew—their version of a heavenly or universal language free from
constructed representations—as an ideal to which their own English could never ascend.
Native languages, though, seemed to mirror, or even be linguistically related to, Hebrew,
and Eliot and Williams hoped native languages would bridge the gap between language
and experience. Because native languages were not written and were thought to arise
organically, they seemed to emerge straightforwardly from experience. Native languages
seemed to connect words to things.
Williams and Eliot approached the problem of reconciling experience and text
differently, and they had distinct ideas about how native languages fit into this project,
but their translation work among the Native Americans reveals their theological and
theoretical ideas about language—how it works, where it fails, and how it corresponds to
or diverges from one‘s experience of God and the natural world. This chapter examines
the ways Williams and Eliot engaged with the complexities of language and its
relationship to meaning and experience, specifically in relation to the work of translation.
Eliot and William worked among the Native Americans in the wake of British
universal language schemes, that flourished from the 1640s through the 1680s. The
language schemes attempted to bring word and thing into a one-to-one correspondence
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and influenced Williams‘s and Eliot‘s conceptions of translation. Like the British
advocates of philosophical grammars and universal language, Williams and Eliot strove
to make language correspond to experience and to link words to things. But unlike
universal language theorists such as John Wilkins or Cave Beck, Williams and Eliot
faced the daily problems of translation. What was only theory in England was practice in
the New World. For Eliot, native languages failed to deliver the promise of a universal
language, and translation exposed the layers of mediation between experience and text.
Therefore, Eliot tried to manage the failure of translation through the proliferation of
translated texts, which resulted in a self perpetuating cycle. For Williams, on the other
hand, translation was generative of new knowledge and novel experiences. Where Eliot
imagined translation as the foundation to Indian evangelism, Williams saw translation as
an epistemological tool.
The connection between Native American language and universal language
schemes has been provocatively elucidated by Sarah Rivett in ―Empirical Desire:
Conversion, Ethnography, and the New Science of the Praying Indian‖ (2006). Rivett
argues that native languages offered evidence for ―the possibility of a universal language
that would make divine phenomena visible in their pure, spontaneous, and unadulterated
forms.‖3 By identifying Native Americans as a lost tribe of Israel, seventeenth-century
missionaries and thinkers categorized native languages as a linguistic cousin to, or
descendent of, Hebrew. Because of their assumptions about the representational capacity
of divine language, these thinkers saw in native languages confirmation of the potential
for a universal language. The Native American conversion testimonies Eliot translated in
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texts like Tears of Repentance (1653), Rivett argues, ―presented an idealized vision of a
universal language.‖4 Yet the actual practice of translation, removed from the
philosophical community of something like the Royal Society, reveals a more
complicated picture of seventeenth-century language theory than the one Rivett
describes. Eliot and Williams offered their English audiences curiosities and evidence,
and certainly they themselves sought tangible evidence of invisible grace as Rivett
argues, but the work of translation necessarily removes some of the idealism with which
Rivett characterizes seventeenth-century translation theories.
Limiting the study of translation theory to English philosophy narrows critical
understanding of the practice of translation; similarly, recent revisionist narratives of
native-colonial encounter that uncover the complexity of native language and
communication discount how these encounters also transformed the colonist and his
theorizations of language.5 Some of the recent work attending to language and translation
has argued that trans-cultural contact transformed both the Native Americans and the
colonizers, but none demonstrate how.6 Matt Cohen observes in The Networked
Wilderness (2010), that colonial assumptions about communication confronted a
complicated and sophisticated indigenous system, resulting in what he calls ―a complex
interplay involving emulating, appropriation, subversion, signifying, and outright
contest.‖7 Similarly, Susan Castillo‘s Performing America (2006) challenges the critical
tendency to characterize colonialism as a ―unidirectional flow of language, institutions
and ideological structures from the active, stable, economically and technologically
advanced colonizer to the passive, barbaric colonized.‖8 In her intervention, though,
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Castillo is more concerned, as are most of her fellow scholars, with revising the picture of
the ―passive, barbaric colonized‖ than with reimagining the ―unidirectional flow‖ as a
dynamic process of exchange and mutual transformation.9
I want to stress the mutual transformation that occurred through indigenouscolonial encounter. What happened to colonial assumptions about language as a result of
inter-linguistic contact? Eliot‘s and Williams‘s respective approaches to translation and
their preconceptions of indigenous language led to distinct ideas about language in
general and about native language itself. Eliot‘s Indian Tracts reveal not simply a
controlling desire to civilize and convert, and Williams‘s A Key into the Language of
America is not only the possession of the colonizer.10 These texts also depict language
theories forged through contact with and translation into native languages and the
resulting linguistic mixture that was seen, alternately, as corrupting or productive.11
Both Williams and Eliot, in their work of rendering the complicated texture of
translation, sought guiding principles or reproducible structures. In their early translation
work, they experimented, searching for the formula(s) that would make future translation
less fuliginous, though not necessarily less arduous. They pursued, as Rivett
demonstrates, a language that bridged the gap between visible and invisible, but the very
process of translation exposed that gap and complicated its mediation.
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II.

Breaking the Ice: John Eliot and Translation

To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth time and judgment. I have adventured to
break the ice.
-Eliot, Logick Primer
From the 1640s through the 1680s, John Eliot worked among the Algonquian
people, spreading the Gospel and establishing ―Praying Towns‖ of converted Native
Americans.12 Eliot understood that without fluency in native language, he ―would make
but slow progresse‖ in converting the Indians.13 Throughout the Eliot Tracts he
underscores the need for increasing his own language skills, for finding Native American
interpreters, and for teaching the people to read and write. When Eliot began
evangelizing the Algonquians, they had no written language; he faced a culture whose
orality posed a stark contrast to his own textually-oriented religion and culture.14 Thus,
translation of the Scriptures became Eliot‘s life task.
In translating the Bible for the Native Americans, Eliot believed that he provided
them with a textual center for the faith to which he introduced them. As a good Puritan
minister, Eliot imposed the tenet of sola scriptura on the Native Americans, but he also
recognized the mediating nature of the biblical text in a faith that was meant to be
unmediated.15 Translation, of course, is another form of mediation, and Eliot was anxious
about the mediating role the translated text and he, the translator, played. He writes in the
preface to the Logick Primer (1672), an Algonquian guide to the reasonableness of the
Scriptures, that ―To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth time and judgment‖ and
that he had only first begun ―to break the ice.‖16
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The Logick Primer appears roughly halfway into, but at the height of, Eliot‘s
missionary career, and in it he acknowledges that his translation work has merely
scratched the surface. Fewer Native Americans had been converted than Eliot had hoped,
the whole Bible had not appeared in translation, and few English had competency in
Algonquian.17 Eliot struggled with the seeming fruitlessness of his evangelism, and he
saw translation as part of the problem. Translating the Bible had failed to actualize Eliot‘s
dream, and though he never abandoned it, he saw the work of translation as an unfulfilled
promise. Despite Eliot‘s doubts and frustrations, he continued to conceive of translation
as the formation of ―words of art.‖ Contrary to the way much scholarship portrays him,
Eliot was interested in the texture of language.18 In his translations of Indian confessions,
or conversion narratives, in conjunction with his more explicit theorizations of language,
Eliot theorized the problem of mediation inherent in translation and in religious
experience.
In Tears of Repentance (1653), a collection of Indian confessions from inhabitants
of Natick, the first and most famous Praying Town, Eliot theorizes conversion,
translation, and the relationship between experience and text. He explicitly represents
translation as a problem.19 Tears is a language experiment, offering experimental proof,
demonstrating the reproducibility of the confessions, and attempting to establish a
methodology for the translation of the confessions.20 Grappling toward a methodology,
Eliot interrupts the confessions with a justification for his translation:
And because all witnesses [translators] failed me, let me say but this, I
began and have followed this work for the Lord according to the poor
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measure of grace received, & not for base ends. I have been true and
faithful unto their souls, and in writing and reading their Confessions, I
have not knowingly, or willingly made them better, than the Lord helped
themselves to make them, but am verily perswaded on good grounds, that
I have rendered them weaker […] than they delivered them; partly by
missing some words of weight in some Sentences, partly by my short and
curt touches of what they more fully spake, and partly by reason of the
different Idioms of their Language and ours.21
Eliot appends to his text a statement of the translation‘s faithfulness because he was the
only English Algonquian speaker present for the confessions and because he realizes that
the process of translation is not transparent. His own shortcomings as a translator, he
suggests, perform the erasure of his mediating presence. Eliot‘s translations themselves
are not the evidence of grace his audiences seeks; readers desire proof of experience,
which comes through the tears in Eliot‘s title. The authenticity of the confessions is
hindered by their representation in text, because translation further removes the reader
from the source. Though Eliot argues that the message will be communicated despite his
―weak‖ translations, his faults as translator do not suggest the transparency of translation;
instead they claim the transparency of the confessor‘s experience. Translation, if
anything, obscures the authenticity of experience: it makes the confessions seem weaker.
Because the translated text of Indian confessions alone is not evidence enough of
authentic conversion, Tears multiplies assenting witnesses. In Tears‘ opening letter to the
Christian reader, Richard Mather invites the reader to ―weigh and consider the ensuing
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Confessions‖ as proof that ―any sound and saving work be yet wrought in‖ the Indians.22
Mather sets the stage for Eliot‘s experiment, acting as witness and inviting readers to
become additional validating witnesses. Then he presents the problem—translation: ―But
how shall we know that the Confessions here related, being spoken in their Tongue, were
indeed uttered by them in such words, as have the same signification and meaning with
these that are here expressed‖?23 Mather, and by extension Eliot, is concerned that
readers will doubt the results of the conversions represented in the confessions because
Eliot was the sole translator. ―It is true,‖ Mather writes, that we only have only one man‘s
testimony, ―but yet it is such an one, as is unwillingly alone in this matter, having
seriously endeavored to have had divers other Interpreters present at Natick that day.‖24
Mather puts his trust in Eliot‘s translations and argues that the readers should do the
same. Other interpreters, though, and witnesses like Mather, could not verify that the
English words in Tears ―have the same signification and meaning‖ as the Algonquian
words the Indians spoke. Mather‘s validation appeals to the experience of the Natick
Indians—to their tears—and not to the veracity of the translations.
Eliot‘s familiarity with Algonquian was unusual. He could not find any other
qualified English-speaking translators to certify his translations at Natick, and he was
thus compelled to find someone else to justify his translations in the opening letter. It is
important that Mather, rather than Eliot alone, did the work of justification; he was an
assenting witness to Eliot‘s character and to the faithfulness of his translations, but he
himself could not speak the native language. Mather‘s authenticating opening letter
suggests that translation hinders transparency, and he instead turns to other kinds of
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evidence. Those present during the confessions who were unable to understand the
language spoken, like Mather, could still understand the events occurring: ―To see and to
hear the Indians opening their mouths, and lifting up their hands and their eyes in solemn
Prayer to the living God‖ was confirmation enough. Hearing the mouth open, without
understanding what it produces, is coupled with seeing; bodies, not words, authenticate
experience for Mather and for Eliot‘s English audience. Mather goes on to accumulate
evidence for the confessors‘ true faith:
And though they spake in a language, of which many of us understood but
little, yet we that were present that day, we saw them, and we heard them
perform the duties mentioned, with such grave and sober countenances,
with such comely reverence in gesture, and their whol carriage, and with
such plenty of tears trickling down the cheeks of some of them, as did
argue to us that they spake with much good affection, and holy fear of
God.25
Mather, and the others present, read the bodies of the Indians as evidence of conversion.
Bodies become assenting witnesses, and countenances stand in for words. When
linguistic translation fails, material signs must be read, and the very necessity of this
body-reading confirms the difficulty of translation itself. Mather is not the lone witness in
Tears. In some individual confessions, Eliot appends a witness statement to an Indian‘s
speech. After Waban‘s speech, for example, Eliot includes another witness‘ testimony
that Waban ―spake these later expressions with tears.‖26 Proliferating witness statements
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testify to the authenticity of an Indian‘s conversion, and they are necessary because
translation is not transparent.
Not only is translation opaque, but Eliot suggests that translation exposes another
site of opacity; it reveals the gap between text and experience. The gospel Eliot preached
to the Indians was not simply textual; his goal was to prepare Native Americans to have a
saving experience of God by providing them with basic knowledge of his faith. Through
his missionary and translation work, Eliot sought to forge a link between the
experimental and the textual. In one sense, translation further removed the text from
experience: it presented another layer of mediation. Yet the goal of translation for Eliot
was to bring text closer to experience by providing Bibles and religious texts in the
Algonquians‘ own language. The complexity of translation meant that it had the potential
to reinforce or undo the link between text and experience. Like all his fellow Puritans,
Eliot believed that a direct experience of God was the only authentication of true
conversion and that, although the text (biblical, sermonic, etc) could facilitate that
experience, the text could also become one more mediating obstacle to an immediate
encounter with the divine. Translated texts, Eliot worried, posed an even greater risk of
mediating experience and obscuring truth.
Yet Eliot firmly believed that by providing religious texts in the Native
Americans‘ own language, he was giving them individual access to God. In 1664, Robert
Boyle wrote to Eliot that ―we desire care may be taken that they reteyne their owne native
Language.‖27 Both men recognized the importance of this, not only for the conversion of
the Indians, but also for the project of scientific inquiry. Rivett reads Boyle‘s desire as an
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expression of the Royal Society‘s ―nullius in verba,‖ thus Eliot ―marks an
epistemological turn from reliance on textual language to reliance on a disciplined kind
of sensual data discernable through techniques of performed speech and witnessing.‖28
Eliot expected that his translations would enable the Indians to access God in their own
language so they would not need to ―take [someone‘s] word for it.‖ Because most Native
Americans could not read, the text was most often a ―performed speech;‖ therefore Eliot
hoped that the translated text would act more like ―sensual data‖ for the listening Indian
than as an obstacle to conversion.
But in response to Boyle‘s letter, Eliot wrote the Indian Grammar, a text designed
to teach the Indians to read, and his ultimate goal was to produce an entire Bible in their
language. So Eliot marks a crossroads in the epistemological turn Rivett rightly
identifies; in his translations, he made the Indians reliant on a ―textual language‖ and on
an empirical ―science of the visible.‖29 Throughout the Eliot Tracts, Eliot enacts an
empiricism of grace, teaching the Indians methods for discerning grace in their own souls
while yet relying on the text as a technology of grace.
Although the Bible was central to Eliot‘s missionary project, the text was never a
substitute for the experience of grace. In a June 1681 letter to Boyle Eliot writes: ―Lord
open a gospel dore! until we have Bibles, we are not furnished to cary the Gospel unto
them for we have no means to cary religion thither.‖30 The text, then, was the means, the
vessel through which authentic experience of the saving gospel could occur. Like his
fellow ministers in New England, who worked to compensate for the mediating nature of
the Bible as textual center of religious experience, Eliot sought to lay the foundation for
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an experimental faith. At the close of one of the Eliot Tracts, The Light Appearing More
and More (1651), largely a collection of Eliot‘s letters, compiler Henry Whitefield
explains the role of the biblical text in conversion:
The Lord hath made this Word the only outward instrumental means to
bring home these wandring sinners; to the Word they have attended from
the first; from this they have received their light; unto this they have given
up themselves; without this they will not stirre; from this they will not
depart; from hence they have their peace, and have seen good days under
the Kingdome of our Lord Christ.31
English assumptions about Native Americans ooze through Whitefield‘s words. He
highlights the agency of the material text as a kind of token (―outward instrumental
means‖); its anchoring affect on a people whose presumed nomadic way of life seemed to
stand in the way of English religion (from ―wandring sinners‖ to ―they will not depart‖);
and its pacifying nature for an ostensibly war-like people. Like Whitefield‘s conclusion,
most of the Eliot Tracts emphasize how the Bible enacts change on Indian culture, but
even Whitefield writes that the text is only an ―outward instrumental means.‖ The Indians
receive ―their Light‖ from the Word, but the Spirit of God is the source of that light. In
order to prepare the Indians for the light‘s reception, Eliot also taught them to appeal to
the natural world and to their natural reason as sources of divine knowledge.
In The Light Appearing Eliot records a question some Indians had asked him:
―Can one be saved reading the book of the creature?‖ Eliot tells his readers that the
Indians had asked this question when he ―taught them, That God gave us two books, and
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that in the book of the creature, every creature was a word or sentence.‖32 The natural
world, like the biblical text, instructs on matters of faith. Though we cannot know just
what Eliot taught the Indians about the book of creation, that he taught them to read their
experience of the natural world confirms his interest in experimental faith. Other tracts
demonstrate Eliot‘s appeal to the Indians‘ natural reason. A Further Accompt of the
Progress of the Gospel (1659) includes, in addition to several of Eliot‘s letters, a
translation; ―Some Helps for the Indians Shewing them how to Improve their Natural
Reason‖ is a short defense of the Christian religion that relies on reason not Scripture. In
A Further Accompt, ―Some Helps‖ follows Eliot‘s attempts to undermine the concerns of
some commissioners that his translation might not be ―understood‖ or ―true,‖ but then he
offers not a biblical translation but a treatise on natural religion.
―Some Helps‖ displays the link between experience and text that translation
potentially threatens: it prepares a way to the biblical text through experience. The title
page suggests that the text will ―improve [the Indians‘] natural reason‖ in two ways: ―1.
By leading them to see the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. [and] 2. By the Scriptures
the Divine Truths necessary to Eternall Salvation.‖33 ―Some Helps,‖ though, only
provides the foundation for these realizations. Although it functions as a languagelearning tool—the opening letter gives instructions on pronunciation and parts of
speech—―Some Helps‖ appeals to the spiritual man through the natural man. As the letter
to the reader states, ―Some Helps‖ will persuade the Indian reader that he is ―utterly out
of the way‖ and then will move him to ―inquire what he shall do to be saved, and listen
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unto that.‖34 ―Some Helps‖ demonstrates Eliot‘s theorization of the relationship between
text and experience. Texts can only appeal to the natural.
The main text of ―Some Helps‖ is written in Algonquian with the English
translation printed in small text directly above it, and it is structured in question and
answer format, the first question being ―How prove you that there is a God?‖ (343). The
text proceeds to answer this and logically subsequent questions without recourse to
Scripture. To the question ―How can you prove that there is but one God?,‖ for example,
the text answers: ―Because the reason why singular things of the same kind are
multiplyed is not to be found in the nature of {God} for the reason why such like things
are multiplyed is from the fruitfulnesse of their causes: but {God} hath no cause of his
being, but is of himself therefore he is one.‖35 The natural world is a religious manual for
the illiterate and ―natural‖ Indian that ultimately opens the way to an authentic religious
experience.
In his letters to the New England Corporation and other English audiences, Eliot
emphasizes the experiential transformation of individuals in the praying towns. The
importance of experience in faith is apparent in the frequently included lists of the
Indians‘ questions, like that in which the question about the book of the creature
appears.36 The questions also communicate to the English the Indians‘ interest and
instruction in doctrinal knowledge. Experience, the proof of faith, and text merge in the
question lists. Eliot writes, ―You may perceive many of the questions arise out of such
texts as I handle, and I do endeavour to communicate as much Scripture as I can,‖ but
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communicating scripture could not assure the saving experience of grace, nor was
knowledge of it evidence of conversion.37
The first of several questions Eliot lists in The Light Appearing exhibits his dual
stress on experience and text. One question the Indians ―have propounded,‖ Eliot writes,
is ―If a man know Gods Word, but beleeve it not; and he teach others, is that good
teaching? and if others beleeve that which he teacheth, is that good believing, or faith?‖38
Eliot brings attention to the potential broken linkage between textual knowledge and
experiential faith. He does not include whatever answer he gave this question, but the
question with which he replies accentuates the distinction between knowledge and
experience. The Indians respond to Eliot‘s query, ―how they could tell when a man
knoweth Gods Word that he doth not beleeve it,‖ with ―When he doth not do in practice
answerable to that which he knoweth.‖39 This is not simply faith versus works, for
certainly Eliot the Puritan believed that only God can truly judge the soul; here he
demonstrates the Indians‘ awareness that knowledge—in particular, knowledge of the
Text—does not equal experiential transformation.
The Eliot Tracts intimate that the Indians often inquired about the disjunction
between external behavior and the internal state of the soul. The Indian confessions, or
petitions for church membership, that appear throughout the Tracts also highlight the
potential discontinuity between textual and experimental knowledge. Although true
grace, for Eliot, does come through the Bible, it does so only once it is experientially felt.
The goal of translation should be to offer the biblical text in its purest possible form, a
form that is not experience itself but that paves the way for experience.
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Though the confessors do attempt to demonstrate some doctrinal knowledge, their
main purpose is to narrate their paths towards conversion and to provide evidence for
their changed souls. They do so by illustrating how their attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, but
most of all, hearts have been transformed. A Late and Further Manifestation (1655)
recounts the examination of a small group of Native Americans who were intended for
church membership at Roxbury in April of 1654. The elders sought to determine whether
the Indians truly understood their answers through lived experience: the elders ―thought it
not fit to ask them in Catechisticall method strictly, in which way Children might
answer‖40 The elders seek confirmation of catechistical and doctrinal knowledge requisite
for Church membership even among the English colonists, but the examination privileges
questions pertaining to experience.
Eliot writes that the recorded trial concerning doctrine was the second part of an
extended examination, the first being ―what experience they had found of Gods grace in
their hearts, turning them from dead works, to seek after the living God.‖41 Though Eliot
writes that he had a better knowledge of the confessors‘ sincerity than others might and
―believed the conversion of these poor Indians,‖ he and the elders express caution about
too quickly granting church membership.42 Eliot‘s witnessing of Indian conversions
confirms for him an experiential knowledge that the language of the examination and the
textual words of confessions could not capture.
Like his contemporaries Cotton, Shepard, and Hooker, Eliot emphasized the
necessity of transforming the heard word into lived experience. His letter to the reader in
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Tears shows that his Indian audience enacts this transformation despite his own linguistic
failings:
their expressions, both in Prayer, and in the Confessions which I have now
published, are far more, and more full, and spiritual, and various, then ever
I was able to express unto them; in that poor broken manner of Teaching
which I have used among them. Their turning Doctrins into their own
experience, which you may observe in their Confessions, doth also
demonstrate the Teachings of Gods Spirit.43
―Turning Doctrins into their own experience‖ is Eliot‘s ultimate hope. The Spirit, not the
text, is the true teacher. Eliot represents his work among the Indians as prophetic work,
demonstrating the power of God‘s word and the agency of human language inspired by
the Spirit. He desires that the Indians will overlay previous experience with new, godly
experience, which the text facilitates, giving experience a foundation and vocabulary. But
experience supersedes the text.
The initial act of hearing is central to each confession and confirms for Eliot‘s
English audience the important role he and other missionaries have played and have yet
to play. One confessor, Monequassun, makes the experience of hearing the word central
to his conversion. He recounts multiple occasions on which he had heard the word but
―broke‖ or rejected it until he finally prayed, ―teach me to hear thy Word.‖44 The ―word,‖
in each confession, has multiple meanings: a text from Scripture, a catechism, a sermon.
For Monequassun and others, the repeated act of hearing eventually takes effect and
God‘s Spirit uses the word to induce internal realization and lived experience. But
130

hearing becomes especially tricky when language barriers exist. The confessions in
Tears, Eliot argues, will become ―instruments‖ of conversion for their readers, but he
admits that the instrument and its resulting knowledge could be limited by the challenges
of translation. Although he ultimately argues that linguistic obstacles only serve to
confirm the experimental nature of Indian conversions—God‘s language breaks into their
souls via spiritual, not natural, means—he recognizes the opacity of translation and its
potential to disrupt authentic experience.
While both text and experience must be active in true conversion, Eliot‘s
emphasis on the text creates problems for translation. In Tears and in the confessions
included in A Further Account of the Progress of the Gospel (1660), Waban expresses
concern that something is lost in translation. He begins: ―Unto this day I do understand
but little of the English Language; the Word of God came not first unto my heart by the
English Language.‖45 Because he did not first hear the Word of God in what he takes to
be its original language, Waban fears he does not understand it. After this first sentence,
he continues in the traditional confession structure, but his confession is haunted by the
anxiety that his ignorance of the English language suggests the deficiency of his belief. In
Tears, Waban asks if he ―prayed to God in our Language, whether could God
understand‖ his prayers, and Waban mentions this in the A Further Account confession as
well: ―but if I should pray, it may be it is vain to pray in my language; could I speak
English, I might learn to pray.‖46 Though he confesses that he comes to faith and learns
that God can understand all languages, Waban feels a barrier between himself and the
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text. Because Eliot emphasizes the text as a tool for accessing God, Waban‘s felt distance
from the text means he also senses an experiential lack and feels a distance from God.
Waban‘s anxiety implies that the Bible and the Christian God are the property of
the English—that language and content are inseparable and that God is bound by words.
Though Eliot does not comment on it, Waban‘s fear echoes through the Eliot Tracts. Eliot
recognizes a similar fear in the New England Corporation‘s reluctance to support the
printing of an Algonquian Bible.47 In every text from the Tracts that contains translated
Indian confessions, and in each moment where he addresses the process of translation,
Eliot legitimizes the translations. The self-anxiousness of these justifications echoes
Waban‘s fear that the translated text is somehow inauthentic and cannot therefore
generate a genuine experience of God.
Again, Eliot does not let his assenting voice stand alone. In A Late and Further
Manifestation, Eliot informs his readers that before the examination he told the assembly:
if any one doubted of the Interpretations that should be given of their
Answers, that they would Propound their doubt, and they should have the
words scanned and tried by the Interpreters, that so all things may be done
most clearly. For my desire was to be true to Christ, to their soules, and to
the Churches: And the trying out of any of their Answers by the
Interpreters, would tend to the satisfaction of such as doubt.48
In this passage, one of many similar calls for validating witnesses, Eliot acknowledges
translation as an often opaque and difficult process and admits that his readers may doubt
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the veracity of the translations. The ―trying out‖ is necessary because translation does not
work in a one-to-one correspondence.
The universal language theories, with which Eliot was familiar, sought the one-toone correspondence that translation made impossible; they attempted to reverse Babble,
and they looked for a language free from ambiguity. Though Eliot had some faith in such
a project, he did not find its confirmation in the native language he translated; he did not
find a ―pure‖ and natural language. Rather than opening up previously unexplored
meanings, the meeting of languages in translation exposed the fundamental difficulty of
making language correspond to experience. His experience with translation suggested to
him all the more the need for such a universal language.
In a letter to English minister Richard Baxter, Eliot shows his hand: he worries
over translating Baxter‘s A Call to the Unconverted, performing humility but also
exposing his own anxieties about how translation transforms a text. In asking permission
to translate A Call to the Unconverted for the Indians, Eliot writes to Baxter that he is
―forced sometime to alter the Phrase, for the facilitating and fitting it to our Language, in
which I am not so strict as I was in the Scripture.‖49 He at once apologizes to Baxter for
taking such arrogant liberties, worrying that he might alter the meaning of Baxter‘s
sermon in some fundamental way. If the Bible‘s form is essential to its meaning, as Eliot
suggests, then translation does transform it. The impossibility of a one-to-one
correspondence in translation necessarily results in transformation.
Eliot goes on in his letter to Baxter to dream of some way around the problems of
translation. A ―universal Character and Language,‖ Eliot writes, would be ―a singular
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Promotion of the great Design of Christ.‖50 He proposes Hebrew as a universal language
because ―it is capable of a regular Expatiation into Millions of Words‖ and, as an added
bonus, because it is the language spoken in heaven, so ―why may we not make ready for
Heaven in this Point?‖51 Eliot slightly misses the goal of universal language schemes, as
Baxter hints in his response, but he nonetheless implicitly acknowledges that translating
the Bible from one language to another changes the text in meaning not just in outward
form.52 Baxter addresses Eliot‘s interest in the universal language in his response: ―For
the universal Character that you speak of, many have talked of it, and one hath printed his
Essay, and his way is only by numeral Figures, making such and such Figures to stand for
the Words of the same signification in all Tongues; but nobody regards it. I shall
communicate your Motion here about the Hebrew, but we are not of such large and
publick Minds as you imagin.‖53 Baxter all but dismisses Eliot‘s idealism, arguing for the
impossibility of erasing the problems of translation.
The epistemological problems Eliot identifies in the work of translation address a
fear, not unlike Waban‘s, that translation somehow corrupts the original text. Eliot‘s does
not suggest that the universal language projects he has heard rumors of would be exempt
from the kind of textual corruption he imposes on Baxter‘s sermon; instead, he proposes
Hebrew construed as a language apart from all others. It is the language of heaven, God‘s
language, and thus—as the doctrinal scripture in Mather‘s Another Tongue intimates—
free from problems of mediation. In Eliot‘s mind, Hebrew allows access to the original,
uncorrupted biblical text.
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Even the English Bible was a translation, whatever Waban may have thought, and
it, too, further removed the reader from God‘s voice. Eliot believed and practiced sola
scriptura, but because translation exposed a gap between text and experience, text itself
was never a sufficient barometer of experience or the authenticity of that experience. The
text could only enlighten the natural mind and prepare the heart for the experience of
grace. To authenticate the conversions of his praying Indians, though, Eliot always
propped up his texts with validating voices, but those voices, too, were textualized and
translated.
In a letter to the New England Corporation dated October, 1658 and included in A
Further Accompt, Eliot encloses several ―notes‖ from various Indians at Natick. These
notes, he writes, are ―exhortations‖ the Indians ―did deliver‖ on a day of fasting and
prayer, and they directly respond to some passage from either Genesis or Matthew, the
only two biblical books to have been translated at the time. Waban begins his note with a
summary of a biblical passage, loosely following the plain style sermon format by
opening with the doctrine.54 He then offers an explication and an application: ―Therefore
what should we doe this day? goe to Christ the Phisitian. […] Again, what is the lesson,
which Christ would have us learne, that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to
repentance.‖55 Through these notes, Eliot demonstrates how avidly—and more
importantly, how correctly—the Natick Indians read the Bible and digest its message. A
Further Accompt was written as a plea for further funding for the printing of the entire
Bible in Algonquian, and Eliot used the Indians‘ own voices to validate the success of his
translation project.
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By relying on Indian voices for validation, though, Eliot relied on translation.
Thus, his translations proliferate, building one upon the other. First, Eliot translated the
English Bible (which was, of course, already translated) into Algonquian; then the
Indians translated it into experience (which was essential for conversion and what the
confessions meant to prove); then the Indians translated that experience into verbal
confessions; finally Eliot enacted a double translation, transcribing the oral confession
into written English text. Not all of these layers were acts of linguistic translation, but the
possibilities of misreading proliferated within each layer. This is why so much ink in the
Eliot Tracts was dedicated to authentication and why readers at each level offered their
own validating testimonies.
That Eliot includes witnesses for each stage of translation suggests his
acknowledgement that translation always includes interpretation. There is not a one-toone correspondence between English and Algonquian. And because a one-to-one
correspondence between word and thing is the ideal of universal language schemes,
Eliot‘s acts of interpretation further reveal native languages to be inadequate substitutes
for a universal language. Only God‘s language is transparent, and all human attempts to
approximate that fall short. Eliot himself acknowledges this when he prefaces his Logick
Primer with his ice-breaking metaphor: ―To form Words of Art, is a work that requireth
time and judgment. I have adventured to break the ice; Lord raise more able Workmen to
follow, and to mend both the Foundation and the Building.‖56 When Eliot says he has
―adventured to break the ice,‖ he means that more translations are necessary, that more
people need to evangelize the Native Americans and to learn their languages, but he
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intimates that the promise of translation is always unfulfilled. In an August 1664 letter to
Boyle he writes,
my purpose is if the Lord will, & that I doe live, to set upon some essay &
beginning of reducing this language unto rule, which, in the most common
& usefull points, I doe see, is reducible: though there be corners, &
anomalities full of difficulty to be reduced under any stated rule, as, your
selfe know better than I, it is in all languages. I have not so much either
insight or judgment, as to dare to undertake any thing worthy the name of
a Grammar. […] But as this is a work for the morrow, to day my work is
Translation.57
That Algonquian can be reduced to rule means it is like all languages, full of obstacles
and anomalies, but ―this is a work for tomorrow,‖ Eliot argues. When Eliot published his
grammar, The Indian Grammar Begun (1666), only two years later, he found
confirmation that language was ―full of difficulty.‖ Though Eliot never abandoned his
belief in the necessity of translation, his layering of validating text upon validating text
betrays his awareness of the opacity of translation and of the difficulty of language. He
looked to Hebrew as a language free from this difficulty, but unless Hebrew was
embraced universally, each witness, each confession, each grammatical rule would
merely break the ice—only to leave the witness, confessor, writer, or reader drowning in
the difficulties of language.
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III.

A Box Full of Keys: Roger Williams’s A Key into the Language of America

A little key may open a box, wherein lies a bunch of keys.
-Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America
Roger Williams writes this in the first paragraphs of A Key into the Language of
America (1643). Though A Key has been read as a grammar, as an ethnology, or as the
foundation of our knowledge about seventeenth-century Native Americans, Williams‘s
text openly presents itself as a text that is more than the sum of its parts, as the door to
more doors, as the ―little key‖ that opens a box full of keys.58 I take the box full of keys
to be the guiding metaphor of Williams‘s translation work, in juxtaposition to Eliot‘s icebreaking metaphor. Eliot breaks through ice only to find more obstacles, but Williams‘s
doors open to a multitude of new discoveries. Williams finds door after door, but he has
the key to each. Because Williams‘s work among the Narragansett was less textually
centered than Eliot‘s missionary work, he was able to think of translation as generative
rather than stunting. Native languages offered him more promise than Eliot; he saw them
as a key to narrowing the gap between experience and text or language. Though he, like
Eliot, recognized the opacity of translation, he saw this opacity as productive of new
mixtures that generated new knowledge. Williams idealized the communalizing function
of Narragansett orality and the language‘s reflection of the natural world. Both of these
claims about language realized a connection between experience and language that
mirrored universal language projects.
David Read, in New World, Known World (2005), argues that ―Williams treats the
relative simplicity of Native American life not sentimentally but experimentally; to
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engage with that life is, so to speak, to have a ‗clean lab‘ in which to study God‘s plan
being acted out in the wilderness—that is, in the human plane.‖59 As Read and others
explain, Williams‘s A Key provided the English with more knowledge of Native
American culture than they had previously, and Williams made comparisons between the
Narragansett and the English in order to better understand God‘s ways working
themselves out in humanity.60 I think Read is right in part: Williams did imagine A Key as
a study in which careful observation could lead to larger principles. But A Key is much
more than an ethnological study of ―primitive‖ humanity; it is about how language works.
The many texts about the new world printed for English audiences, whether languagecentered texts like Williams‘s and Eliot‘s or travel narratives, functioned as curiosity
cabinets; they presented evidence in the lab Read describes.61 But for those engaged in
the actual work of translation, theory had to become practice. A Key is both an example
of practical translation and linguistic theory.
The key to the Narragansett language was also a key to their culture and to
language itself. The structure of A Key follows its opening logic: each chapter focuses on
an aspect of Narragansett life and culture, and Williams begins each chapter with
particular observations on that aspect, moving between observations and dialogues in
Narragansett that are translated into English. At the close of each chapter the topic opens
into an ―observation in generall.‖ In chapter VIII, ―Of their persons and parts of the
bodie,‖ for example, Williams concludes with the general observation that ―Nature
knows no difference between Europe and Americans in blood, birth, bodies, &c. God
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having of one blood made all mankind.‖62 Every chapter concludes with a ―more
particular‖ observation in verse form. Chapter VIII ends with this verse:
Boast not proud English, of thy birth & blood,
Thy brother Indian is by birth as Good. […]
By nature wrath‘s his portio, thine no more
Till Grace his soule and thine in Christ restore
Make sure thy second birth, else, though shalt see,
Heaven ope to Indians wilde, but shut to thee.63
Like many of A Key‟s general observations and verses, this chapter conclusion compares
the Indians to the English, seizing the opportunity to reprimand the ―civilized‖ English
for their depravity. Williams proclaims the essential and natural goodness of the Indians,
a common refrain in the chapters‘ conclusions, but he reminds all readers that ultimate
meaning lies in the salvation and spiritual transformation of both the ―wilde‖ Indians and
the English. The closing verses move from the particular to the general and from the
cultural to the spiritual. Thus, the particularities of Indian culture act as keys for
understanding the nature of the people in general and for observing the visible as
evidence of what cannot be seen; English and Narragansett material life and language are
signs of their respective spiritual states. For Williams, language is most often the key that
opens both of these doors—a key to culture and a key into divine mysteries. Because
language is the key, Williams structures his observations, particular and general, around
dialogues in Narragansett translated into English. The key that opens a box containing
more keys is language, but language is also what lies behind the unlocked doors.
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In Forked Tongues, David Murray writes that Williams‘s A Key has been used
more as a source of knowledge about early Indian culture ―than for any specifically
linguistic insight.‖64 Almost twenty years after Murray published Forked Tongues, this is
still largely true. Even Cohen‘s recent analysis of A Key, which focuses on Narragansett
communication structures, scarcely comments on the translation at the heart of the
Williams‘s text. My purpose here is to attend to the linguistic, to mine A Key for insight
into how Williams might have imagined the epistemological work of language and
translation.
If anxieties about the text‘s corruption seep into Eliot‘s translation project,
Williams presented a more flexible idea of language itself. Rather than viewing language
as the necessary foundation for civilization and conversion, Williams sought an
understanding of the language in its own right and for the subsequent knowledge it would
open. Whereas those surrounding Eliot worried that translation corrupted the text,
Williams saw the process of translation as productive, generating new knowledge and
new ways of accessing that knowledge.65 A Key thus represents inter-linguistic contact as
genuine exchange, as opposed to the exchange of religion for riches that Mather suggests
in Another Tongue. Williams offered the Indians a written language and the English a
grammar book, but he gained from his education in Narragansett the belief that text could
faithfully mediate language and experience.
Like Eliot, Williams thought of translation as an experimental project. Whereas
Eliot experimented with the role of language in conversion, or the nature of the translated
text, Williams‘s interest in translation posed an experiment with the theories of universal
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language projects. Williams‘s language experiment was not, like Eliot‘s, about
deciphering and representing authentic religious experience; instead Williams argued that
the Narragansett language functioned ideally as a more transparent mediator between
words and experience than English. Against Eliot‘s doubt, Williams embraced the ideal
of a universal language represented in Narragansett and theorized how language in
general could reach toward this goal.
Williams‘s relative idealism was possible, in part, because his relationship with
the Narragansett was not primarily religious and because he imagined his work to be that
of the linguist more than the evangelist. Because he did not translate the Bible, his
translation work had the freedom to explore language in its own right rather than as a tool
for conversion. In A Key‘s opening letter to the reader, Williams writes that knowledge of
the Narragansett language will enable his countrymen to converse with the ―Natives all
over the Countrey: and by such converse it may please the Father of Mercies to spread
civilitie, (and in his owne most holy season) Christianitie.‖66 ―God‘s most holy season‖ is
a refrain seen throughout A Key; Williams hopes and prays for the conversion of the
Indians, but he does not see it as his primary calling. He writes that he has ―uprightly
labored to suite my endeavours to my pretences: and of later times (out of desire to
attaine their Language) I have run through varieties of Intercourses with them‖
concerning the things of religion, and he emphasizes that ―there is no small preparation
in the hearts of Multitudes of them.‖67 Williams is attuned to the state of Indian souls, but
he acknowledges his primary goal to be the attainment and understanding of language.
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In Christenings Make not Christians (1645), Williams elaborates on his reasons
for not evangelizing the Indians more aggressively. He notes the objection made against
him, in which the critic adopts Williams‘s own language: ―Why then if this be
Conversion, and you have such a Key of Language, and such a dore of opportunity, in the
knowledge of the Country and the inhabitants, why proceed you not to produce in
America some patterns of such conversions as you speak of?‖68 The door Williams‘s key
opens is not the door to conversion; he would not undertake such a ―worke without a
Word, a Warrant and Commission, for matter, and manner, from God,‖ he writes.69 His
commission is to open the door of knowledge through language.
In his various justifications for not engaging more heavily in the project of Native
American conversion, Williams emphasizes language as his first priority. Christenings
defends Williams‘s lack of ―productivity‖ by noting the ―hardship‖ and necessity of
learning Narragansett: ―In matters of Earth men will helpe to spell out each other, but in
matters of Heaven (to which the soule is naturally so averse) how far are the Ears of men
hedged up from listening to an improper Language?‖70 A proper language, Williams
suggests, will open ears to heavenly matters. Hence, he writes A Key partly with the goal
of converting the Native Americans: language acquisition is the first step in evangelism.
This, too, was Eliot‘s position, but A Key demonstrates more than just Williams‘s
education in Narragansett; it also reveals what it had taught him about communication or
language in general. ―In matters of Earth men will helpe to spell out each other,‖
Williams wrote, and Narragansett offered him a model for the kind of communal verbal
exchange that could open reluctant ears. He structures A Key as a dialogue for the sake of
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accessibility but also in order to demonstrate the kind of verbal exchange he sees as the
foundations of Narragansett culture. The Narragansett conventions he describes in A
Key—authenticity and community—are the principles on which he bases his translation.
Narragansett oral codes were the keys to understanding their culture and the keys
to transforming language in general. The Narragansett relied on oral communication to
persuade the community to consensus, and Williams saw oral persuasion as a linguistic
and social ideal. In A Key, one sees the beginnings of a colonial interest in the eloquent
Indian, which Thomas Jefferson wrote about more than a century later.71 Williams does
not go as far as Jefferson will in suggesting that the Indian practice of deciding all
communal action through persuasion, rather than through compulsion, is a model on
which to build the early Republic, but Williams does idealize Narragansett oral practice.
In chapter XXII, ―Of their Government,‖ he notes that the leaders, or sachims, ―have an
absolute Monarchie over the people; yet they will not conclude of ought that concernes
all, either Lawes, or Subsides, or warrers, unto which the people are averse, and by gentle
perswasion cannot be brought.‖72 When taken with Williams‘s opening remarks on the
importance of pronunciation and on the ―copiousness‖ of the Narragansett language, this
passage suggests that Narragansett has a greater capacity to create understanding and
consensus. And Narragansett ―copiousness‖ mirrors the people‘s ―delight‖ in verbal
exchange. ―Their desire of, and delight in newes,‖ Williams writes in Chapter VIII, ―Of
Discourse and Newes,‖ ―is great, as the Athenians.‖73 As Cohen notes, Williams ―links
Native audiences explicitly to classical republicanism through their valorization of
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information circulation‖—and I would add, through their belief in the ability of language
to persuade, transform, and create consensus.74
There is evidence of such a position with the text of A Key, as well. Williams
structures the text around snippets of dialogue. He writes in the prefatory, ―Directions for
the use of the Language,‖ that he had originally intended to shape the entire text as a
dialogue but abandoned it ―for brevities sake.‖ But he continues: ―yet (with no small
paines) I have so framed every Chapter and the matter of it, as I may call it an Implicite
Dialogue.‖ This form gives the text wider application, Williams believes, than a grammar
or dictionary would, but it also highlights the role of conversation in Narragansett culture:
dialogue is the key that opens an authentic exchange of minds.
That Williams configures the text through dialogue further demonstrates the
centrality of verbal exchange to Narragansett culture and to his own linguistic theory. The
dialogue that follows Williams‘s observation on Narragansett government highlights the
role of verbal exchange:
Péititeatch.

Let him come

Mishaúntowash.

Speak out.

Nanántowash.

Speak plaine. […]

Wunnadsittamútta

Let us search into it. […]

Cuttiantacompáwwem.

You are a lying fellow.75

In this exchange, the speakers use dialogue to ―search into‖ truth. Thus, dialogue
functions not only as a cultural ideal, but as an epistemological tool. Verbal exchange
keeps the speaker accountable and uncovers the truth. The demand for authentic, plain,
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and honest speech does not only reveal a defect in the Christianized English and an innate
tendency toward civil order in the Indians; it also forms a foundational principle of
Narragansett culture.
In chapter VIII, Williams describes a typical scene of Indian orality demonstrating
why the language has many ways of describing honesty and falsehood. Honesty in
communication is valued because verbal exchange determines who will lead: ―Their
manner is upon any tiding to sit round double or treble or more‖ wherein ―a deepe silence
they make, and attention give to him that speaketh; and many will deliver themselves
either in a relation or news, or in a conflutation with very emphaticall speech and great
action, commonly an houre, and sometimes two hours together.‖76 The audience‘s
attentive silence is matched by the speaker‘s vocal and bodily presence; the speaker
commands attention through his eloquence and physical persuasion. This description
underscores the importance of public speech in Narragansett culture, and it marks orality
as material. The body, not just words, persuades, and the body‘s materiality mirrors the
mouth‘s speech. The body, then, becomes another mark of authenticity. It reflects the
―emphaticall speech,‖ creating union between the oral and the material.
Williams‘s praise for the orality of Narragansett culture was directly opposed to
the politics of verbal exchange he fought in his own culture. Williams‘s stance on the
issue of conscience in religion informed his idealization of Narragansett orality. In the
years surrounding A Key‘s printing, Williams engaged in a pamphlet war with John
Cotton on the subject of freedom of conscience. In his The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution
(1644), Williams professes freedom of conscience, taking Cotton to task for a letter
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written some years earlier that argued the state should punish religious offenses (such as
blasphemy and idolatry) as well as civil ones.77 The Narragansett practice of forestalling
action until reaching a verbal consensus was the model Williams desired in his own
public sphere. Open religious debate, he believed, would strengthen both church and
state.
Cohen most persuasively examines the relationship between A Key and William‘s
theology and politics and argues that the ―visual, linguistic, and generic features of A Key
imply, rather than insist on, a separation of the religious garden from the civic realm.‖78
The formal elements of the text, including ―material and linguistic structures,‖ Cohen
writes, ―model[] the mode of passive proselytization‖ Williams practiced.79 The content,
Cohen argues, matches Williams‘s political writings, but the very materiality of the text
demonstrates this claim. Thus both A Key and the larger body of Williams‘s work verify
his admiration for the Narragansett practice of persuasion; a society in which language
was used for debate and eventual consensus was more desirable than a society wherein
language trapped and divided, which was Williams‘s own experience with his expulsion
from Massachusetts.
Williams idealized Narragansett orality as politically and socially efficacious, but
he seems to have understood the challenge of textualizing an oral language. In his
prefatory ―Directions for the use of the Language,‖ Williams writes that he has ―been at
the paines and charges to Cause the Accents, Tones or sounds to be affixed‖ to the
Narragansett type, ―Because the Life of all Languages is in the Pronunciation.‖80 The
Narragansett admiration for one who speaks eloquently with ―great action‖ is reflected in
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Williams‘s sense that Narragansett is a living, oral language, but he extends this claim to
―all Languages.‖ Williams is aware that his act of textualizing Narragansett transforms it
in some way.
Sandra Gustafson argues that in Eliot‘s missionary model, ―‗the Book‘ is the
central symbol,‖ but Williams‘s model, she claims, is the spoken word.81 He held a
―relatively deep understanding of and appreciation for Narragansett society‖ that
―included a lively sense of the spoken word‘s power for them and the importance of
authentic speech.‖82 She speculates that if Williams had ―continued with his early
missionary efforts, he might have developed a missionary style with some fidelity to
native oral modes of spiritual practice,‖ a fidelity that Eliot, in her account, ignores.83 I
take this distinction between Eliot and Williams, for Williams‘s interest in orality enabled
him to imagine language and translation as more generative than Eliot did. For Williams,
the text did not necessarily undermine experience, and the material textuality of A Key
mirrors Narragansett principles of orality.84
In ―Directions,‖ Williams guides his reader through the process of maintaining the
original character of the language as best as possible, but in these instructions he also
acknowledges that the translations are not always equivocal: ―The English for every
Indian word or phrase stands in a straight line directly against the Indian: yet sometimes
there are two words for the same thing […] and then the English stands against them
both.‖ Williams is describing the material appearance of the translations on the page: the
translations are arranged in columns, with the English directly parallel to the original,
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divided by a vertical line. Often there is more than one Narragansett word for the English
equivalent:
Npenowauntwâumen.

I cannot speak your language.

Matta nippánnawem

I lie not.

Cuppánnowem.

You lie.

Mattanickoggachoùsk

I am no lying fellow.

Matntiantacómpaw.
Matntiantásampáwwa.85
The last three Narragansett words all translate to ―I am no lying fellow,‖ but they each
have a slightly different connotation. Williams does not elaborate here on these
distinctions, yet in the preface, he writes that ―their Language is exceeding copious, and
they have five or six words sometimes for one thing.‖86 The material page reflects
Williams‘s translation theory: translation is not equivocal. ―In a straight line directly
against‖ materially represents the exchange between the two languages, but the columns
on each side of the line are not equal; each language represents meaning differently. The
movement on the page attempts to reflect the living, spoken word.87 The copiousness of
Narragansett opens it to a larger capacity for authentic verbal exchange, and this
abundance is manifested on the material page.
Narragansett verbal profuseness, Williams argues, is beneficial, but it is also the
result of Narragansett‘s reflective relationship to the land. Ultimately, both of these
qualities mean a more mutually reflective relationship between language and experience.
Cohen notes the Narragansett‘s connection between the people, their language, and the
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landscape: they were a people on the move, he observes, ―cued by the flux of food
availability, disease, and trade.‖88 And landscape and language mutually structure one
another: ―Brush and rock piles were used to commemorate people and events, while
landscape features in the undulating New England topography […] were used to structure
storytelling.‖89 The most striking aspect of Cohen‘s analysis, though, is its extension to
the material page. Cohen brings our attention specifically to layout and typography,
arguing that ―these features play with the temporality of reading, analeptically and
proleptically restructuring interaction with the text.‖90 This ―moving page,‖ as Cohen
terms it, is in my reading also a manifestation of Williams‘s interest in the relationship
between the landscape and the Narragansett language. The oral/aural and material
components of language are intimately connected, and both, Williams demonstrates, are
structured by the land.
Throughout A Key, Williams observes that the Narragansett language displays the
people‘s unique relationship to the land; they are formed by their relationship to nature.
In his chapter on the religion of the Narragansett, for example, Williams presents a
dialogue concerning the creation of the world:
Tà suóg Mannítoowock.

How many Gods bee there?

Maunaũog Mishaúnawock.

Many, great many.

Nétop machàge.

Friend, not so.

Paũsuck naũnt manìt.

There is only one God.

Cuppíssittone.

You are mistaken.

Cowauwaúnemun.

You are out of the way.91
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Williams observes how this last phrase—―Cowauwaunemun‖—―much pleaseth them,
being proper for their wandering the woods, and similitudes greatly please them.‖92 That
Narragansett is structured by ―similitudes‖ to nature suggests to Williams the people‘s
organic relationship to the land. In Dispossession by Degrees (1997), Jean M. O‘Brien
argues for a related reading of native language, one in which linguistic conventions
―formed a principal source of identity and a sense of place that included but also
transcended natal village.‖93 Language literally marks place. She gives as an example a
reading of a passage from A Key: ―The Narragansett word ‗Nqussutam, ‗I remove house,‘
gave expression to a mobile way of life geared toward reaping seasonally available
resources that fundamentally shaped the relationship of Indians to the land.‖94 O‘Brien
argues that language shaped native identity, but Williams goes beyond her model in
suggesting that language organically reflects an identity shaped by the land; language
grows out of landscape.
Language‘s rootedness in nature reflects a major goal of universal language
projects: to create a more organic language in which the word or symbol inheres in the
meaning of the thing represented. John Wilkins‘s An Essay Towards a Real Character
and Philosophical Language (1668) offers a representative example of these universal
language projects. His text attempts to reverse linguistic corruption by creating a
language in which ―signs and names express their natures,‖ and he argued that in his new
scheme there would be no semiotic ambiguity, no false appearances caused by this
ambiguity, and that words would be ―answerable in their character‖ to the things to
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which they correspond.95 Williams saw in Narragansett an expression of the nature of
things, because their language was situated so closely to the natural world.
Though he never explicitly linked Narragansett, or native languages in general, to
universal language projects, Williams did identify Narragansett with Hebrew. In A Key‘s
letter to the reader, he observes that ―some of their words […] hold affinitie with the
Hebrew,‖ and he connects Narragansett culture to that of the Old Testament Jews (they
both anoint heads, offer dowries for wives, and separate their women ―during the time of
their monthly sicknesse‖).96 So though he did not claim native languages as a model for
universal language schemes, he did see Narragansett as functioning as a universal
language would. Williams saw the potential in indigenous language to narrow the space
between text and experience. A language that emerged from the land and that structured
communal life better reflected experience of the natural world and of daily life.
The success of Wilkins‘s project was dependent upon his assumption that all
people agree to the same ―internal notion or apprehension of things‖ because these
notions are communicated to the mind through sensory experience.97 Williams‘s A Key
similarly assumes that the English and Narragansett had the same ideas about things, but
the process of translation also reveals distinctions between languages that are ultimately
productive of new knowledge: the copiousness of Narragansett gives the English a new
way of thinking about honesty, for example, and the text-likeness of English prepares the
Indian for eventual conversion.98 Linguistic exchange is productive, but it is not
transparent. In Williams‘s assessment, it neither corrupts the English text nor erases
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Indian orality. The key opens the door from both sides. And because translation is not
transparent, it becomes a key opening a box containing many more keys.

IV.

Eliot and Williams in Context
Of course, the trans-cultural exchange A Key represents is also fraught with

political trouble. Williams‘s key also affords the English a tool of control. Ultimately, A
Key represents an orthodox desire to subsume native languages within a theologically
prescribed hierarchy—even as Williams‘s own heterodoxy makes this a text about the
superiority of ―natural‖ language over the performative rhetoric of the plain style. He,
like Eliot, cannot be exonerated from charges that translation also works to erase and
control.
Both Williams and Eliot professed ideals about language that corresponded in
many ways to contemporary universal language projects. Rather than reading their
translation work as effacing the process of translation, I propose we read them as
explicitly acknowledging that translation was not transparent. Instead, they worried about
what it does efface—the original Hebrew text and authentic experience—that ultimately
revealed a gap between text and experience that was the landmark anxiety of early
American Puritanism—even in its heterodox forms.
Earlier seventeenth-century texts depicting inter-cultural communication often
erased the process of translation, as Murray argues, or represented linguistic barriers as
irrelevant in light of ―English eloquence,‖ as Randall C. Davis says in his ―Early AngloAmerican Attitudes to Native American Languages‖ (2006).99 But Eliot and Williams are
153

representative of English colonial attitudes toward translation. They first imagined native
languages as complex in their own right and then openly depicted the work of translation
as often opaque and riddled with difficulties, and these distinctions were a result of their
Puritanness.
Translation sometimes exacerbated the Puritan anxiety about the gap between text
and experience and sometimes offered new ways of compensating for that gap. Later
Puritan encounters with Native Americans do not display this same anxiety. Jonathan
Edwards‘s missionary work almost a century later demonstrates this shift: he avoided any
direct linguistic encounter with Native Americans. Though he preached many sermons to
Native American audiences during his tenure at Stockbridge, he always relied on
interpreters. Translation was not effaced in Edwards‘s life and work; he entirely avoided
it. Perhaps he never learned native languages because his career at the Northampton
congregation ended in disaster, perhaps because he was getting along in age, or perhaps
because it aroused an anxiety his philosophy worked to dispel. Edwards gave his career
to theorizing and attempting to bridge the gap between text and experience, but Indian
language never attracted his attention. Williams and Eliot, however, confronted the gap
between text and experience. In this, they were very much like their fellow New England
Puritans.
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Chapter 4
The Material Word: Jonathan Edwards and Language as an Image of the Divine
I.

Words, those Dreadful Enemies
From March of 1739 to March of 1745, during the height of the Great Awakening

in New England, Sarah Pierpont of New Haven, Massachusetts kept a diary.1 Over the
course of these years, Pierpont documented the sermons she heard and her reactions to
them. In June of 1742, she records, she heard a sermon ―Preached from those words
‗Examine yourselves whether ye be in the Truth,‘‖ and she writes that she saw an image
of herself in the minister‘s words, just as the face sees its reflection in a mirror: ―My
Heart went sweetly along with the Sermon I thought I could say that a face answers to
face in a glass. So my Heart answered to the Marks there given My soul seemd for a
Little Space to be almost overcome with a sense of the sweet union.‖ Throughout the
manuscript, Pierpont flags her spiritual journey through sermons such as this one.
Sermons, the diary is explicit, do something to her: they instigate change, reflection,
hope, and conviction. But spiritual transformation took place in the space between
sermons as she reflected on them, wrote about them, and worked out her doubt through
the act of writing. As minister Ebenezer Parkman‘s introductory remarks to the Memoirs
state, ―She was one that obtained her orthodoxy not only by Tradition and History but by
Tryal and Experience.‖ The sermons she heard communicated tradition and history, but
they also gave her ways to work out her salvation experientially—through tests and trials.
Pierpont‘s diary was a space of testing herself against the sermons; the material act of
writing was as important as hearing the sermon and sensing God‘s work on the soul.
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In April of 1740, Pierpont records hearing eighteen sermons preached by ―the
wonderful Mr. J…E.‖2 These sermons, she writes, are the ―most soul-searching sermons
that ever I heard,‖ giving ―shocks‖ to her soul and her whole ―frame.‖ This passage
begins as a recollection of Mr. J. E.‘s sermons but ends as a self-reflection: Pierpont
transitions from recalling her unsteady frame at the time of hearing the sermon to a soulsearching, present-tense plea for God to appear ―to discover to me that I am in a state of
nature and […] push me out of doubt.‖ J. E.‘s sermon awakened Pierpont‘s soul and body
in the moment of its aural reception, but its effective work continued and deepened as
Pierpont reinforced the initial experience through the act of writing. Jonathan Edwards,
perhaps Pierpont‘s mysterious ―J…E,‖ would have been well pleased with Pierpont.
Throughout his career as pastor of the Northampton, Massachusetts church, he worked to
retain a sense of spontaneity and the Spirit‘s immediate presence in his sermons.
Pierpont, whether her J. E. was Edwards or another Great Awakening preacher,
experienced an unmediated encounter with God in the eighteen sermons she heard, and
her Memoirs model just what Edwards desired: that the auditor would experience the
immediate presence of God in the sermonic moment and then reflect on and carry out that
encounter through her own experience.
Jonathan Edwards was the most important chronicler and philosopher of the
experimental faith fostered by the Great Awakening. As part of this philosophy, he
forged a middle ground between the Old and New Lights—the two rival doctrinal groups
of the Great Awakening—attempting to work out a philosophy of religious experience
and to develop a vocabulary for bodily affect so that language would mirror the
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performance of religious affection.3 There were, Edwards argued, no sure visible signs of
regeneration, but he maintained the importance of right religious affections. Pierpont‘s
Memoirs offer an archive for how Great Awakening sermons were experienced—for how
they were heard. They describe daily religious experience in a language less mediated by
religious authority; they demonstrate right religious affections that are written on the
body in language that attempts to mirror and capture that experience; and they exhibit a
reflexive relationship between experience and text. The Great Awakening, with its
extemporaneous preaching and highly physical religious experience, threatened to
separate these—or to create a gap between experience and theology. Edwards‘s
philosophy responded to this gap; he attempted to write empiricism into a rigorous
theology, hoping to suture experience and theology. And text was always the mediating
center: for Edwards, experience was initiated, reflected on, and manifested in language.
In this sense, Edwards differs from the other figures I have treated throughout the
dissertation. He turned the problem of the mediating text into an advantage: the convert
could literally write his or her own experience as a tool for accessing the divine. The act
of writing was a means for bridging theology and experience. Yet Edwards‘s
philosophical mind at times saw language as an inadequate tool for accessing and
describing spiritual things. In this sense, he struggles with the same epistemological
problems of language his Puritan predecessors had. Edwards is distinguished from them
by his philosophical redefinition of language and by his belief in the writing act as
spiritually transformative. Here I trace the development in his thought that allowed him to
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view language as both a part of the natural world and a bridge between the material and
the divine.
In Edwards‘s early writings language is always a problem: ―Oh, how the world is
darkened, clouded, distracted and torn to pieces by those dreadful enemies of mankind
called words,‖ Edwards laments at the close of his Miscellanies no. 4.4 The gap between
language and experience was, it seemed to Edwards, unavoidable. Yet his philosophy and
his sermons worked to overcome this, and he turned to experimental accounts of grace in
his case histories—accounts that seemed to reflect and generate experience—in order to
determine how experience and text could merge or how the textual account of conversion
could deepen the experience of grace and even transfer it to readers. Edwards‘s lament
over cloudy words in the Miscellanies would seem to suggest that he saw words as
entirely arbitrary, yet he came to the conclusion that language—though a part of the
natural world—was an image of the divine, capable of clarity and agent of spiritual
transformation. I argue in what follows that Edwards came to this conclusion through his
typology and cosmology and turned to the case histories as evidence that the materiality
of language could capture and generate authentic religious experience. And the sermon
was a space wherein Edwards‘s philosophy of language manifested itself with the highest
stakes.

II.

Solid Shadows: Edwards’s Philosophy of Language
Edwards urged his audience to meditate on sermons in the manner Pierpont‘s

diary demonstrates. In his sermon Heeding the Word, and Losing It (1734), he opens with
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the necessity of hearing and obeying God‘s word: ―there is a dependence on the word,‖
he writes.5 Edwards means to alert his auditors to their responsibility in making
experimental the text heard from the pulpit; the hearer needs to embrace the word, like
Pierpont, in order to make it more than empty sounds—in order to give it application to
lived experience. Although the individual listener has responsibility, ultimate agency
rests in the word, and the word, in Edwards‘s definition, is God ―speaking of himself,
after the manner of men.‖6 Throughout this sermon, language is the medium for God‘s
communication, and it seems a relatively transparent one: although Edwards lists several
reasons men might lose the word, language does not appear as an obstacle. That is, until
the close of the sermon, when Edwards warns his auditors that action alone demonstrates
true ―heeding‖ because ―words are cheap:‖ ―it would be more desirable to see a man use
some vigorous endeavors to restrain degeneracy once, than to hear him lament
degeneracy a hundred times.‖7 Heeding the Word demonstrates the linguistic tension at
the core of Edwards‘s philosophy and sermonic theory. ―There is a dependence on the
word,‖ because God communicates himself in human language, but words are cheap. By
this, Edwards means that words do not necessarily correspond to the internal state of the
soul.
Edwards came to think something like this concerning any external signs of an
individual‘s spiritual state. His Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746), written
throughout the revivals in Northampton, asks as its central question: ―what are the
distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God,‖ or ―What is the nature
of true religion? and wherein do lie the distinguishing notes of that virtue and holiness?‖8
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Official doctrine did not sanction the religious experience of many Great Awakening
converts, but Edwards established a philosophy of religious affections that validated
affective experience without reading the affections as empirical evidence of grace. The
contradictions between experience and theology Edwards observed during the Great
Awakening manifested themselves in contentious debates about the validity and type of
external signs of redemption. The Great Awakening has come to be characterized by
several attributes ―new‖ to American religion: the extemporaneous sermon, characteristic
of much lay preaching, affected bodies materially, manifesting the signs of the New
Birth.9 These outward manifestations were read, alternately, as evidence of enthusiasm,
hypocrisy, redemption, and hysteria. Counterfeit religion, Edwards argued, was the
devil‘s greatest advantage, and saints lacked discernment to distinguish between what
was true and what was counterfeit.
The first part of Religious Affections lays out various signs, like the ―appearance‖
of love, that are ―no certain signs that religious affections are truly gracious, or that they
are not,‖ and the second part establishes ―what are distinguishing signs of truly gracious
and holy affections.‖ Even this second part clearly acknowledges that certainty is
impossible: ―it was never in God‘s design to give us any rules, by which we may
certainly know, who of our fellow professors are his.‖10 Although true religion is judged
by the ―fixedness and strength of the habit that is exercised in affection,‖ it is also true
that ―the strength of that habit is not always in proportion to outward effects and
manifestations.‖11 Thus, there is a gap between true godly affection and external signs.
Edwards was concerned that revival converts misread outward signs—even in
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themselves—as ―certain‖ because they felt great spiritual desire, heightened sorrow for
sin, or some other emotional response to God‘s glory. He argued that there could be
discontinuity between one‘s experience of God and the theology of religious affections he
describes. These gaps—between external signs and the state of one‘s soul or between
theology and experience—led Edwards to write Religious Affections, and he was led to
his conclusions about the possible gaps between sign and thing represented by his reading
of John Locke.
Edwards‘s Puritan predecessors understood language as a divine gift, within
which any failures or fissures were due to human error, but Edwards merged this concept
with his reading of Locke‘s notion that words signify ideas rather than things. Edwards‘s
worry, expressed in Miscellany no. 4, that the world is darkened by words, was also
Locke‘s: Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ―Of Words,‖
addresses what Locke sees as the ―imperfection‖ and ―abuse‖ of words. Edwards and
Locke both worked to clarify the relationship between language and knowledge,
understanding language as a system of signs whose primary purpose was the
communication of knowledge. In his sermon The Importance and Advantage of a
Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth (1739), Edwards argues that visible signs, of which
the gospel is composed, are meant ―to convey some knowledge of the things signified,‖
and Locke contends that language‘s purpose is to make understanding possible—between
people and of ideas.12 Without functioning signs, Edwards argues, knowledge is
impossible, and a sermon might as well be delivered in ―the Chinese or Tartarian
language, of which we know not one word.‖13
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Language as human construct meant for Edwards, re Locke, that words were signs
of ideas arrived at through sensory experience. He addresses this again in Knowledge of a
Divine Truth. Paul, in Hebrews 5:2, writes to his addressees that they need the taste of
milk before strong meat, and Edwards argues that Paul is here reproving them for their
lack of ―spiritual and experimental knowledge of divine things.‖14 Spiritual and
experimental knowledge are not synonymous for Edwards; experimental knowledge is
derived through visible signs whereas spiritual knowledge comes from the Spirit.
Edwards adds that Paul reproves the Hebrews for their lack of doctrinal knowledge, and
this rational knowledge—alongside the necessary experimental knowledge—comes
through visible signs, like language.
But here Edwards faces a problem: sensory experience and rational knowledge, he
argues throughout his writings, do not give one full apprehension of spiritual or moral
things. Language is at its most cloudy when trying to represent the immaterial. In
Miscellanies no. 782, where Edwards first lays out the new sense, to which Perry Miller
attributes Lockean influence, he writes that God does not rely on language or signs, for
he ―understands himself, and all other things, by the actual and immediate presence of an
idea of things understood.‖15 Man, on the other hand, cannot excite actual ideas in his
mind, and he relies on signs because they are more efficient—the exciting of actual ideas
being a slow process and not amenable to communication among people. Actual ideas,
Edwards continues, are even more difficult to excite in the mind when not concerning
sensible and external things. Things of a divine, supernatural, sublime, and metaphysical
nature are only truly understood (ideally apprehended, in Edwards‘s language) through
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the extraordinary work of the Spirit of God, which is inaccessible through natural reason
or sensory experience.16 Edwards again addresses the inability of language to express
spiritual things in Freedom of the Will: ―Words were first formed to express external
things,‖ but words ―applied to express things internal or spiritual, are almost all
borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense.‖17 And figurative language is one of
Locke‘s abuses of language: ―all the artificial and figurative application of words
eloquence has invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment.‖18 Edwards often employed figurative
language, especially in his sermons, but he did suggest that figurative language can be
obscuring. Despite this, Edwards found ways, through and beyond Locke, to make
language rational and authentic—even figurative language describing spiritual things.
Edwards scholars have noted his connection to Locke since Perry Miller first
wrote that Edwards made ―holiness‖ a new simple idea, but less attention has been given
to how Locke‘s theory of language influenced Edwards after Miller‘s ―Edwards, Locke,
and the Rhetoric of Sensation‖ (1950).19 Miller‘s essay describes how Edwards used
Locke‘s theory of sensory psychology to move the passions: Edwards determined that
―an idea in the mind is not only a form of perception but is also a determination of love
and hate. […] to apprehend [things] by their ideas is to comprehend them not only
intellectually but passionately.‖20 Miller addresses Edwards‘s reading of Locke‘s theory
of language, describing Edwards‘s ―sensory rhetoric‖ as one that took Locke a step
further by arguing that ideas could be apprehended emotionally, not just intellectually.
Miller‘s claim that Edwards believed ideas were emotional as well as intellectual is
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critically accepted, and it uncovered a fundamental aspect of Edwards‘s philosophy, but
Miller fails to account for Edwards‘s thought on language itself.
Edwards did share much with Locke‘s conception of language, but Edwards also
argued for divinely organized substantial forms and the essential connection of words to
those forms. In other words, Edwards believed that words could signify things or real
essences. Locke argues that because words are dependent on the speaker‘s own ideas, the
speaker‘s words may fail to excite in others the same ideas he intends: ―no one hath the
power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the
same words he does.‖21 Edwards, as sermonizer, however needed to believe that his
words would excite in his listeners the ideas he took them ―to be signs of.‖22 Locke
acknowledges the possibility—and necessity—of exciting in others the ideas the speaker
―makes them stand for,‖ and Edwards made this his sermonic goal. Edwards, though, did
not consider this as difficult a task as did Locke. In Locke‘s view, one of the false
assumptions that leads to an ideal disjunction between speaker and hearer is ―that nature
works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those
species, by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual which we
rank under one general name.‖23 Such names, he goes on, signify only complex ideas and
not real essences; the ―doctrine of substantial forms‖ does not imply that general words
are connected to real essences. Edwards, though, disagrees on precisely this point. In
―The Mind‖ no. 43 he writes
that God has not only distributed things into species by evidently
manifesting, by his making such an agreement in things, that he designed
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such and such particulars to be together in the mind, but by making the
soul of such a nature that those particulars which he thus made to agree are
unavoidably together in the mind, one naturally exciting and including the
others.24
Against his interpretation of Locke, Edwards argues that nature, or rather God, does work
regularly in giving the same essential qualities to things tied together under a general
name. Therefore, there is a ―union‖ in the ideas tied together under genera and species—
―the tying of ideas together in genera and species is not merely the calling of them by the
same name.‖25 Because of this natural union of ideas, and because language is part of the
natural world, Edwards argues that words are connected to real essences. And he adheres
to something like the ―doctrine of substantial forms‖ in his typology and cosmology.
Miller argues that Locke had taught Edwards ―that the words used by persons
‗signified nothing that really existed in nature,‘‖ but Edwards believed the things that
existed in nature were in themselves signs—and signs of real substances.26 The natural
world, Edwards argued, was ―full of images of divine things,‖ and these images were but
shadow of what Edwards called the more substantial spiritual world.27 Although language
often seemed, to Edwards, incapable of grasping the glory of God, he found a solution in
his philosophy of the universe. He believed that the material world inhered with spiritual
truths, and this meant, in turn, that material language was capable of reaching spiritual
truths. Language may be a human construct, but the material world itself is full of images
of the divine. Edwards ultimately concluded that language, too, could reflect the divine.
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Although Edwards believed that words as signs were cloudy when attempting to
represent spiritual things, he always maintained that the words of sermons had agency.
They could, as Pierpont wrote, transform the hearer. Edwards‘s reading of Locke
presented him with a problem, but he resolved it through his view of God‘s
communications through nature. Recent work on Edwards has noted that he saw
communicativeness as one of God‘s most essential qualities.28 ―God is a communicative
Being,‖ he wrote.29 Some scholars take this as a vital starting point for examining
Edwards‘s sermonic career, the rhetorical structure of his works, his typology, his sense
of his pastoral role, and his biblical hermeneutics, among other things, but few examine
what this meant for his theory of language. Janice Knights‘s ―Learning the Language of
God,‖ comes the closest to accounting for Edwards‘s philosophy of language:
―Edwards‘s fundamental conviction of God‘s effulgence underwrote his theory of divine
communications that overflow the human categories of history and ontology. The first
and essential attribute—the impetus in God‘s self-generation and his generation of the
world—is being and its communication.‖30 Although Knight writes that Edwards
believed God‘s communicative nature overflowed into the natural world and in the
―words of the prophets,‖ she adds that he often seemed hesitant about the value of human
communication. Edwards had concluded, Knight says, that the ―greatness of God must
always elude mortal description.‖31 Edwards did at times express this sentiment, and to
an extent, he had to admit that divine glory transcends human understanding, but because
―God‘s effulgence […] overflow[s] the human categories of history and ontology‖ even
language captures something of the divine glory.
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That one can access spiritual reality through the material world is the fundamental
premise of ―Images of Divine Things,‖ a collection of Edwards‘s typological writings.32
Edwards reads the material world—including rivers, the sun, the Olympic games, and
even wheels—as representations of moral and supernatural realities, as shadows of true
substance. His eighty-fourth ―Miscellany‖ from ―Images,‖ for example, reads fire as a
type:
The torrents and floods of liquid fire that sometimes are vomited out from
the lower parts of the earth, the belly of hell, by the mouths of volcanoes,
indicate or shadow forth what is in hell.33
Fire is not mere metaphor for hell; it ―indicate[s] or shadow[s] forth‖ hell. For Edwards,
the natural world and all it contains is a shadow of divine reality, and he means shadow in
a neo-platonic sense. Edwards‘s types are images, ―used in a sort of figurative sense‖ to
express spiritual things, but they are not merely metaphorical. ―The material world, and
all things pertaining to it,‖ he writes in ―Images,‖ ―is by the Creator wholly subordinated
to the spiritual and moral world.‖34 This hierarchy means that spiritual truths inhere in
material things. Against Locke, Edwards argues that words are inherently imbued with
the representation of particular things. The difficulty is reading that connection.
―Images of Divine Things‖ is devoted to reading these inherent truths, and it
contains a systemized hermeneutic for discerning the divine in the natural world. The
manuscript‘s alternative title, ―The Language and Lessons of Nature,‖ suggests a
theorization of language that overshadows Edwards‘s worry that ―words are the enemies
of mankind.‖ He understood the types in the natural world as signs, a system of language,
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by which humanity accesses God‘s communication of his own being: ―The works of God
are but a kind of voice or language of God, to instruct intelligent beings in things
pertaining to himself.‖35 Certainly, this language is not perfect; again, Edwards argued
that only the extraordinary work of the Spirit could excite actual ideas in the mind. But if,
as Edwards argues, the lessons of nature are empirically legible through the natural
senses—if not fully apprehensible as ideas—human language must, too, be able to
capture the spiritual truth that even man-made objects reflect.
In ―Images of Divine Things,‖ Edwards quotes George Turnbull‘s The Principle
of Moral Philosophy to support his own argument that ―external things are intended to be
images of things spiritual, moral and divine.‖36 Turnbull espouses a similar position—
that moral objects are ―clothed with a sensible form or image, and represented to us as it
were in a material shape and hue.‖37 The material world is a manifestation of true
(spiritual) substance. Edwards quotes Turnbull further:
not only are wit and poetry owned to take place only in consequence of
this analogy or resemblance of moral and natural ideas; but even all
language is confessed to be originally taken from sensible objects, or their
properties and effects….Words cannot express any moral objects, but by
exciting pictures of them in our minds. But all words being originally
expressive of sensible qualities, no words can express moral ideas, but so
far as there is such an analogy betwixt the natural and moral world.38
Turnbull reads language itself as a type, reasoning back from language to the nature of
the universe. Edwards does not suggest that language is a type, but it does work like a
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type. In Miscellany no. 782 Edwards writes that the signs we ―substitute in the room of
the actual ideas themselves‖ are ―the ideas of some external sensible thing that some way
belongs to the thing, some sensible image or resemblance, or some sensible part, or some
sensible effect.‖39 The names of things do have some relationship to the material qualities
of the thing, or the material qualities of some analogous thing.
In ―The Mind,‖ Edwards more fully articulates the cosmological foundation for
his typology: the ―corporeal world is to no advantage but to the spiritual,‖ he writes,
arguing that true substance is ―the infinitely exact and precise and perfectly stable idea in
God‘s mind together with his stable will.‖40 In other words, the world exists as ideas in
God‘s mind. However, as Jasper Reid points out in ―Jonathan Edwards on Space and
God,‖ this does not mean that bodies (those excited by God‘s mind) do not exist outside
of the mind. In ―The Mind‖ no. 51 Edwards writes that when he says ―the material
universe exists only in the mind, I mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception
of the mind for its existence.‖41 For Edwards, Reid argues, the world exists in God‘s will,
or in ―God‘s volition to arrange ideas—created ideas, that is—in certain particular
patterns in our minds.‖42 Reid‘s argument for Edwards‘s conception of the divine will
reinforces his interpretation of Edwards as an immaterialist, but it also implicitly
refocuses our attention on the status of the material in Edwards‘s philosophy. The
material world is a shadow of immaterial substance; the immaterial is more substantial
than the material; and the material world is read through sensory experience. In ―The
Mind‖ no. 13, when arguing that the universe exists in God‘s mind, or will, Edwards
writes ―That which truly is the substance of all bodies […] shall gradually be
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communicated to us, and to other minds, according to fixed and exact established
methods and laws.‖43 Because the natural world is God‘s language about and to himself,
and human language is derived from the natural world, there is some connection,
however shadowy, between God‘s essential communicative nature and human language.
God‘s essential quality of communicativeness was never far from Edwards‘s
mind, and ―The Mind‖ and ―Images,‖ taken together, establish a system for reading
God‘s communication of himself in the material world, allowing human minds to
apprehend ideas by natural law and its attending epistemologies as well as spiritual
methods and laws. If the material world gives humans access to the spiritual, then
language—derived from the material world—must be, at least in part, able to
communicate something of the spiritual. Language, then, is saved from clouding the
world in two respects. It works like Edwards‘s typology: words are images of ideas just
as material things are images of spiritual ideas. And words themselves are natural,
connected to the natural world in such a way that they work like simple ideas. So,
Edwards returns to Locke, writing in Religious Affections that ―Ideas of certain marks
upon paper, such as any of the twenty-four letters, in whatever order, or any sounds of the
voice, are as much external ideas, as of any other shapes or sounds whatsoever.‖44 Words,
then, can act as external ideas. If words communicate simple ideas it would make sense
within Edwards‘s philosophical universe that words would be inadequate for
communicating spiritual, or sublime, things to the mind, but the relationship between the
material and immaterial means that those material or sensible qualities that generate
language are shadows—though but shadows—of moral truths. Words become extensions
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of the natural world. By accepting language as part of the natural world (re Locke) and by
understanding the natural world as the shadowy reflection of the divine, Edwards
constructs an epistemology that is connected to and grounded in experience. And by
accepting from Locke the notion that words exist in order to communicate ideas in the
speaker‘s mind, Edwards ameliorates the gap between text and experience.45
In ―Images,‖ Edwards makes a direct comparison between typological images and
the words of language:
I expect by very ridicule and contempt to be called a man of a very fruitful
brain and copious fancy, but they are welcome to it. I am not ashamed to
own that I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and seas,
and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of
images of divine things, as full as language is of words.46
That Edwards opens this claim with an anticipation of ridicule suggests his awareness of
the novelty of his typology, as others have noted, though very little has been made of the
comparison Edwards makes here.47 The analogy Edwards draws between the ―whole
universe‖ and language suggests that language can function like Edwards‘s universe:
words as signs, though human constructs, can represent actual ideas of a spiritual nature.
Edwards‘s concerns about the imperfections and abuses of language appeared most often
when he was combating bad theology or attempting to describe particularly complicated
aspects of his philosophy. Worries about language expressed in such texts have
dominated critical perceptions of Edwards on language, but Edwards did express hope in
the ability of language to capture the divine.48 In ―Images‖ Edwards makes an essential
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comparison between his typology and language: the world is as full of images as
language is of words. For Edwards, the material universe consists in images; it is only
images. Just as words are images. The material universe and language work in just the
same way.
Edwards embraced Locke‘s idea of language as a human construct signifying ideas in
the mind of the speaker, but he then merged it with his own belief that the material world
is a kind of divine language, and he ended with a sense that language is a material
reflection of immaterial truth. Part of Edwards‘s initial concern that words were
incapable of expressing spiritual ideas came from his sense that language and experience
did not always seem to match up, but his typology reveals a world in which experience
occurs through signs; spiritual knowledge can be, at least partially, apprehended in signs
and images, and words are such signs and images. Nothing suggested this to Edwards
more strongly than his study of conversions and religious experiences during the Great
Awakening. Edwards wrote several texts describing the experiences of converts as they
were related to him, and he edited one diary—that of missionary to the Indians, David
Brainerd. These texts influenced Edwards‘s understanding of the relationship between
language and experience, reflected his philosophy of language and the material world,
and informed his composition of sermons. Text and experience, the case histories
demonstrate, need not be separated. Language is capable of capturing spiritual ideas.
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III.

Let the Judicious Reader Observe: The Case Histories
Language, Edwards argued, is material: a human construct, corporeal, and a

shadow of spiritual substance. But as another image of divine things—even man-made
things like clocks were images for Edwards—language had agency to instruct spiritually
and to generate and reflect authentic religious experience. And Edwards waged spiritual
war with material words. He introduces his Some Thoughts Concerning the Present
Revival (1743) with a defense of the text itself as a published expression of his opinions
on the awakening. Although he condemns ministers for supposing ―that they were the
persons to whom it especially belonged to dictate, direct and determine,‖ he
acknowledges the necessity of such expressions in tumultuous times.49 ―Private subjects
offer their sentiments to the public from the press, concerning the management of the war
with Spain,‖ he says, and the Great Awakening suggests New England is ―engaged in a
more important war.‖50 Therefore, it is imperative that ―something should be published,
to bring the affair in general […] under a particular consideration.‖51
Some Thoughts was but one of the texts Edwards penned during and after the
Great Awakening about the revivals, and it contains one of the several spiritual
autobiographies or conversion narratives that have come to be known as his case
histories. In A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God (1737) he describes the
conversion experiences of Abigail Hutchinson and a child, Phebe Bartlet; in Some
Thoughts he shares that of his wife, Sarah Edwards, though he disguises her identity by
omitting any reference to name and gender; and in The Life of David Brainerd (1749)
Edwards edits and annotates the missionary‘s diary. 52 Edwards represents each of these
180

cases as exemplars of Christian experience, a particularly important task for him in light
of the controversies and debates stimulated by the revivals over what constituted true
conversion and piety. Edwards‘s goal in the case histories was to defend the ―raised
affections‖ of the Great Awakening as not necessarily enthusiastic, and thus he describes
the affective responses of Bartlett, Sarah Edwards, and Brainerd, among others, as
examples of ―truly, holy and solid affections.‖53 The case histories demonstrate
Edwards‘s philosophical arguments concerning the agency of material language. Words
affect their hearers: bodies manifest these effects, and the act of writing one‘s experience
is spiritually transformative.
Though the case histories act as evidence for language‘s agency—the converts
describe sermons and the biblical text as transformative, and these accounts are meant to
correct wrong assumptions about the awakening and also transform their readers—they
contain a tension between the material and immaterial. Each convert demonstrates a
renewed focus on his or her spiritual state through a seeming unconcern for material life
and a range of affective responses to spiritual realizations. David Brainerd, for example,
writes again and again of trying to penetrate the immaterial world, and Phebe Bartlett
tells her family that she has found God in heaven, adding that ―heaven was better than
earth.‖54 Though the converts seem to reject the material world, the case histories reveal
that religious experience is also material—or sensory—experience. As the converts
undergo religious experience, their very bodies react. The immaterial subsumes the
material, mirroring Edwards‘s cosmology: the universe exists as ideas excited by God‘s
mind or will. As we have seen, it is this very philosophical perspective that allowed
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Edwards to see the natural world as the language of God; God inscribes himself in the
material world because communicativeness is his most essential attribute. The case
histories are a rational companion to this: when God communicates, the body responds.
God‘s language infuses bodies.
Part of the exemplarity of these cases lies in the converts‘ realization that the
supernatural is more substantial than what they can see, touch, and hear, but also that the
supernatural is fundamentally something that can be seen, felt, and heard—that the
immaterial could be sensibly experienced. Edwards believed the material world was but a
shadow of immaterial substance, but he also believed it was an experimentally
communicative and instructive shadow. During the Great Awakening, bodies were
frequently targeted as sites of legibility—of hypocrisy or piety—but Edwards argues that
those who ―are full of concern about the involuntary motions of the fluids and solids of
men‘s bodies, and from thence full of doubts and suspicious of the cause‖ are ―out of the
place that Christ has set them in.‖55 Edwards reprimands ministers who would seek
concrete evidence of an individual‘s spiritual state in physical appearances and argues
that the body is not a legible sign, but his case histories inevitably read bodies.
The body is not a certain sign, Edwards writes in Religious Affections, but
whatever occurs in the soul or mind will inevitably affect bodies: ―Such seems to be our
nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there never is any case
whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without
some effect on the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of
the animal spirits.‖56 This does not imply that the motions of the body‘s fluids are
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therefore certain signs of spiritual authenticity, because the mind, and not the body, ―is
the proper seat of the affections.‖57 The body‘s motions are only effects and are ―distinct
from the affections.‖58 Edwards allows that bodily motions might be effects of something
other than the lively operations of grace, such as a person‘s voluntary ―exercises‖ or,
more dangerously, Satan‘s wiles. But in Religious Affections, as in the case histories,
Edwards works to undermine the frequent accusations against any and all bodily
exercises as manifestations of deceptive demons or deluded converts. In Some Thoughts,
therefore, Edwards uses Sarah Edwards as an example of how right religious affections
can and will affect the body materially: ―there is such a thing as having the bodily
strength weakened by strong and vigorous exercises of love to‖ God.59 Like fire, wheels,
and words, bodies are images of divine things.
Edwards devotes much of Some Thoughts to the demonstration of this claim
through the accumulation of small case histories, arguing that bodily effects occur
because the spiritual world subsumes the material.60 The material world is not always
perfectly legible, but it manifests God‘s movements; bodily effects can be signs of many
things, but the body manifests whatever occurs in the mind and soul. Edwards‘s
defensive acknowledgement of bodily affect soon becomes a full-fledged reading of
Sarah‘s physical religious experience. In the section of Some Thoughts dedicated to her
case, ―An Example of Evangelical Piety,‖ Edwards focuses heavily on the body, despite
his earlier warning against this kind of faulty epistemological reasoning. He describes
Sarah, though cloaked in anonymity, dwelling ―in that clear and lively view and sense of
the infinite beauty and amiableness of Christ‘s person‖:
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the soul remained in a kind of heavenly Elysium […] without being in any
trance, or being at all deprived of the exercise of the bodily senses […]
being frequently attended with very great effects on the body, nature often
sinking under the weight of divine discoveries, the strength of the body
taken away, so as to deprive of all ability to stand or speak; sometimes the
hands clinched, and the flesh cold, but senses still remaining; animal
nature often in a great emotion and agitation, and the soul very often, of
late, so overcome with great admiration, and a kind of omnipotent joy, as
to cause the person (wholly unavoidably) to leap with all the might.61
The language of bodily experience overtakes the description of Sarah‘s spiritual
perception, and Edwards demonstrates how her religious experience has transformed her
senses: she now has a ―clear and lively view‖ of spiritual things. Her view of the spiritual
world is even more substantial than her bodily senses, though Edwards qualifies that
those are at work as well. A trance in which the bodily senses cease operating would
suggest enthusiasm, and Edwards lists these bodily manifestations as evidence against
enthusiasm. Sarah‘s bodily responses were not, he argues, ―attended […] with the least
appearance of any laughter or lightness of countenance‖—commonly suspected as signs
of enthusiasm—but ―have had abiding effects in the increase of the sweetness, rest and
humility that they have left upon the soul.‖62 Although Edwards argues that he is not
deducing authentic religious experience from these signs, by marshalling them as
evidence for Sarah‘s character and true piety, he seems to. He is, instead, arguing that the
body necessarily manifests the internal, spiritual state.
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The various spiritual experiences and realizations Sarah has, such as an awareness
of God‘s greatness or a sense of mourning for sin, are accompanied by bodily effects. As
Edwards describes the ―increase‖ of Sarah‘s sense of ―divine views and divine love,‖ he
mentions how it affects or overcomes her body no less than fifteen times in the space of a
few paragraphs: ―The strength of the body very often taken away with a deep morning for
sin;‖ a sense of God‘s wisdom that ―swallow[s] up the soul, and overcome[s] the strength
of the body;‖ and a ―compassion […] to saints under darkness, so as to cause the body to
faint‖ occurs in Sarah.63 Although Edwards reads Sarah‘s body, the body is not an
epistemological site in the sense that it can be read as evidence of true piety, but is
instead one more shadow of the supernatural. One more image of God at work.
Edwards reads the body as a sign in the same manner in which he reads the fire as
a shadow of hell. He continues by describing how Sarah‘s experience enables her to see
the natural world as an image of the divine: she had ―a sight of the fullness and glorious
sufficiency of Christ, that has been so affecting as to overcome the body: a constant
immovable trust in God through Christ, with a great sense of his strength […] so that the
everlasting mountains and perpetual hills have appeared as mere shadows to these
things.‖64 This is the new sense at work: Sarah‘s vision recalibrates, and she sees the
mountains as shadows of God‘s strength. In turn, Edwards‘s reads her overcome body as
a shadow of God‘s glory. The material world is subordinated to the spiritual, but Sarah
Edwards does not, as a result, reject the material world: ―High experiences and religious
affections in this person have not been attended with any disposition at all to neglect the
necessary business of a secular calling […] but worldly business has been attended with
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great alacrity, as part of the service of God.‖65 Because the material world is subordinated
to the spiritual, material business is always spiritual business. For Edwards, the revivals
confirm his immaterialism: ―The New Jerusalem […] has begun to come down from
heaven, and perhaps never were more of the prelibations of heaven‘s glory given upon
earth.‖66 Heaven is better than earth, as Phebe Bartlett says.
Heaven may well be better than earth, but Edwards was stuck on earth. Edwards‘s
philosophy of language as man-made, material image was one way of bridging the gap
between heaven and earth. His typology imagined an earth full of legible images of
heaven, and the case histories represent that same paradigm in the language of
experience. They are the chronicles of individuals experiencing God‘s
communicativeness, and they demonstrate one manner in which language reaches toward
heaven: by showing God‘s communicative movement through the body and capturing
that movement in written language. The introduction to Some Thoughts is not simply a
justification for the text that follows; Edwards lays out an argument for the role of texts in
public controversy. Texts, like Pierpont‘s sermons, do things. In and through them, wars
are waged, individuals are transformed, and bodies are moved.
An individual‘s own words, ostensibly unmediated by meddling authorities, have
an even greater ability to effect such transformation. Edwards often represents the case
studies as dictations, suggesting the transparency of language and erasing his own strong
editorial presence. His Life of Brainerd is even more suggestively transparent; it is, after
all, a diary. Edwards instructs the reader that he or she will see in the Life ―not only what
were the external circumstances and remarkable incidents‖ of Brainerd‘s life, but also
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―what passed in his own heart, the wonderful change that he experienced in his mind.‖67
Although Edwards believed all of his case histories would set right wrong opinions or aid
in saints‘ self-reflection, he attached special privilege to the Life. His prefatory remark
that Brainerd wrote the diary for his ―own private use‖ suggests that Brainerd‘s own
language could transparently represent his heart, mind, and affections, and it ostensibly
erases Edwards‘s presence.
Like Some Thoughts and A Faithful Narrative, The Life was meant to act as a
concrete example of true and false religious experiences.68 Brainerd had come through
the fire of the Great Awakening‘s more dangerous enthusiasms and its ―extraordinary
effects‖ into a ―solid piety.‖69 In his preface, Edwards writes that Brainerd was not
subject to affections that were merely ―strong impressions on the imagination,‖ because
he distinguished between those and ―rational and scriptural‖ affections.70 Because of his
experiments in enthusiasm while at Yale, Edwards argued, Brainerd was keenly
discerning. When George Whitefield preached at New Haven, even singling out Yale for
its spiritual deadness, Brainerd found himself moved in enthusiastical fashion. In the
winter of 1741-2 Brainerd was overheard criticizing Yale‘s rector, Thomas Clap, for his
opposition to the Awakening, and lambasting tutor, Chauncey Whittelsey, for having ―no
more grace than a chair.‖71 To his life-long regret, Brainerd was expelled.
The expulsion alone did not instigate his guilt over his indiscreet enthusiasm.
Throughout The Life Brainerd bemoans his sinful inclinations—especially toward
pride—and the trials of maintaining piety in a world so full of physical hardship, social
distractions, ―party spirits‖ (enthusiasm), waning faith, and hardhearted sermon
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audiences. Edwards‘s introductory remarks frame what will be a great theme of
Brainerd‘s life: discernment between good and bad affections. Edwards introduces
Brainerd in a way that seems directly pitched at the anti-revivalists: ―however undesirable
the issue of the awakenings of that day have appeared in many others, there have been
manifestly happy and abiding affects.‖72 Brainerd is an even stronger example than Sarah
Edwards, whose religious experience began ―seven years before‖ the revivals, because he
experienced ―lively actions of true grace‖ during the Great Awakening but later
acknowledges ―that his religious experiences and affections‖ during the revival ―were not
free from a corrupt mixture.‖73 The Life, then, acts as a model of piety in a context of
great confusion and debate over what constituted true piety, but as both Edwards and
Petit note, Brainerd was not a man without fault. Brainerd‘s melancholy, or ―morbid
introversion,‖ distinguishes his case history from that of the others.74
Norman Petit, editor of the Yale edition of The Life, suggests that Edwards goes
to great lengths to dismiss Brainerd‘s melancholy, and Edwards does not make
Brainerd‘s melancholy the focus of exemplarity, writing in his preface that Brainerd‘s
melancholy is not a moral flaw and that it is not in any way tied to religious experience.
Along with his introductory anticipations of Brainerd‘s melancholy, Edwards‘s editing
practices reveal his resistance to Brainerd‘s affliction, as Petit remarks: ―When Brainerd
too vividly describes his thoughts, or shows a self-concern that Edwards deems extreme,
the sentence of paragraph is dropped. […] Because Brainerd frequently sank into deep
despair, Edwards condensed certain passages and changed the wording. When Brainerd
sank too low, the passage was simply left out.‖75 Others have agreed with Petit that
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Brainerd‘s melancholy was an obstacle for Edwards, and because Edwards claimed that
he compiled and edited Brainerd‘s diary as a model of faith, few have offered more
complicated interpretations of the apparent conflicts between The Life and Edwards‘s
own theology and philosophy. Though little has been written on Brainerd‘s melancholy
within the body of Edwardsean scholarship, that which exists argues that Brainerd‘s
melancholic spirit undermined Edwards‘s goals. David L. Weddle, in ―The Melancholy
Saint‖ (1988) argues that ―Brainerd is, at best, an ambiguous example of Edwards‘s
theology of religious experience‖ and his melancholy is ―out of harmony with Edwards‘s
own analysis of religious experience.‖76And even Petit‘s more delicate reading suggests
that Brainerd‘s melancholy was something Edwards hoped would not strike his readers as
―out of harmony.‖ But Brainerd‘s melancholy was not at odds with Edwards‘s purpose in
editing the diary: it enabled Edwards to combat prejudice against the revivals, because
Brainerd suffered from melancholy and yet was not excited by ―enthusiastical
imaginations.‖
Initially, Brainerd‘s melancholy does appear to undermine his exemplarity, but it
ultimately reinforces Edwards‘s broader philosophy of religious experience and his
typology. Brainerd yearns to ―penetrate the immaterial world‖ and bemoans the material
realities of life as distractions from true piety. He describes a moment during prayer: ―I
think my soul scarce ever penetrated so far into the immaterial world in any one prayer
that I ever made, nor were my devotions ever so much refined and free from gross
conceptions and imaginations framed from beholding material objects. […] I have reason
to think that my religion is become more refined and spiritual.‖77 Penetrating the
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immaterial world, Brainerd feels freed from his distracting physical senses, which he
thinks induce dangerous or enthusiastic ideas. While preaching in Greenwhich, New
Jersey, Brainerd learns of a sick man on the verge of death, rides to visit him, and prays
with the mourners when the man dies—all typical activities for a minister. But this event
especially distresses Brainerd. Meditating on the reality of death, which had never
―appeared more real to me,‖ Brainerd envisions himself in death: ―I saw myself in the
condition of a dead corpse, laid out and dressed for a lodging in the silent grave. […] I
never felt such an universal mortification to all created objects. Oh, how great and solemn
it appeared to die! Oh, how it lays the greatest honor in the dust! And oh, how vain and
trifling did the riches, honors, and pleasures of the world appear!‖78 The ―universal
mortification to all created objects‖ that reveals itself to Brainerd in this moment marks
his entire existence. This is in stark contrast to Edwards‘s instance, throughout Some
Thoughts, that Sarah‘s religious experiences never implied a separation from bodily
existence or a rejection of the material business of life. And it seems to undermine
Edwards‘s own sense of the instructive quality of the natural world developed in his
typology.
Yet Brainerd‘s melancholic view of the natural world—his disdain for nature and
his own body—suggest the very connectedness of body and mind that Edwards argues
for in Religious Affections and demonstrates in Some Thoughts. Brainerd writes that his
physical journeys to and from Stockbridge tax his soul, not just his body. And Edwards
observes that Brainerd‘s ―great bodily weakness‖ and ―exceeding painfulness in religion‖
occur simultaneously.79 Brainerd‘s journeys wore heavily on his already weak body, and
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Edwards comments on one such journey that Brainerd ―fear[ed] that the diversions of it
would prove a means of cooling his religious affections, as he had found in other
journeys.‖80 When Brainerd‘s faith wanes, his body fails; when his faith is strong, so is
his body. His body manifests internal spiritual experiences; they are written on the body.
The Life, then, reinforces the philosophy of Edwards‘s typology: the material world is
full of signs of the immaterial world.
The Life documents a world of experience in which internal, spiritual experiences
are written on the body, but Brainerd‘s melancholy serves Edwards an additional
purpose. Edwards argues that Brainerd displays careful discernment that grows deeper
through the regular practice of self-examination in writing. ―Tis a rare thing indeed, that
melancholy people are well sensible of their own disease,‖ Edwards writes, but Brainerd
―gained it gradually,‖ as the diary demonstrates.81 Early on, Brainerd ―had so little
opportunity for reading, observation and experience,‖ Edwards explains, that it is not
surprising that he ―should for a while be dazzled and deceived with the glaring
appearances of that mistaken devotion and zeal‖ (94). But it will be ―easy for the
judicious reader to observe‖ that Brainerd grows ―more and more distinguishing in his
judgment‖ (96). The diary itself was an essential instrument of this discernment, as
Edwards hoped it would be for all its readers. The text of the diary demonstrates
Brainerd‘s growth into discernment. He writes of his youthful enthusiasm and spiritual
struggle that he ―was not yet effectually and experimentally taught that there could be no
way prescribed whereby a natural man could, of his own strength, obtain that which is
supernatural.‖82 Brainerd‘s awareness of his own spiritual and physical weaknesses
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matures as we see him, late in the Life, acknowledging that his lack of fervency in prayer
―was very much owing to my bodily weakness‖ and not spiritual defect.83 The Life
records a connection between religious experience and text: text reflects, authenticates,
and deepens experience.
Edwards‘s Life chronicles the trial and experience of religious life. It models the
religious experience of every reader—the cycle of faith and doubt every individual
striving for piety will encounter—and Brainerd‘s inclination towards melancholy makes
that tension more intense. The entries record his struggle to overcome all obstacles to
piety, and Edwards often breaks in to highlight the tension between faith and
despondence. After a June 8, 1742 entry, for example, Edwards writes that Brainerd, for
the three following days, ―complains of desertion and want of fervency in religion; but
yet his diary shows that every day his heart was engaged in religion, as his great and as it
were only business.‖84 Though Brainerd‘s bodily strength waned and his spiritual doubt
grew, his diary acts as a tool of self-examination and a site of religious experience. On
November 2, 1743, Brainerd writes of his intense pain and loneliness while ministering at
Stockbridge. But, in the act of recording these events in his diary, Brainerd pauses: ―But
blessed be the Lord […] I have a house and many of the comforts of life to support me,‖
and ―some sense of [God‘s] presence.‖85 The reader sees Brainerd working out his faith
through the act of writing—much as Sarah Pierpont does. Edwards fully intended the Life
to act as an example of spiritual life but also as an example of how to experience that life
and interpret that experience. Brainerd was one who was knowledgeable, Edwards tells
the readers, ―especially in things appertaining to inward experimental religion,‖ and
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models right interpretation of religious experience.86 The manuscript of the diary opens
with Brainerd‘s accounts of his early life and conversion, and he begins where Edwards
began, with a claim that the diary records private, internal experiences: ―For my own
private satisfaction, etc (may it likewise be for the glory of God) I make the following
remarks upon the various scenes of my life.‖87 Edwards, for one, believed the diary did
glorify God and act as a material tool of spiritual growth, for Brainerd and for his readers.
Brainerd was an ideal example of true piety for Edwards because he was both an
―eminent person[]‖ and an ‗eminent teacher:‖ Brainerd offers the world ―confirmation of
the truth, efficacy, and amiableness of the religion taught, in the practice of the same
persons that have most clearly and forceably taught it.‖88 Brainerd was an example of
what Edwards calls, in a 1744 ordination sermon for Robert Abercrombie, both a shining
and a burning light: a preacher of doctrine and an example of one who has experienced
and lives God‘s power. These two characteristics made for an effective minister, Edwards
believed, and he strove to emulate this in his own preaching.

IV.

Words Burning and Shining: Edwards’s Sermons
The Life of David Brainerd and other case histories bridged the gap between text

and experience by demonstrating experience that was manifested externally, reflected in
language, and transformative for its readers. But the sermon was the most important text
of religious experience, and Edwards worked, first and foremost, to bridge text and
experience in his preaching. Text, experience, and theology are fused in the linguistic
character of Edwards‘s sermons. He hoped his sermons encoded an epistemology in
193

which both the spoken and printed text retained immediacy to God‘s Spirit. The revival
context in which Edwards worked out his philosophy was fraught with concerns about
hypocrisy, enthusiasm, false prophets, and emotionally-charged lay and itinerant
preaching, and Edwards‘s system for understanding, reading, and communicating
individual religious experience forged a middle ground between the extremes of these
responses. Although he searched for such an ordered system, Edwards concluded—in
accordance with his Puritan predecessors—that external signs were effects, rather than
conditions, of saving grace.89 Hypocrisy, in other words, was not always legible.
This put the sermon in a tricky place: it was composed of man-made words but
ideally composed through the assistance and inspiration of the Spirit, and it should ideally
(working like the biblical text) communicate God‘s revelations without much interruption
and confusion. In addition, Edwards needed to avoid charges that his sermons were
merely inducing enthusiasm while he held to the claim that sermons should generate
affective responses. These tactical challenges were not new to Edwards, but they were
important to the hell-fire preaching in which he engaged at his Newhampton church.
Solomon Stoddard was pastor of the Northampton congregation until 1729, when he died
and passed the position to his grandson, Jonathan Edwards. Stoddard heavily influenced
Edwards‘s sermonic philosophy—most importantly, his emphasis on the experience of
conversion and his use of rhetoric. 90 As Wilson H. Kimnach argues, ―in the hands of
Stoddard,‖ the plain style sermon form ―had become a finely tuned instrument of
psychological manipulation. […] For Stoddard, rhetoric was power.‖91 The hell-fire

194

sermon, most prevalent around the awakenings in the 1710s, for Stoddard, and in the
Great Awakening, for Edwards, was the most obvious and effective of such instruments.
But manipulation was not the way Stoddard would have described his rhetoric; he
desired to transmit an authentic experience to his auditors. Like Pierpont, he understood
the value of both tradition and experience, but elevated the latter. Stoddard‘s sermons
inculcated terror in his congregation, but they did not arouse the fear of hell because they
demonstrated with reasonable proof but because they awakened the soul to new
experiential realities. ―Wit and eloquence,‖ obtained through learning, could not
communicate saving grace or God‘s presence, but an experience of God, Stoddard
argued, would ―set the Consciences of Men on fire.‖92 Stoddard wrote several sermons
intended to awaken both sermon-givers and sermon-hearers to this important argument.
The Presence of Christ with the Ministers (1718), for example, argues that only the
minister with experimental knowledge of God can communicate powerfully through the
medium of the sermon. Tradition is not meaningless, but only experimental knowledge
can make the minister‘s words resonate with the auditor. This privileging of experience
could, of course, lead to dangerous enthusiasms, but Stoddard was no enthusiast, and he
asked his auditors to hear sermons with a cautious ear and to read their own experiences
with careful discernment.
In Stoddard‘s view, the sermon was, aside from the Bible, the main channel for
accessing God‘s communications, and in his 1724 sermon, The Defects of Preachers
Reproved, he demanded that ministers obtain an experimental faith if they were to have
any success in the pulpit, lambasting those ministers who believed learning and
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eloquence would have true or lasting spiritual efficacy. The opening letter to the reader
sounds in many respects like a typical Congregationalist preaching discourse, but the
circumstances surrounding Stoddard‘s composition of the sermon change the tenor. The
sermon about sermons had been a standard genre for a long while when Stoddard
preached The Defects, but previous sermons were usually limited to reprimanding bad
preachers and preparing the auditors for right hearing. Stoddard added to this what he
saw as a more essential focus on the difference between preaching and teaching: good
sermons did not make good preaching. This distinction rests, for Stoddard, on experience:
―some Preachers are men of Learning & Moral men‖ but ―they want Experience.‖93 A
good preacher must be able to ―speak exactly and experimentally to such things as Souls
want to be instructed in‖; experience alone ―fits men to Teach others.‖94 But Stoddard
also speaks about experimental knowledge of faith in general, for the auditors and not
just the orators of sermons. Those who receive their religion from their ―fore-fathers by
Tradition‖ have religion only by ―hear-say,‖ Stoddard writes, and thus have false faith.95
Religion embraced by the understanding only, bypassing the will, is false exactly because
it is not experimental. As an example of true faith, distinguished from religion received
by tradition, Stoddard writes that figurative expressions of faith, such as ―coming to
Christ,‖ ―do imply not only an act of the Understanding, but also an act of the Will.‖96
Stoddard seems to see in these expressions—―opening to [Christ]…flying to Him for
Refuge, building on Him‖—an active agency on the part of the faithful.97 Yet this
attribution of agency is at odds with Stoddard‘s doctrine: individuals receive grace from
God, and nothing in their own strength can earn or achieve it. Stoddard is clear to whom
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agency is granted: ―Justifying faith is wrought in men by the mighty Power of God,‖ he
writes in the following paragraph.98 This apparent contradiction is resolved, though, in
the space of figurative language.
The figurative phrases Stoddard lists do attribute agency to the individual
―feeding‖ on Christ, but what Stoddard emphasizes here is action over understanding.
Faith, he argues, is a ―living principle,‖ and figurative language captures experience over
reason. These figurative expressions are the sole example of true faith Stoddard names in
opposition to some ministers‘ ―wrong account of the nature of justifying faith.‖99 To use
and appreciate these figurative expressions of faith, Stoddard suggests, one must have
experimental knowledge of flying to, building on, or sitting under Christ. Otherwise, they
convey understanding without holiness, reason without experience. Stoddard‘s sermonic
theory emphasized the inefficacy of reasoned argument in securing sanctifying faith, but
this did not imply that rhetoric had no relationship to experimental faith. Defects opposes
reason to revelation in a fairly conventional manner, arguing that faith comes through
revelation and not through reason:
Men cannot believe […] upon probable Arguments: Probable Arguments
must be looked on but as Probable and not Convincing. Men must have
infallible Arguments for loving God and believing His Word; the
foundation of Believing the Divine Authority of the Scripture, is the
manifestation of the Divine Glory in them. There is a Self-evidencing
Light in the Works of God […] so there is a Self-evidencing light in the
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Word of God; there are such things Revealed there as can be made known
by none but God.100
Infallible arguments are necessary for faith, but these come through the ―self-evidencing
light‖ of scriptural revelation. Only God can make himself known, but he does so through
his Word and Works in an empirically accessible manner. This is not the empiricism of
reason, but of revelation, and the self-evident light of the Word is that to which the will
assents. The understanding is a sign of true grace only when accompanied by the
witnessed self-evidence.
Experimental faith, then, was at the root of Stoddard‘s argument in these sermons,
and he had clear faith that sermons could inculcate experience. Stoddard concludes
Defects with a reinstatement of his conviction that the minister‘s calling is ―to set the
Consciences of Men on fire:‖ ―Experience shews that Sermons Read are not so Profitable
as others. It may be Argued, that it is harder to remember Rhetorical Sermons, than meer
Rational Discourses; but it may be Answered, that it is far more Profitable to Preach in
the Demonstration of the Spirit, than with the enticing Words of mans wisdom.‖101 The
wit and eloquence of rhetoric that Stoddard opposes to effective sermons in the earlier
quotation from The Presence of Christ here become tools of the Spirit. Rhetorical
sermons are preferable to persuasive arguments read from the pulpit, because rhetoric can
stir the emotions. But the ―enticing Words of man‘s wisdom‖ are unprofitable compared
to preaching ―in the demonstration of the Spirit,‖ which, in the world of Stoddard‘s
Defects at least, requires rhetoric. Thus, even as Stoddard creates an opposition between
rhetoric and ―wit and eloquence‖ or ―enticing words,‖ he also makes the case that
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rhetoric and preaching in the Spirit are kin. By this seeming inconsistency, Stoddard
means that the Spirit instills in inspired sermons a power in language otherwise absent.
This empowered language communicates experience to the auditor.
Edwards‘s approach to sermonic rhetoric did not deny this empowered language,
but unlike Stoddarean preaching, Edwardsean sermons relied on the power of the
reasoned argument and a natural empirical experience. Edwards learned from Stoddard
the experimental purchase of figurative language, but he carried it further by organizing
his sermons around single metaphors and incorporating their use into his larger
philosophy of religious experience: figurative language offered sensory experience to
sermon audiences. Edwards, like Stoddard, saw rhetoric as a tool of the spirit, and he
relied on figurative language to address the heart. But he combined the strategies learned
from his grandfather with a belief in the value of reason: an effective minister was not
just a burning light; he should also be a shining light and instruct the mind. The Spirit
moving through his words enacted change, but the words themselves were essential.
In his Warnings of Future Punishment (1727), a sermon squarely within the hellfire genre, Edwards argues that the reality of hell has to be realized in the audience
through evidence. People dismiss the fear of hell, the sermon states, because it does not
―seem real to them,‖ and it does not seem real because they do not have a ―sensible idea
or apprehension of it.‖102 The Edwardsean hell-fire sermon presented the sensible
experience of hell, and Edwards‘s philosophy of language meant that the words of the
sermon were capable of provide this experience. The sermon gave the audience a sensible
idea, or experience, of hell, therefore inculcating belief based on evidence, not just
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tradition and example. We find ourselves, then, returning to Sarah Pierpont‘s
categorization of faith into tradition and trial. Both Edwards and Stoddard believed the
sermon‘s role was both experimental and traditional. But Edwards, unlike Stoddard,
combined the reasoned argument with Stoddard‘s hell-fire sensory rhetoric to transmit
experience to his auditors.103
That said, Edwards worried that those who doubted the reality of hell did so
precisely because they relied too much on sensory experience to determine truth: ―they
have been used to concern themselves only about sensible things, and used to depend on
their senses only; and therefore nothing seems real to them but what is sensible. The
business of their life has been about things that they can see and hear and feel and taste.
[…] They have tied down their minds to such objects of their senses.‖104 Yet Edwards
does not attempt to change the epistemological mechanism on which his target audience
relies; instead he says the sermon‘s goal is to ―make future punishment seem real to you:
first, to make you really believe that there is such a thing; and second, that you may have
a more lively sensible apprehension of it.‖105 After making a rational case for the
existence of hell, Edwards describes it in concrete details (fire, scorpions, lack of water),
in order to give his auditors a ―lively sensible apprehension.‖ In this early sermon we can
see the beginnings of Edwards‘s philosophy of sensory experience concerning things
immaterial. He worries that his auditors have ―tied down their minds‖ by relying on
sensible things only, yet he makes the case that hell also reveals itself to the mind as
sensible objects do. This works because hell was a material reality for Edwards; it was
true substance.
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The work of the sermon, then, according to Warnings of Future Punishments, is
that of presenting sensible evidence of spiritual, moral, and divine realities. Reason and
evidence, Edwards argues outside Warnings, are not sufficient for the human mind to
apprehend spiritual ideas, but the natural workings of the mind are still necessary: the
mind can receive speculative, sensible knowledge of spiritual realities.106 The sermon
helps in this regard by transmitting reasonable arguments in language (tradition) and
presenting the fodder for sensory experience (trial).
The paradigm Edwards establishes in Warnings is evident in many of his
sermons. As Wilson H. Kimnach argues in his ―General Introduction‖ to the Yale series
of Edwards‘s sermons, Edwards used imagery as a vehicle for ―immediacy‖ and
―meaning.‖ Kimnach writes that images offered Edwards a solution to what I call the gap
between experience and language: ―Imagery, fused metaphorically to abstract concepts,
would touch the mind of the auditor as surely as an ‗immediate sensation‘ […] A wellchosen image could transform thought into experience and neatly fix the most
paradoxical of concepts.‖107 Kimnach implies that Edwards‘s typology poses this
solution, but he still sees Edwards as full of ―doubts about the adequacy of words.‖
Certainly, Edwards always had doubts: his Newhampton congregation always returned to
their hard hearts, and his expulsion from the church in 1750 once again gave him pause
over his own oratorical skills. But the images Edwards deployed in his sermons were
words, and he believed those words were capable of doing things. Warnings uses images
to make the terrors of hell sensory and therefore real, like the image of ―these roaring
lions dare then lay hold as it were with open mouths‖ to the souls of sinners.108 Or, more
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famously, Edwards employs the image of the spider suspended above a pit in Sinners in
the Hands of an Angry God. These and like images reach the listeners‘ hearts, arouse the
fear of hell, and thus ―lure‖ them into heaven.109 But Edwards also firmly believed that
the minister had a duty to educate his congregation, to instruct them in doctrine as well as
arouse their emotions. The combination of these two purposes makes a minister‘s words
effective.
Edwards‘s 1744 sermon The True Excellency of a Minister of the Gospel offers an
argument about the efficacy of ministry that explains how reason and passion work
together in the sermon to make language productive for salvation. Edwards‘s text is John
5:35: ―He was a burning and shining light,‖ referring to John the Baptist, a ―harbinger of
the gospel day [who] excelled all the other prophets.‖110 Edwards uses John as an
example of how all ministers should be both burning and shining lights. Ministers are,
Edwards writes, like the moon and stars to the sun of Christ, and therefore their burning
and shining lights are ―the communications and reflections of something of his
brightness.‖111 A minister‘s burning light means ―that his heart be filled with much of the
holy ardor of a spirit of true piety,‖ full of ―power and energy.‖ Thus, his preaching must
be earnest and powerful, ―declar[ing] to sinners their misery, and warn[ing] them to fly
from the wrath to come,‖ just as Sinners and Warnings do.112 But the minister must also
shine, or guide and direct: he must ―be pure, clear and full in his doctrine,‖ which for
Edwards means ―his instructions are clear and plain, accommodated to the capacity of his
hearers, and tending to convey light to their understandings.‖113 This dual work of the
sermon—to arouse the passions toward action and to direct the understanding—occurs in
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language. As we have seen, Edwards relies on detailed descriptions and figurative images
to speak to the heart, arousing terror. But those images also work on the understanding
because they provide a kind of sensory experience.
Words, for Edwards, were material signs of divine substance. And as such, they
acted as sensory evidence for spiritual things, always pointing toward and arousing love
for true substance, or God. Diaries, Edwards‘s written accounts of religious experience in
the case histories, and sermons all demonstrate the philosophy of language Edwards
establishes throughout his writings. Material words, written or spoken, act as fire, clocks,
and flowers; they are shadows of the divine.
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Coda
After Edwards: The Bodily Language of George Whitefield
Most studies that trace sermonic or popular religious rhetoric through Edwards‘s
lifetime argue that an important shift occurred during the Great Awakening. Most often,
this shift is defined as a burgeoning American evangelicalism that emphasized experience
over reason or the text. Many scholars see extemporaneous preaching, preaching without
preparation and relying on the immediate inspiration of the Spirit, as the agent and
embodiment of this shift. Sandra Gustafson, for example argues that ―the
extemporaneous ideal required the speaker to inhabit Scripture fully and personally
experience its meaning‖; extemporaneous sermons revealed ―an unmediated access to
truth.‖1 Thomas Kidd‘s recent narrative of the Great Awakening also stresses the
individual‘s experience of salvation. He opens The Great Awakening: The Roots of
Evangelical Christianity in Colonial America with these words: ―To expect revival, one
had to experience despair.‖2
These and related narratives assume that experience was a category not
emphasized as adamantly in orthodox forms of colonial religion before the outbreak of
revivals.3 Even if they locate the beginnings of evangelicalism in the late seventeenthcentury, as Kidd does, they see the extemporaneity of the Great Awakening as inducing
experiential faith in a novel way.4 But throughout this dissertation, I have argued that
experience was always thought to be essential to early American religion. The Great
Awakening did see a shift in the nature of that experience, but evangelicalism was not
more experiential than the Congregationalism before it. Though experience had always
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defined religious faith and had always been essential to the sermon, the character of
sermon delivery did change in the Awakening.5 George Whitefield, the Grand Itinerant of
the Great Awakening, introduced a sermonic style that would characterize American
evangelicalism through the twentieth-century. Here I will briefly treat Whitefield‘s
sermonic theory to suggest one of the ways in which the narrative of the sermon and
religious experience I have traced changes after Edwards.
To set the scene: in The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, The
African, Equiano chances by a church where ―a number of people were even mounted on
ladders, looking in at the windows.‖6 The event he witnesses here is a sermon given by
George Whitefield, the fiery revivalist and famous Great Awakening preacher. Equiano
presses into the church, interested in witnessing for himself the performance of this man
whom he had ―wished to see and hear.‖ The one impression Equiano shares about
Whitefield focuses on his bodily, physical presence and not on his sermon itself: ―I saw
this pious man exhorting the people with the greatest fervour and earnestness, and
sweating as much as I ever did while in slavery at Montserrat beach.‖7 Whitefield
preached to crowds reaching numbers in the thousands. He often preached outdoors, and
he preached itinerantly—in various locations without a home church. These
characteristics distinguished Whitefield from previous preachers, yet the philosophy
underlying these changes is usually characterized as one emphasizing the experiential.
But this characteristic was not new to Whitefield. What was actually occurring in the
very theatrical, bodily, and public space of Whitefield‘s pulpit that changed the nature of
religious experience for the audience? The complicated rhetorical relationships between
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minister, word, and lay listener were negotiated through the audience‘s act of witnessing
and through Whitefield‘s body, not through words and rhetoric as it was for Cotton or
Edwards.
By shifting agency away from the spoken words of the minister to the experience
of hearing, Whitefield demanded a more active participation from his audience. His
Directions How to Hear Sermons (1740) theorizes the purposes of sermons and the role
of preacher, God, and audience within the particular rhetorical situation of the sermon.
Whitefield asks his audience ―not only to prepare your Hearts before you hear, but also to
give diligent heed to the Things that are spoken‖ and to ―lend an attentive Ear to
[Christ‘s‘] Ambassadors.‖8 Nothing Whitefield explicitly asks from his audience is
substantially different than the work of preparation Shepard or Hooker asked of their
congregants. Although Cotton, Shepard, Stoddard, and Edwards all asked their auditors
to hear carefully, Whitefield‘s emphasis is different.
Whitefield‘s voice was thunderous, and it was the voice and not the words
themselves that he thought brought God and auditor together. Whitefield locates agency
within the audience‘s attentiveness and in his own performance. For example, in the
closing words of Directions Whitefield describes two types of hearers and suggests an
agency grounded in the act of hearing:
It does indeed sometimes happen that GOD to magnify his free Grace in
CHRIST JESUS, is found of them that sought him not; a notorious Sinner
is forcibly worked upon by a publick Sermon, and plucked as a Fire-brand
out of the Fire. But this is not GOD‘S ordinary Way of acting. No; for the
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Generality, he only visits those with the Power of his Word, who humbly
wait to know what he would have them to do. And sends unqualified
Hearers not only empty, but hardened, away.9
Agency is located within the listener‘s willingness, and without this openness the Word
has no power to persuade. Whitefield assumes and bodily performs an immediacy that his
Puritan forebears tried to achieve rhetorically.
Whitefield located religious experience in the act of hearing the minister‘s voice,
and he dictated and modeled the kind of experience he argued that hearing would induce.
He accomplished this through the bodily, performative spectacle of his preaching style.10
His power proceeded not just from extemporaneity, because Whitefield‘s sermons were
not always or truly spontaneous. As the Grand Itinerant, Whitefield repeated sermons
over and over. In his Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin addresses Whitefield‘s practice
of revisiting sermons:
By hearing him often I came to distinguish easily between Sermons newly
compos‘d, and those which he had often preach‘d in the Course of his
Travels. His Delivery of the latter was so improv‘d by frequent
Repetitions, that every Accent, every Emphasis, every Modulation of
Voice, was so perfectly turn‘d and well plac‘d, that without being
interested in the Subject, one could not help being pleas‘d with the
Discourse […] This is an Advantage itinerant Preachers have over those
who are stationary: as the latter cannot well improve their Delivery of a
Sermon by so many Rehearsals.11
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Franklin hears not an unmediated access to truth but a performance that improves with
practice. This is hardly surprising given Franklin‘s disposition, but it does reveal
extemporaneous preaching as not truly extemporary.
Despite the repetition of sermons, the physical relationship between Whitefield
and audience theoretically allowed for an authenticity and transparency in the rhetorical
moment. Equiano focuses on the sweat pouring from Whitefield‘s body, not on the words
of the sermon. And many have noted Whitefield‘s borrowings from the theatrical stage.
The bodiliness of Whitefield‘s sermons mediates a new kind of relationship between
speaker and audience; as a result of the theatrical spectacle, the distinction between
speaker and audience collapses. Harry Stout comments on the physicality of Whitefield‘s
preaching, arguing that ―[t]he effect of all of Whitefield‘s innovations was to free his
body for performance, erasing all intermediaries between him and his audience. […]
Oftentimes it was the audience who left emotionally drained and exhausted after a
Whitefield revival.‖12 The audience reacts to Whitefield‘s performance with a
reenactment, an authentically felt imitation that seems to remove all mediators between
God and convert.
Whitefield‘s contemporaries were aware of the singularity of Whitefield‘s
preaching style. Josiah Smith, minister during the Great Awakening and defender of
Whitefield, describes the ―manner of [Whitefield‘s] preaching‖ as physical performance.
Smith laments the inability of his pen to represent the ―action and gesture‖ of the Grand
Itinerant; Whitefield‘s performance cannot be translated onto the printed page. Smith
describes the reaction he witnesses in Whitfield‘s audiences: ―The Awe, the Silence, the
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Attention, which sat upon the Face of so great an Audience, was an Argument, how he
could reign over all their Powers.‖13 The evidence for power of Whitefield‘s preaching,
Smith argues, is not in his listeners‘ conversion, but on their faces. Whitefield‘s ―reign
over all their powers‖ also translated to the fainting, groaning, tears, and other external
manifestations his audiences enacted. They respond to Whitefield‘s affective
performance with their own bodily performance.14
Franklin addresses the differing agency between Whitefield‘s writings and his
spoken addresses: ―His Writing and Printing from time to time gave great Advantage to
his Enemies. Unguarded Expressions and even erroneous Opinions [delivered] in
Preaching might have been afterwards explain‘d, or qualify‘d,‖ and Franklin concludes
that if Whitefield ―had never written any thing he would have left behind him a much
more numerous and important Sect.‖15 Franklin repeatedly expressed amazement at the
sheer power of Whitefield‘s voice to arouse fleeting emotions in the hearer, and he
recognized the indelibility of the written word; Whitefield could never unsay what he
printed. The printed word did not possess the power to disrupt the boundary between
speaker and audience in the same manner as did Whitefield‘s visceral and affective voice.
It was the bodily nature and theatrical power of Whitefield‘s sermons that disrupted the
audience‘s ability to locate agency in the speaker or the Word and to simultaneously
imitate the experience Whitefield modeled in the pulpit.
In Religious Affections Jonathan Edwards establishes a philosophy of bodily
affect: ―Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body,
that there never is any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or
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inclination of the soul, without some effect on the body, in some alteration of the motion
of its fluids, and especially of the animal spirits‖ (98). Whitefield would have agreed, and
this philosophy became the practice of his preaching. His affective performances in the
pulpit and his audiences‘ bodily responses modeled Edwards‘s philosophy. Edwards,
then, is a bridge between Whitefield‘s sermonic performance and earlier rhetorical efforts
to narrow the distance between text and experience. While Edwards practiced a sermonic
rhetoric that borrowed aspects from his Puritan predecessors, he diverged from them in
his philosophy of religious affections. That philosophy, though, did not manifest itself in
his preaching like it did in Whitefield‘s, and Edwards warned his congregants not to
confuse the preacher and the message. In a 1740 sermon series on the parable of the
sower from Mathew 13, Edwards advised his auditors:
examine & try whether or no your Joy has only been that sort of Joy [that
takes] more a delight in the manner of preaching than a Rejoicing in the
thing Preached . was the pleasure you had principally in the Eloquence &
aptness […] fervency & becoming de livery of the speaker more than in
the divine Excellency of the things that were spoken.16
Edwards implies that Whitefield‘s success was due to the fervent manner of his
preaching, not to the sermon‘s message. Yet without Edwards‘s philosophy, Whitefield‘s
performances in the pulpit would have had much less success, and would have received
even more criticism than they did. If the preachers, laypeople, and thinkers traced
throughout this dissertation were always worried that language would be an obstacle to
an immediate experience of God, Whitefield was unconcerned about language as a
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barrier to immediate divine experience. Language essentially disappeared in the body of
the preacher.17
Language falls away as a mediator or vehicle in tension with the experience,
because Whitefield‘s body performs a natural, not linguistic language.18 At some point in
the conversion process language fails, and bodily, emotional response is the only possible
response. Whitefield‘s bodily performance replaces language. This is an obvious shift
away from the kind of physical presence William Perkins suggested in The Art of
Prophesying, where he warned ministers to be grave in their gestures: ―It is fit therefore,
that the trunke or stalke of the bodie being erect and quiet, all the other parts, as the arme,
the hand, the face and eyes have such motions, as may express and (as it were) utter the
godly affections of the heart.‖19 Each small physical movement was calculated to
correspond to the message but never to distract from it. But in Whitefield‘s sermons, the
movement was the message.
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Gustafson, Eloquence is Power, 47, xvii.

2

Thomas Kidd, The Great Awakening, 1.
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Donald Weber, in Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), similarly argues that the shift in sermonic rhetoric during the Great Awakening consists of
emotional experience and affective preaching. Extemporaneous preaching, he argues, borrows from
Ciceronian amplification that was meant to persuade through emotion and ―compelled [the speaker] beyond
the fragment of the written direction, beyond the prescribed text, into the realm of pure, extemporaneous
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hearer; to effect an interchange between idea and emotion‖ (27). See also Nancy Ruttenburg, Democratic
Personality for an implicit corrective to narratives in which the Great Awakening is described as a
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of the 1660s and 1670s, and he sees the beginning of what he calls ―the theology of revival‖ in the late
1660s. Kidd also, and in my mind rightly, identifies ―an emphasis on the outpouring of the Holy Spirit‖ as a
crucial characteristic of American evangelicalism. Yet he still sees Whitefield‘s preaching style as
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44.
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Of course, transformations in sermonic rhetoric were always occurring. We see changes even from the
Puritans through Edwards. Though Edwards relied on the four-part sermon of early Reformation preaching,
his process of notation, preparation, and delivery was his own, and it changed throughout his career. See
Kimnach, ―General Introduction,‖ Sermons and Discourses: 1720-1723 for more on how Edwards‘s
sermonic process changed over the course of his life.
6

Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano,or Gustavus Vassa, The
African, Written by Himself (New York: The Modern Library, 2004), 129.
7

Ibid, 130.

8

George Whitefield, Directions How to Hear Sermons (Boston, 1740), 9.

9

Ibid, 14.

10

For more on Whitefield‘s performative preaching style see Timothy Hall, Contested Boundaries and
Ruttenburg, Democratic Personality.
11

Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography and other Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 111.

12

Harry Stout, The New England Soul, 60.

13

Josiah Smith, The Character, Rreaching, &c. of the Reverend Mr. George Whitefield, Impartially
Represented and Supported (Boston, 1740), 11-12.
14

While Whitefield‘s bodily performance transformed witnesses, he also printed and circulated his sermons
throughout the colonies, believing they could instigate revival and conversion just as powerfully as his oral
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performances. Whitefield seems to have valued not only the aural and visual experience of the sermon in
the fields but also the power of texts peripheral to the Bible to bring enlightenment to the reader. What
seems like a contradiction is resolved by the fact that Whitefield performed through the press just like he
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